Nanny State: Joshua Rosenberg on the UK Palestine Action ban and the politics of criminalising dissent!
Joshua Rosenberg’s attack on Palestine Action, published yesterday in the Law Society Gazette, gets one thing badly wrong from the start: it treats the state’s label as if it were the law itself. If the UK government calls disruptive protest “terrorism,” that does not make it so. The real legal question is whether the conduct fits the statute, whether the response is proportionate, and whether terrorism law is being stretched to protect political power rather than the public.¹
The label is not the law
Rosenberg’s article relies on a simple but powerful move: call the group dangerous, then present the ban as self-justifying. That is not legal analysis. It is a conclusion dressed up as common sense.
The state already has ordinary criminal offences for damage, trespass, obstruction, and conspiracy. What needs justification is the leap from protest-related wrongdoing to terrorism law.²
Gaza is the moral centre
The Gaza context is not background noise. It is the reason many people feel so strongly about these protests.
The International Court of Justice has indicated provisional measures in the genocide case and later reaffirmed them. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant on allegations including starvation as a method of warfare and crimes against humanity.³ UN experts have also warned that arms transfers to Israel that may be used in Gaza are likely to violate international humanitarian law and should stop immediately.⁴
That does not mean UK law currently permits criminal damage as a defence. It does not. But, it does mean the law should be honest about the moral urgency behind the protest instead of flattening it into vandalism.⁵
Rosenberg’s claimTRUTHAHOLICS rebuttalThe ban makes us all safer.That is a policy conclusion, not a legal proof. The state must still justify why terrorism law, rather than ordinary criminal offences, is necessary and proportionate.²Palestine Action’s conduct is basically terroristic.The law distinguishes criminal damage, obstruction, protest, and terrorism. Labels do not substitute for proof.³Their rhetoric shows dangerous intent.Political rhetoric is not the same as legal intent. Protest language can be radical without meeting the statutory threshold for terrorism or proscription.⁴The courts are being too lenient on protestors.The opposite concern is stronger: anti-war and climate protest is increasingly met with severe framing, heavy sentencing, and narrowed lawful-excuse arguments.⁵Protecting the public requires banning them.Public protection is legitimate, but it does not follow that every disruptive protest must be met with terror law. Ordinary criminal law already exists for damage and obstruction.⁶Their tactics make democracy stronger only for extremists.Disruptive direct action has a long democratic pedigree, including abolition, the suffragettes, and anti-apartheid boycott campaigns.⁷Direct action has a democratic pedigree
Rosenberg’s article also misses a basic historical truth: direct action has always played a major role in democratic reform. The abolition of slavery did not happen because people politely waited. The suffragettes did not win votes by being “reasonable” in the narrow, state-approved sense. Trade union and civil-rights movements, too, relied on pressure, disruption, and refusal.⁶
The same is true of the campaign to isolate apartheid South Africa, where boycotts, divestment, and sanctions helped force a political reckoning. That history matters because it shows that disruptive action is not automatically anti-democratic. Sometimes it is the route by which democracy forces power to listen.⁷ The idea that protest is only acceptable when it does not disrupt anything is not a principle of freedom; it is a principle of managed dissent.⁸
The double standard
The broader argument, developed in earlier Truthaholics posts, is that the UK state increasingly punishes anti-war dissent while shielding power-aligned interests.⁹ That concern becomes sharper when compared with the way climate protest and Just Stop Oil are usually charged under ordinary offences like criminal damage or obstruction, while anti-war direct action is pushed toward the language of extremism and terror.¹⁰
That is not consistency. It is selective severity.
HRA 1998 and ECHR rights
The Human Rights Act 1998 brings Convention rights into domestic law, especially Articles 10 and 11 on expression and peaceful assembly.¹¹ Those rights are qualified, so proportionality matters. In protest cases, courts have sometimes had to ask whether conviction is a justified interference with those rights.¹²
But this is where the current doctrine is uneven. After DPP v Ziegler, Article 10 and 11 analysis matters in some protest settings, especially where the offence itself turns on obstruction and the interference is non-violent.¹³ By contrast, the Court of Appeal’s 2024 criminal-damage ruling sharply narrows the room for using beliefs, urgency, or moral importance as a lawful excuse.¹⁴
That creates a real tension. The law recognises that disruptive protest can still fall within Convention protection, but it often refuses to let that protection do any serious work where criminal damage is concerned. A serious legal system should at least admit that this is a narrowing choice, not a neutral inevitability.¹⁵
What should change
A better legal approach would not create a blanket excuse for criminal damage. It would simply stop the state from using terrorism law where ordinary criminal law is enough. It would also force the system to distinguish properly between vandalism, civil disobedience, and genuine terrorism.¹⁶
That is the real issue Rosenberg’s article avoids. It assumes the conclusion it wants to prove: that state suppression equals public safety. But the legal and moral picture is more complicated than that.
Bottom line
If the law is to remain credible, it must be able to distinguish between protest, criminal damage, and terror. Rosenberg’s article blurs those lines. The law should not.
If the law is to retain any credibility, it must stop confusing protest with terror and inconvenience with danger. Palestine Action may be controversial and unlawful, but that is not the same as terrorism. The real scandal is not that people are protesting Gaza too loudly; it is that the state is reaching for the most draconian label available to protect itself from accountability. That is not the rule of law. It is the rule of power.
When a state calls dissent “terrorism” to protect its own complicity, the problem is no longer the protest movement — it is the political system itself.
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