Suite aux nouvelles menaces vindicatives formulées par Donald Trump, l'entreprise canadienne SHERITT (exploitation du nickel) a décidé de quitter Cuba et de rapatrier tous ses salariés.
Le 1er mai 2026, des centaines de milliers de Cubaines et Cubains ont manifesté à La Havane devant l'ambassade états-unienne pour dénoncer le blocus.
Pourtant, face à ce crime contre le peuple cubain, les médias occidentaux restent coupablement silencieux.
Op-Ed: Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears, East Asia Forum
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardise essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #Mining #Nickel #nikel #OpEd #Pertambangan #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #SouthChinaSea #Sulawesi #UnitedStates
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Dans un arrêté du 5 mai, le #préfet de #Gironde autorise la modification du plan d'urbanisme de #Bordeaux Métropole. L'entreprise #EMME, qui souhaite construire une usine de traitement de #nickel et #cobalt en bord de #Garonne https://mastodon.social/@la_voix/116121597967667568 devrait ainsi pouvoir s'implanter en zone inondable, au grand regret des opposants au projet. https://france3-regions.franceinfo.fr/nouvelle-aquitaine/gironde/bordeaux/aucun-respect-de-la-democratie-le-prefet-de-gironde-modifie-le-plan-local-d-urbanisme-pour-l-installation-d-une-usine-en-zone-inondable-3347908.html
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Nickel associations of Indonesia, Philippines sign agreement on nickel cooperation
Answer: "No."
Most #CriticalMinerals are on #IndigenousLands. Will miners respect #TribalSovereignty?
by Taylar Dawn Stagner, March 26, 2025
"#Mining — whether for #FossilFuels or, increasingly, the critical minerals in high demand today — has a long history of perpetuating violence against #IndigenousPeople. Forcibly removing tribal communities to get to natural resources tied to their homelands has been the rule, not the exception, for centuries.
"Today, more than half of the mineral deposits needed for a global energy transition — including #lithium, #cobalt, #copper, and #nickel to make things like #batteries and #SolarPanels — are found near or beneath Indigenous lands.
"In 2007, the United Nations adopted a resolution called the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [#UNDRIP] that included the right to free, prior, and informed consent to the use of their lands, a concept known as #FPIC. This principle protects #IndigenousPeoples from being forcibly relocated, provides suitable avenues for redress of past injustices, and gives tribes and communities the right to consent to — and the right to refuse — #extractive industry projects like #mining.
"There’s a lot at stake: When followed, FPIC promises a process that gives Indigenous peoples a voice in how their homelands are used, as well as the right to say no to development altogether. And when it’s not, which is the vast majority of the time, #TribalCommunities are further #disenfranchised, facing #violence and #ForcedRelocation as their #sovereignty and rights are ignored.
"There are an estimated 5,000 tribal communities around the world, encompassing roughly 476 million people across 90 countries, according to the U.N. Different tribes have different opinions on mining, but rarely is their legal right to refuse extraction projects recognized, even under the 2007 declaration.
"Grist talked with five experts to better understand what free, prior, and informed consent should look like in this new era of mineral extraction. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity."
#CanPol #CanadaPol #BigOilAndGas #LandBack #IndigenousSovereignty #TribalSovereignty #LithiumMining #RecycleLithium #LithiumAlternatives #RecycleCopper
"Critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt and nickel are becoming the “oil of the 21st century” as the scramble for precious metals deepens poverty and creates public health crises in some of the world’s most vulnerable communities, a report by the UN’s water thinktank has found.
The investigation by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH) concluded that the growing demand for lithium, cobalt and nickel used in batteries and microchips is draining water supplies, eroding agriculture and exposing communities to toxic heavy metals.
An estimated 456bn litres of water were used to extract 240,000 tonnes of lithium in 2024, the researchers found, with little of the financial benefit or technological advances from the green energy transition or AI boom reaching the affected communities.
“Critical minerals are quickly becoming the oil of the 21st century,” said Kaveh Madani, director of UNU-INWEH and the 2026 Stockholm water prize laureate.
“What we are selling as a solution to sustainability is actively hurting people somewhere else in the world. How can we then call the transition green or clean?”
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), growth in demand for key energy minerals has been strong in recent years, with lithium demand rising by nearly 30% in 2024. The production of rare earths almost tripled between 2010 and 2023 as demand for electric vehicles (EVs) and powerful computer chips has soared.
The report found that while EVs may reduce emissions by consumers in North America and Europe, the environmental and health costs are borne by communities far away, in the mining regions of Africa and Latin America."
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