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Op-Ed: The Individual Opposition of Mahfud MD by Kompas.com

The Individual Opposition of Mahfud MD

By Budiman Tanuredjo, Senior Journalist for Kompas.com, April 30, 2025

My friend Sukidi Mulyadi sent me a news link headlined, “Mahfud MD Supports Draft Law on Presidential Power to Prevent ‘Abuse of Power.'” Moments later another colleague shared a different article: “Mahfud Says Constitutional Court Has Outlawed Ministers and Deputy Ministers Holding Two Jobs.”

I describe Mahfud as an early emerging example of the “individual opposition,” that is to say, an opposition that is not formed by political parties or parliamentary structures, but rather by virtue of the person’s moral legitimacy, government experience, and public courage in opposing the dominance of those in power.

Indeed there is no political theory to explain the phenomenon of the “individual opposition,” or what to me is a kind of “citizen whistleblower in a democratic crisis” or a “symbol of counter power.”

On the actual topic of the proposed law, the renewed proposal for a law regulating the exercise of presidential power is a reflection of the current anxiety in the nation and of Mahfud himself. The former Chief Justice of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court is deeply troubled by the state of the law in the country.

He argues that a law regulating presidential power is needed to prevent a president emerging who could potentially commit an “abuse of power,” who would use their position for the benefit of their own group. This would include using their influence for the interests of their own group and family during the “lame duck” period between a presidential election and inauguration.

From the presidencies of Sukarno through to Prabowo Subianto, the nation has never had a law regulating presidential power. There has never been any legislation that even minimally distinguished the president’s roles as head of state, head of government, supreme commander of the armed forces, party leader, and head of their family.

Such a distinction would be aimed at preventing the current conflicts of interest running rampant in the country. One of the causes of these conflicts of interest is the trend to appoint public office holders to multiple positions, as with the double roles of ministers who also serve as chief executive officers or directors of state-owned companies. And this despite the country’s Constitutional Court having prohibited the doubling up of the positions held by ministers and deputy ministers as directors of state-owned companies.

Article 23 of State Ministries Law No. 39/2008 prohibits ministers from holding double positions as: other state officials; commissioners or directors of state-owned or private companies; or leaders of organizations funded by the central or provincial budgets.

The question is, is the State Ministries Law being followed? The answer is clearly it is not! Several ministers and deputy ministers hold double positions as the CEOs of companies, including Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund Danantara, or as the directors of government owned companies. There are several deputy ministers who hold positions of directors of state-owned governments and this is just ignored.

So what is the point of having included the prohibition against double jobs in the law? Why does Indonesia’s House of Representatives as the body responsible for exercising oversight say nothing? There has been not a critical sound from the House about these violations. But Mahfud has spoken out saying, “This is an indication of corruption,” in an interview with Rizal Mustari on his YouTube channel.

Some legal products have slipped through the cracks of oversight. One such regulation causing concern and uncertainty among palm oil workers is Presidential Regulation No. 5/2025 On the Regulation of Forest Areas. This regulation established a task force to oversee forest areas with the head of the advisory council as the Minister of Defense and a number of other officials as an Executive Board chaired by the Under Attorney General for Special Crimes.

Article 5 of the regulation provides that: Forest Areas as the recovery of assets in Forest Areas as provided for in Article 3 can be undertaken through criminal, civil, and administrative mechanisms in accord with the legislation in force.

After this regulation was issued photos circulated on social media showing areas that had been seized. However, the question is what happens next? I have spoken with a number of palm oil workers concerned about the ongoing operational sustainability and financial burdens of their palm oil businesses. “This has created uncertainty,” they say. The regulation has been identified as raising several issues, such as regulatory conflicts, the institutional structure of the task force led by the Minister of Defense and the Attorney General Office, and the lack of clarify about when criminal sanctions might be used. Governance seems to be a pressing issue needing attention in this country.

For nearly two months media reports have highlighted complaints from the business community about disruptions from criminals. However, there has been no significant effort to solve the problem. Criminals seem to be acting as proxies for the state. The issue of criminal behavior has only recently emerged as a public concern over the past six months and it appears that it is being tolerated. The business community is having to find ways to secure their operations themselves.

A variety of anomalies or irregularities in society seem to be left unresolved. Violations of the law seem to be normalized because there is no accountability. Mahfud has previously said that corruption has permeated the legal system in this country.

But consider philosophers like Aristotle (384-322 BC) who wrote, “law must govern,” and “lawmakers must also be subject to the law.” Cicero (106-43 BC) noted, “we serve the law so that we may be free.” John Locke (1690) wrote, “where law ends, tyranny begins” and John Adams emphasized, “Government of laws, not of men.”

In this country the law is manipulated, regulations are changed to suit the whims of those in power. In Indonesia, the legal system is clearly in disarray. Judicial verdicts can be bought and sold. Legislation is not crafted for justice but for other interests, including “state reclaiming.” Legal instruments come with a price tag, which explains why the House of Representatives does not want to debate a Seizure of Criminal Asset Law. Rather everyone is opting to remain silent.

In the context of the powerlessness of the political infrastructure, or, the lack of a crisis in the institutional opposition, Mahfud’s role has become crucial. In a multiparty presidential system like Indonesia’s, institutional opposition (the House of Representatives, political parties) and civil society organizations are often powerless, having been co-opted by power or because they are complicit in enjoying the benefits of power. The House and political parties have lost their oversight function as they have become part of the cycle of power (executive aggrandizement).

In a context like this, a vacuum has emerged for non-institutional opposition. Figures like Mahfud—who have legal credibility, a track record of reform, and moral authority—can emerge as solitary actors who can provide a check on power.

He does not represent a party, nor is he a formal opposition leader, however his voice can resonate with the public and shake the foundations of power. According to the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, Mahfud possesses social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. However, he lacks economic and political capital because he does not hold a position of power. Public intellectuals—such as Sukidi Mulyadi, Zainal Arifin Mochtar, Bivitri Susanti, Fathul Wahid, Sulistyowati Irianto, and Yanuar Nugroho, to name but a few—who are still isolated now have to join forces to create a roadmap for repairing the nation and for developing “the opposition of individuals” into a “civil society opposition.” Editor : Sandro Gatra

This post is based on https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/04/30/13522401/oposisi-individual-mahfud-md. Featured image credit: WSJ.

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Stories From Indonesia Jun 6

Op-Ed: Not the Representatives of the Corrupt

Not the Representatives of the Corrupt

By the Kompas Editorial Board

JAKARTA, July 5, 2017. Members of the Indonesian House of Representatives are not the representatives of the corrupt. The supposedly honorable representatives of the people are paid from the people’s money.

The House Committee of Inquiry into Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission plans to go on safari to meet convicted corruption offenders in a number of prisons throughout Indonesia and this has deeply unsettled the sense of justice of citizens — taxpayers. According to the deputy chair of the House inquiry, Representative Risa Mariska, from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, “the committee wants to find information on how they felt about their treatment as witnesses, suspects and convicts of corruption offenses.” Risa is a Representative for the 6th West Java electoral district covering the regencies of Bogor and Bekasi. She received 25,578 votes.

It is very easy to find corruption convicts in prison. They will be overjoyed to tell the inquiry about how the commission behaved when they were questioned, their experience in custody, their belief they were the victims of a conspiracy, their feelings of being entrapped and any amount of other mistreatment.

Being driven by a coalition of parties supporting the government and armed with this data, the inquiry will collect ammunition for dismantling the anti-corruption body. The aim of the House inquiry at the very least can be seen from the statement of House deputy speaker Fahri Hamzah from the Prosperous Justice Party representing West Nusa Tenggara and it is to review government commissions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission. By ‘review,’ he clearly means disbanding the commission, limiting its authority or transforming it into an ad hoc agency.

The real aim of the House inquiry is obvious and it is to undermine the Corruption Eradication Commission. The declaration of some politicians that the inquiry is aimed at strengthening the commission does not have a shred of empirical evidence. From the beginning, some House of Representatives politicians have been uncomfortable with steps taken by the commission to eradicate corruption from the country. There are Representatives on trial as well as party chairs and business people who have been arrested. The commission is certainly not without fault. But the way to fix these mistakes is not to exercise the House’s right to establish inquiries of dubious legitimacy.

Members of the inquiry should realize they are representatives of the people, not representatives of the corrupt. Corrupt behavior by members of the government violates the civil and economic rights of the people. The behavior of constitutional judges who trade in Constitutional Court decisions to enrich themselves is a betrayal of the law. It is the victims of this corrupt behavior that the inquiry should be listening to and not the perpetrators of the corruption.

Unfortunately, President Joko Widodo’s pronouncements have been too weak in defending the commission. President Widodo has said only that he wants to strengthen the commission. However, President Widodo is apparently not able to intervene in the inquiry because it is a constitutional right of the House of Representatives. The fact is the direction taken by the House inquiry can only be seen as intended to delegitimize the Corruption Eradication Commission.

This post is based on “Bukan Perwakilan Koruptor” [Not the Representatives of the Corrupt], Kompas Editorial, July 5, 2017 https://kompas.id/baca/opini/2017/07/05/bukan-perwakilan-koruptor/.

Featured image credit: Paula Bronstein www.paulaphoto.com/. University students protest on top of Indonesia’s capitol building in Jakarta after President Suharto resigned May 21, 1998, “This photographer has spent decades covering war. But she doesn’t focus on the front lines”, Photographs by Paula Bronstein, Story by Tristen Rouse, CNN, September 7, 2024 https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2024/09/world/paula-bronstein-retrospective-cnnphotos/.

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#ConstitutionalCourt #Democracy #DemocraticDecline #FahriHamzah #HakAngket #History #HouseOfRepresentatives #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #Kompas #KPK #Law #OpEd #PartaiPolitik #PDIP #PKS #Politics

David Grayless May 21

On May 21st, 2019: Indonesian President #JokoWidodo confirmed as winning re-election, defeating Prabowo Subianto with 55.5% of the vote.

Stories From Indonesia May 12

Op-Ed: Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears, East Asia Forum

Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardise essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

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