| truthaholicsJury Equity, Contempt Of Court & Lawfare! When Protest Meets the Courtroom; Re Rajiv Menon KC and the Limits of Defence Advocacy!
A contempt referral in a protest trial shows how firmly the courts now police advocacy, jury messaging, and courtroom protest.
Editor’s note: This post is written from both an activist and legal-analytic perspective, but it stays anchored to the judgment and later appellate reporting. The point is not to soften the ruling’s force, but to state it accurately.
Alongside the political headline of prime minister Keir Starmer announcing his resignation yesterday, on 22 June 2026 Mr Justice Johnson found that there is a case to answer for contempt arising from Rajiv Menon KC’s closing speech in the “Filton Six” proceedings and referred the matter onward for consideration of whether formal contempt proceedings should be brought.1 That is a serious step. It means the court considered there was enough to move beyond complaint and into possible contempt action, though not yet a final finding of guilt.2 3
The judgment matters because it does not treat the issue as a technical slip. It records that Mr Menon was held to have informed the jury of “jury equity”, invited them to apply it, repeatedly told them the judge could not direct a conviction, and pushed the jury toward Gaza- and Elbit-related material the judge had already ruled inadmissible.3 4 The court’s analysis is that such conduct may amount to deliberate defiance of express rulings, creating a real risk of impeding the administration of justice.5 6 7
That is the legal import, and it should not be softened. The judgment says the speech may have subverted the jury’s role and forced the judge to give further directions to stabilise the trial process.11 12 In plain terms, the court is warning that advocacy can cross the line from forceful defence into contempt if it knowingly ignores rulings the jury has been told to follow.
For activists, the lesson is blunt. The courtroom is not a protest stage, and a political cause does not give counsel a licence to reintroduce excluded arguments through closing speech.11 12 If a judge bars contextual evidence or limits the route to verdict, the lawful response is to challenge that ruling by proper procedure, preserve objections, and build an appealable record — not to bypass the ruling by appealing directly to conscience.
The judgment also sharpens the warning around “jury equity” tactics. The court had already prohibited counsel from inviting the jury to disregard legal directions, juror oaths, or the court’s route to verdict, and had expressly forbidden informing the jury of the principle described as jury equity.10 That means the old instinct to invoke jury conscience can now trigger contempt risk where the judge has clearly marked the boundary.
None of this removes the court’s obligation to weigh fairness, freedom of expression, and the role of defence counsel. The judgment expressly recognises the pressure on advocates and the chilling effect contempt proceedings can have.28 29 30 But that recognition does not neutralise conduct the court considers deliberate non-compliance. The court’s position is that activist defence must still remain lawful advocacy.
The institutional message is sharper still. The court says it must be able to enforce its directions, particularly where further trials are pending and the same issues may recur.32 That makes this judgment about more than one barrister. It is about how the courts will manage protest trials, how tightly they will police advocacy, and how far they will go to stop criminal proceedings becoming a vehicle for importing excluded political argument into the jury box.8 17
Later reporting on the appeal confirms that the central dispute was also procedural jurisdiction, including who should properly have been asked to act first on any contempt referral.14 21 That does not erase the underlying warning: it means the route to contempt matters as much as the allegation itself.
The key lesson is simple: if you want to fight the law, do it by challenging the law, not by disobeying the judge’s rulings in front of the jury. Once a court has ruled a line off-limits, turning that line into the centrepiece of your closing speech may look, to the court, less like fearless advocacy and more like contempt.
What activists should note
- If a judge excludes contextual material, challenge it procedurally and preserve the point for appeal.
- Do not use closing speeches to smuggle back in arguments the court has ruled off-limits.
- Do not invite the jury to apply “jury equity” or conscience-based nullification where the judge has prohibited it.
- Keep political messaging separate from courtroom advocacy.
- Remember that contempt risk can arise even where the courtroom strategy is framed as fearless or morally urgent.
Transcript extracts and findings
Transcript excerptJuSTICE JOHNSON’s findingLines 3–14; 32–59Invited the jury to put aside judicial directions and consider Middle East context; this contradicted pre-trial rulings that such material was inadmissible.9Lines 118–146Suggested the prosecution had accepted defence evidence on excluded points; the judge found this misleading and incompatible with prior rulings.4Lines 166–172Gave an inaccurate account of the court’s answer to a jury question; the judge found the account incompatible with the ruling actually given.4 15Lines 213–245; 239–240; 244–245; 308–309On six occasions told the jury a judge could not direct a conviction; the judge held repetition of this point was an invitation to disregard the legal route to verdict.4 10Lines 246–280; 281–289Informed the jury of “jury equity” and invited them to apply it; the judge had previously directed counsel not to inform the jury of, or invite them to apply, jury equity.3 10 15Lines 68–108; 148–152Suggested the court was protecting Elbit Systems; the judge found this may have been an improper suggestion of partiality amounting to contempt if proved.4 20Footnotes
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