And the reality is that U.S. policy largely succeeded during that period in achieving the core objectives the United States had defined for itself: keeping Israel secure, keeping the oil flowing, and preventing any internal or external adversary from disrupting the system from which it benefited.
https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2026/05/corrupted-by-absolute-power
The New Energy Realpolitik: Lavrov’s Warning About Trump 2.0’s Quest For Global Dominance
The New Energy Realpolitik: Lavrov’s Warning About Trump 2.0’s Quest For Global Dominance
Russia’s threat perception of the US is growing as a result of stalled peace talks, increasing pressure to enter into even more concessions than were already agreed to during the Anchorage Summit, and the global systemic consequences of the Third Gulf War that the US initiated.
Last month, “Lavrov Soberly Acknowledged The Challenges Posed By Trump 2.0”, and now he’s warning about its plans for global dominance in a recent interview. In his words, “[The US] is prepared to defend [its] wellbeing by whatever it takes – coups, abductions, or even the killings of leaders of the countries that possess natural resources that are of interest to the United States. Our US colleagues do not hide the fact that oil is what they are after in Venezuela and Iran.”
He observed that “They operate in line with their doctrine of dominance in global energy markets”, which alludes to what was written here at the start of the Third Gulf War about how one of its goals is to disrupt China’s import of Iranian oil (13.4% of last year’s total by sea) or control it by proxy. In parallel, Russia is being squeezed out of the European energy market, first in Germany through Nord Stream’s destruction and now Hungary, Slovakia, and even Serbia, to turn the continent into a captive US market.
As such, “We are being forced out of all global energy markets. Eventually, we will be left with our own territory. The Americans will then come to us and tell us they want to be partners. However, if we are prepared to carry out mutually beneficial projects on our territory and provide Americans with whatever may interest them, while taking our own interests into account, they, too, must take our interests into consideration.” This is an allusion to the ongoing talks over a resource-centric strategic partnership.
Lavrov is sceptical that any deal with the US is possible right now, however, after revealing to his interlocutor that “Our US colleagues are telling us: let’s settle the situation in Ukraine – we were ready to do so back during the summit in Alaska, but they are not so sure about it now – suggesting that we make more concessions, and vast economic opportunities will open up to us after that.” This suggests that Trump 2.0 was emboldened since the Anchorage Summit into ramping up pressure on Russia.
A week before his meeting with Putin in Alaska, he hosted the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders at the White House, where they signed a peace deal and jointly announced the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). This megaproject will expand Western – including NATO – influence across Russia’s entire southern periphery in the South Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia. It’s therefore possible that Trump now wants to weaponize TRIPP to coerce more concessions from Russia.
Russia is in a stronger position vis-à-vis the US than before the Third Gulf War, however, since it’s poised to be one of the only oases of security and stability in Afro-Eurasia if the global energy crisis sparks a polycrisis of starvation, unemployment, and unrest there. If the US doesn’t get Ukraine to give Russia what it wants, then Russia might cut off energy exports to the EU before the bloc’s 2027 deadline, which the US can’t replace in full. That would deal a deathblow to one of the US’ largest trade partners.
Regardless of whatever comes from the Russian-US talks and no matter the outcome of the Ukrainian Conflict, Lavrov is assessed that Trump 2.0 is “taking us back to a world where nothing existed – no international law, no Versailles system, no Yalta system – nothing. A world where might makes right.” In such a world, “the weak get beaten. That sums it all up. We must be strong. And Russia is a very strong country.” It’s therefore expected to fare a lot better than most in Trump 2.0’s envisaged world order.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#DonaldTrump #EU #EuropeanUnion #Geopolitics #Iran #IranIsraelWar #MiddleEast #Multipolarity #NATO #Russia #TheGulf #TheWest #USA
Iran has shown Europe its Turkish future
Assessing The Economist’s Argument That Trump Has No Good Options In Iran
Assessing The Economist’s Argument That Trump Has No Good Options In Iran
Of these four, the relatively least bad from the perspective of Trump 2.0’s interests are talking and escalating, the first if its interests are taken at face value and the second if ulterior ones are at play.
The Economist argued over the weekend that “Donald Trump has four bad options for the war in Iran”: talk, leave, continue, or escalate. In the order that they were mentioned, the drawbacks to talking are that the Iranians distrust the US after being attacked twice already during talks, the US might wonder whether any interlocutor still exists that can speak for Iran, the mediator is unclear, and neither side wants to make concessions. Unmentioned, however, is that Russia or India could realistically mediate.
As for leaving, while Trump might be tempted to declare victory and “give the oil-price shock seven months to abate before the midterms in November”, Iran would still retain control of its highly enriched uranium with a “newfound resolve” to build a bomb as well as control over the Strait of Hormuz. Moving along to him continuing the conflict, while more Iranian missiles might be destroyed, more Gulf and Israeli air interceptors would be depleted too. Iran would also continue to control the Strait.
This leaves the escalation scenario of destroying Iran’s energy infrastructure, occupying Gulf islands like Kharg and/or the three Iranian-controlled ones disputed by the UAE, and/or seizing Iran’s highly enriched uranium, but this entails troop losses and the possible destruction of more Gulf infrastructure. Iran might also still resist any deal and instead focus on inflicting maximum harm on its enemies no matter the cost to itself. Objectively speaking, their arguments are convincing, and none of these options are good.
Of these four, the relatively least bad from the perspective of Trump 2.0’s interests are talking and escalating, the first if its interests are taken at face value and the second if ulterior ones are at play. If Trump 2.0 really wants to demilitarize Iran, then it mostly succeeded apart from not fully destroying its missiles. Denuclearization, understood as obtaining Iran’s highly enriched uranium, would then be pursued diplomatically. Regardless of whoever mediates, Russia would likely play a role in the endgame.
In exchange for Russia taking Iran’s highly enriched uranium with its consent, the US would end the conflict (telling Israel that it’s on its own if it doesn’t stop too) and withdraw its forces from the Gulf Kingdoms, with this occurring in sync with Iran reopening the Strait. Russia’s long-proposed Collective Security Concept for the Gulf would then fill the regional security void. If Trump 2.0 has ulterior motives, however, then it might escalate (possibly without boots on the ground) to catalyse a new world order.
Iran’s destruction of Gulf infrastructure would destroy the global economy, likely resulting in years of instability in Afro-Eurasia (Russia being the exception), while the US would insulate itself by retreating to “Fortress America”, where it might even thrive due to the hemisphere’s resources, markets, and labour. There’d predictably be some shocks to the US economy, but everything would be much more manageable for the US than for everyone in the Eastern Hemisphere, especially the US’ Chinese rival.
Of course, it’s also possible that Trump 2.0 has been improvising since the start, whether as part of a “flexible strategy” (including elements of the “Madman Theory” therein) or after epically miscalculating that Iran would capitulate to the US’ demands within days. If that’s the case, then the best solution would be the diplomatic one where the US would settle for less in exchange for not throwing the world into turmoil, which risks the worst blowback ever no matter how insulated the US might think that it is.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#China #DonaldTrump #Iran #IranIsraelWar #MiddleEast #Russia #TheGulf #USA
عیدِ محکوماں، ہجومِ مومنیں
عیدِ محکوماں، ہجومِ مومنیں
#ArabWorld #Eid #Gaza #Geopolitics #Iran #IranIsraelWar #Islam #MuslimUmmah #Muslims #Palestine #TheGulf #فلسطین #مسلمان #پاکستان #ایران #اردو #اسلام #اسرائیل #غزہ
Agenzia Nova: Speciale difesa: Germania, armatori criticano no governo a missione militare per protezione navi nel Golfo
16 mar 13:00 - (Agenzia Nova) - L'associazione degli armatori tedeschi (Vdr) ha espresso "perplessita'" per il rifiuto del governo tedesco... (Geb)
Special defense: Germany, shipbuilders criticize government’s refusal to send military mission to protect ships in the Gulf
Mar 16 13:00 - (Agenzia Nova) - The German Shipowners’ Association (Vdr) has expressed “perplexity” at the German government’s refusal… (Geb)
Agenzia Nova: Giappone-Corea del Sud: Takaichi ringrazia Seul per l'assistenza nell'evacuazione di cittadini dal Golfo
16 mar 05:38 - (Agenzia Nova) - La prima ministra del Giappone, Sanae Takaichi, ha ringraziato il governo della Corea del Sud per aver evacuato... (Git)
Japan-South Korea: Takaichi thanks Seoul for assistance in evacuating citizens from the Gulf
16 Mar 05:38 - (Agenzia Nova) - The Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, thanked the South Korean government for evacuating... (Git)
#Japan #Takaichi #Seoul #theGulf #AgenziaNova #Japanese #SanaeTakaichi #SouthKorean
Sacrificing Seoul For Tel Aviv: The Global Geopolitical Ripple Effects Of The Iran War
Sacrificing Seoul For Tel Aviv: The Global Geopolitical Ripple Effects Of The Iran War
By Uriel Araujo
The redeployment of THAAD defences from South Korea to the Middle East reflects the widening geopolitical shockwaves of the Iran conflict. While Seoul diplomatically seeks to minimize it, the episode highlights US strategic overstretch and shifting alliance dynamics. Across Asia, debates over security dependence and multi-alignment should intensify.
The ongoing war against Iran jointly pursued by Washington and Israel is already producing geopolitical ripple effects far beyond the Middle East. One of the most telling developments arguably emerged this week, with the partial redeployment of US missile defence systems from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East. Reportedly, elements of the THAAD system stationed in South Korea are being transferred to reinforce regional defences amid the escalating conflict in Iran.
The move, possibly accompanied by Patriot batteries, reflects Washington’s urgent need to reinforce missile defences around Israel and US assets in the Gulf, thus alarming sectors of the South Korean political and military elite.
This redeployment in fact also highlights a deeper structural problem: the United States is attempting to manage multiple theatres of confrontation simultaneously while possessing finite defensive resources. And the consequences are now being felt in Northeast Asia: from a “Western” point of view, removing or even partially relocating THAAD from South Korea arguably creates exposure by weakening the peninsula’s upper-tier ballistic missile defence, thereby potentially opening a high-altitude interception gap against North Korean missiles.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has publicly downplayed the issue, stating that deterrence remains credible thanks to layered defences, US troops on the peninsula, and existing alliance mechanisms.
Be as it may, the symbolism and political message is clear enough. Critics in Seoul have already voiced concern that the redeployment signals wavering US commitment to Northeast Asian security while Israel-driven Washington prioritizes Middle Eastern crises. South Korea may officially accept the decision: it cannot block it, anyway, meaning: when strategic priorities collide, secondary allies must adjust.
This development should also be understood within the broader global consequences of the Iran war. I recently wrote about how the conflict is generating worldwide repercussions, from oil market volatility to regional instability across Eurasia. Iran has demonstrated resilience and the risk of a very prolonged conflict is real enough.
The THAAD redeployment illustrates precisely that overstretch. In addition to its neo-Monroeist pivot to the American continent (see Cuba and Venezuela, not to mention the war on drugs in Mexico), Washington now finds itself balancing commitments in the Middle East, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, this takes place while confronting adversaries across all these regions simultaneously (and the line between adversary and “ally” is often blurred, as we have seen with Greenland). The limits of missile defence assets in any case have become visible. Systems deployed in one theatre cannot be instantly replicated elsewhere.
From Seoul’s perspective, the implications are quite serious. The peninsula remains one of the most militarized regions in the world, and any perceived weakening of the missile defence architecture may alter strategic calculations. Even if the gap proves temporary, the political signal still matters.
One may recall that during Trump’s first administration tensions with North Korea briefly eased through direct diplomacy. Whatever one thinks of those negotiations, they demonstrated that engagement could lower immediate risks. By contrast, the Biden years largely abandoned that approach, treating negotiations primarily through the lens of denuclearization demands that Pyongyang of course had little incentive to accept.
As I argued previously, a more realistic approach to the Korean Peninsula (even from an American perspective) would recognize that North Korea’s nuclear capability is a permanent strategic fact and, accordingly, seek mechanisms to manage it rather than try to eliminate it.
In that context, regional dynamics have evolved rapidly. Cooperation between Russia and North Korea, for instance, has expanded within a broader Eurasian strategic landscape.
Meanwhile, Washington’s own Indo-Pacific strategy has already contributed to an accelerating missile race across the region. Deployments and defence initiatives involving Japan, the Philippines, Australia and others have intensified the militarization of the region, thereby raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation.
The redeployment of THAAD demonstrates a hard truth: even this expanding network cannot fully compensate for limited resources.
The irony is that the Korean Peninsula itself has been drawn into Washington’s evolving alliance architecture. Discussions about an “AUKUS-plus” framework including South Korea, along with debates about nuclear-submarine cooperation, illustrate how Seoul has been encouraged to deepen military integration with US-led structures. Yet the current episode suggests that alliance commitments remain quite conditional when global crises emerge elsewhere, especially given the complexity of the US-Israeli special relationship.
No wonder some Asian policymakers increasingly consider multi-alignment strategies. Countries such as Indonesia have already experimented with more flexible diplomacy, maintaining relations across rival blocs rather than relying exclusively on one security patron. For many emerging states navigating the new Cold War environment, such pragmatism appears reasonable.
That being said, the Iran war will likely accelerate that very trend. Washington’s decision to escalate alongside Israel has already produced worldwide economic and strategic repercussions, as mentioned. Energy markets are volatile, shipping routes face disruption, and regional tensions extend from the Persian Gulf to Eurasia. The redeployment of missile defences from South Korea is yet another example of how this conflict reverberates globally. For US allies, it also shows that, when Washington engages in simultaneous confrontations, priorities shift rapidly, to say the least.
Seoul has responded cautiously, emphasizing alliance stability and minimizing public criticism. Diplomatically, that restraint is understandable. Yet strategically the lesson should not be ignored.
If the United States is willing to redeploy critical defences from the Korean Peninsula in order to support a Middle Eastern war, Asian governments may conclude that diversification of partnerships is prudent or necessary. Reliance on a single security provider, especially one as unpredictable as Washington, becomes rather risky in an era of global instability.
To sum it up, the THAAD episode is a geopolitical signal in itself. It tells the world how overburdened Washington has become, how quickly alliance priorities can shift, and how urgently Asian states must rethink their strategic autonomy.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#Asia #Eurasia #Geopolitics #Iran #IranIsraelWar #MiddleEast #SouthKorea #TheGulf #USA
Agenzia Nova: Iran: Arabia Saudita accoglie con favore risoluzione Onu di condanna ad attacchi nel Golfo (2)
12 mar 08:37 - (Agenzia Nova) - Ieri il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha adottato una risoluzione che chiede all'Iran di cessare... (Res)
Iran: Saudi Arabia welcomes favorably UN resolution condemning attacks in the Gulf
March 12 08:37 - (Agenzia Nova) - Yesterday the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Iran to cease... (Res)
Agenzia Nova: Giappone: industria petrolchimica taglia la produzione in risposta alla crisi nel Golfo
10 mar 06:14 - (Agenzia Nova) - Alcune aziende chimiche giapponesi si sono gia' viste costrette a ridurre la produzione a causa della crisi... (Git)
Japan: petrochemical industry cuts production in response to crisis in the Gulf
10 Mar 06:14 - (Agenzia Nova) - Some Japanese chemical companies have already been seen forced to reduce production due to the crisis...
Fionnbharr
Voice of East
Israel News | Israel Hayom - www.israelhayom.com [Unofficial]
Italian News by RSS