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New India-France Defence Deal: De-NATOizing The Indo-Pacific?

The India–France military pact marks a subtle but decisive break with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. As New Delhi seeks technology rather than loyalty, the Quad’s relevance fades and its “Asian NATO’s” ambitions diminish. Multi-alignment, not rigid bloc logic, is gaining ground.

The new India–France defence pact marks a quiet shift in the Indo-Pacific. Framed as joint research and development (R&D), aimed at co-producing cutting-edge munitions and tech, it actually reflects India’s move away from empty US promises toward real French technology, thereby diluting the Quad’s “Asian NATO” logic and echoing Paris’ parallel resistance to NATO’s Indo-Pacific push. While Trump’s Washington welcomes the burden-sharing, the deal also accelerates a turn toward flexible partnerships and away from bloc discipline — a quiet de-NATOization of the Quad, so to speak.

The timing, in fact, could not be more pointed. Expert Usman Haider laid it out in The Diplomat thusly: the Indian-French pact stems directly from the India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative’s (DTTI) long stagnation — or its “failure” as Javin Aryan, a former Research Assistant with ORFs Strategic Studies Programme, puts it). The DTTI was announced with big expectations, but it delivered little beyond discussions, with no meaningful technology sharing.

Then came the May 2025 India-Pakistan border clash, and strained ties with Washington made US support look uncertain. Paris seized the moment, still smarting from the AUKUS snub (that cost it a submarine deal with Australia), and offered New Delhi real cooperation. The result is mutual gain: India funds joint R&D to get advanced tech, while France expands arms sales and influence.

Recently, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and France’s Safran launched a joint venture to make HAMMER precision bombs in India, with full tech transfer and IP rights. Production is already ramping up, with a new Safran plant planned. The deal, described by some analysts as a headache for Pakistan and China, boosts Indian self-reliance and bypasses the export controls that troubled US agreements.

For Trump’s team, eyeing fiscal restraint amid domestic priorities, all of this offloads Research and Development burdens. It’s classic burden-sharing: “Europe” takes on more responsibility in a region where US carriers already patrol exhaustively.

Yet this calculus misses the bigger picture: the deal shifts power, not just costs. India is not joining a US-led bloc; it is creating an exit option. Be as it may, Washington still frames the Indo-Pacific as a containment theatre against China, with the Quad as its cornerstone. New Delhi resists that role, as shown in 2022 with India’s balancing act.

Back then, French Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu visited India to draw it closer as the Quad hardened its anti-Eurasian tone. Under Trump, those tensions only sharpen: “America First” distrust of alliances now collides with hawkish calls inside Washington to militarize the Quad. The India–France pact cuts through that contradiction, giving New Delhi European options for bilateral engagement without Quad obligations.

This ties directly to France’s Indo-Pacific playbook, which I’ve argued is increasingly at odds with NATO’s eastward push. Paris’s ambitions — anchored in colonial remnants like New Caledonia — often clash with Western bloc goals. France increasingly casts itself as a “balancing power” through ventures like the 2050 Initiative with Indonesia and joint naval patrols with the UK and Italy.

Yet the 2024 Kanak uprising exposed its neocolonial underside: it was a deadly unrest, largely ignored by Western media, met with emergency crackdowns rather than concessions. At the time, RSIS scholar Paco Milhiet urged Paris to reframe its strategy by addressing indigenous grievances, lest it alienates Pacific partners sensitive to post-colonial echoes.

In any case, France’s pact with India isn’t pure power projection — it’s strategic hedging, favouring economic leverage over NATO’s “mini-Quad” logic. The Quad feels the effect: still pitched by Washington as an anti-China front, it’s resisted formalizing into anything alliance-like, largely thanks to India’s vetoes. Macron’s 2024 quip, blocking a NATO office in Japan rings truer now: “Geography is stubborn; the Indo-Pacific isn’t the North Atlantic.” So much for US hopes for a militarized bloc.

France’s own divergences with NATO go deeper. For one thing, its July 2025 recognition of Palestine — the first by a G7 state — openly defied Washington. Paris also barred Israeli firms from defence expos and challenged aid blockades, echoing Turkey’s own NATO dissent. In both the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, France now arguably favours independence over NATO discipline.

India follows a similar path: Jaishankar resists NATO expansion, the EU competes with Russia and China for influence, while Modi’s Beijing visit showed careful distancing from Washington, notwithstanding Chinese-Indian tensions. As Philippe Le Corre (Asia Society scholar) puts it, EU-India relations now interplay with China dynamics, forming a “new triangle” of balanced options.

In this context, the new Indian-French pact signals Indo-Pacific multipolarity, in a way. Trump shifts burden, but US influence thins. The Quad remains, but its “Asian NATO” ambitions are diminished.

I recently argued that the Quad is losing relevance under Trump’s “America First” turn, as Washington prioritizes the Western Hemisphere and pushes allies to shoulder more of the burden against Beijing. Instead of building an “Asian NATO,” the US is outsourcing containment through AUKUS and similar deals, while partners increasingly hedge via bilateral and regional platforms. The result is a more multipolar Indo-Pacific with looser coalitions replacing the US-centric Quad framework.

This is the context of the latest Indian-French deal. The Indo-Pacific now hosts a crowded archipelago of choices, even amidst the New Cold War.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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