The Hormuz Pincer: Why Trump’s Naval Coalition Is A Strategic Trap For China
The Hormuz Pincer: Why Trump’s Naval Coalition Is A Strategic Trap For China
Trump wants to throw Xi into a dilemma before his upcoming trip, which he threatened to delay if China doesn’t join the US’ coalition, but it’s still possible that Xi flips the tables on Trump somehow.
Trump called on China and several other countries over the weekend to join his proposed naval coalition for securing freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz amidst the ongoing Third Gulf War. He then told the Financial Times the day after that “I think China should help too because China gets 90 per cent of its oil from the Straits [sic]…We’d like to know before [my trip to China at month’s end]. It’s [two weeks is] a long time. We may delay.” This enormously raises the stakes of his demand.
If China doesn’t comply and Trump’s trip is delayed, then the fragile Sino-US trade truce might not last, which could worsen the global economic uncertainty caused by the oil crisis. On the other hand, compliance would lend legitimacy to his proposed naval coalition and likely be seen by Iran as unfriendly. Iran already clarified that the strait is only closed to unfriendly countries, which presently doesn’t include China, and a proposal was also reportedly floated for China to begin paying for Iranian oil with yuan.
About that, 13.4% of the oil that China imported by sea last year came from Iran, while the Gulf Kingdoms (excluding Oman whose exports are from the Arabian Sea) and Iraq contributed around 35% of its imports for a total of approximately 48.4% — or almost half – of its annual oil imports by sea transiting through the strait. To be sure, China also has strategic oil reserves estimated at 1.3 billion barrels, or enough for 3-4 months, and it’s making rapid progress on implementing its green energy agenda too.
Even so, this data proves that China is economically dependent on the resumption of regular oil imports through the strait, which this analysis here argues could be weaponized by the US via control of Iran’s resources and pressure on the Gulf Kingdoms to coerce China into a lopsided trade deal. The goal is to derail its superpower trajectory and then institutionalize its junior relationship to the US. Perpetuating the Third Gulf War and seizing Iranian vessels sending oil to China could advance this agenda as well.
If China subordinates itself to the US by lending legitimacy to his proposed Hormuz naval coalition and pledging to sign a lopsided trade deal during his visit, then Trump could de-escalate the conflict and thus restore the reliability of China’s regional oil imports. If Xi proudly defies his demand, however, then Trump could perpetuate the conflict (thus prolonging the Gulf Kingdoms’ drastically reduced oil exports to China), seize Iranian vessels sending oil to China, delay his trip, and then intensify their trade war.
The US is still China’s largest single trade partner despite China’s trade diversification since Trump 1.0’s trade war, and the US still wields huge economic and financial influence over many of China’s other trade partners, so a new Sino-US trade war coupled with drastically reduced oil imports could hit China hard. Moreover, in this scenario, Trump might reach a deal with Putin first that could further worsen China’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the US and then lead to more lopsided trade terms being demanded of it.
Trump’s demand for China to join his naval coalition is therefore meant to throw Xi into a dilemma. Xi is being pushed to either subordinate China to the US by lending credence to this coalition in exchange for US-controlled energy security ahead of formalizing their junior partnership during Trump’s trip by agreeing to a lopsided trade deal or fight another trade war with the US but in a worse position than before. The Chinese are brilliant strategists, however, so maybe they’ll devise a way out of this dilemma.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#China #Geopolitics #Iran #IranIsraelWar #Israel #StraitOfHormuz #USA
Implications Of Israel’s Attack On Iran – Sheikh Imran N. Hosein
Implications Of Israel’s Attack On Iran – Sheikh Imran N. Hosein
In his latest video, Sheikh Imran N. Hosein offers a perspective that blends current military events with Islamic eschatology. He says that Israel’s recent actions against Iran signify a permanent shift in the global world order.
The main points that he discussed:
1. The Strategy of “Public” Warfare
Sheikh Imran Hosein notes a significant departure from Israel’s typical “policy of ambiguity.” Unlike past strikes, Israel announced its intent to attack Iran in advance. He interprets this transparency not as a tactical error, but as a deliberate display of dominance. Despite the warning, the “spectacular success” of the strikes, killing high-ranking generals and nuclear scientists, reveals a mastery of espionage. He links this to the concept of Al-Jassasah (the spy/beast) mentioned in the Hadith of Tamim al-Dari, suggesting that Israel’s intelligence capabilities are a primary tool of the Dajjal (the False Messiah).
2. The Three-Part “Shadow” of Global Power
The core of Sheikh’s thesis relies on his interpretation of a “shadow in three parts” (from Surah al-Mursalat). He posits that the world has transitioned through three stages of global hegemony designed to pave the way for the Dajjal:
He argues that we have now entered the third stage. By openly defying the UN Security Council, international law, and the “rules” followed by all other nations, Israel is signalling to the world that it has replaced the US as the supreme global authority.
3. The “Flying Donkey” and Modern Technology
Sheikh Imran Hosein criticizes traditional Islamic scholars for a “box-like” methodology that refuses to interpret prophecy through modern lenses. He argues that the “Flying Donkey” described in prophetic literature, traveling as fast as clouds with ears stretched wide, is not a literal animal, but a clear description of modern aircraft and hypersonic missiles. He asserts that those waiting for a literal donkey are missing the reality of the Dajjal’s technological reign.
4. The Moral Integrity of Iran
The Sheikh distinguishes Iran from other Muslim-majority nations (specifically criticizing Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), praising Iran for its “phenomenal integrity” in refusing to submit to Israeli pressure. He views Iran’s resistance as a spiritual necessity, even as he acknowledges its vulnerability to Israeli intelligence and air superiority.
5. A Call for Nuclear Deterrence
Perhaps the most important point is his advice to the Iranian leadership regarding their nuclear policy. While he respects the moral substance of the existing fatwa against nuclear weapons, he cites Surah al-Anfal (8:60):
“And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy…”
He argues that nuclear weapons are the only modern “power” that functions as a deterrent. He urges Iran to:
Sheikh Imran Hosein concludes that the “Great War” (Malhama) is the inevitable transition point that will finally make Pax Judaica clear to all political scientists and laymen alike.
[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LamK-3SKTsA?version=3&rel=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&fs=1&hl=en-gb&autohide=2&wmode=transparent&w=700&h=394]#Antichrist #Dajjal #EndOfTimes #Eschatology #Geopolitics #Iran #IranIsraelWar #Islam #Israel #MuslimUmmah #Muslims #Russia #SheikhImranNHosein #USA #video
Sacrificing Seoul For Tel Aviv: The Global Geopolitical Ripple Effects Of The Iran War
Sacrificing Seoul For Tel Aviv: The Global Geopolitical Ripple Effects Of The Iran War
By Uriel Araujo
The redeployment of THAAD defences from South Korea to the Middle East reflects the widening geopolitical shockwaves of the Iran conflict. While Seoul diplomatically seeks to minimize it, the episode highlights US strategic overstretch and shifting alliance dynamics. Across Asia, debates over security dependence and multi-alignment should intensify.
The ongoing war against Iran jointly pursued by Washington and Israel is already producing geopolitical ripple effects far beyond the Middle East. One of the most telling developments arguably emerged this week, with the partial redeployment of US missile defence systems from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East. Reportedly, elements of the THAAD system stationed in South Korea are being transferred to reinforce regional defences amid the escalating conflict in Iran.
The move, possibly accompanied by Patriot batteries, reflects Washington’s urgent need to reinforce missile defences around Israel and US assets in the Gulf, thus alarming sectors of the South Korean political and military elite.
This redeployment in fact also highlights a deeper structural problem: the United States is attempting to manage multiple theatres of confrontation simultaneously while possessing finite defensive resources. And the consequences are now being felt in Northeast Asia: from a “Western” point of view, removing or even partially relocating THAAD from South Korea arguably creates exposure by weakening the peninsula’s upper-tier ballistic missile defence, thereby potentially opening a high-altitude interception gap against North Korean missiles.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has publicly downplayed the issue, stating that deterrence remains credible thanks to layered defences, US troops on the peninsula, and existing alliance mechanisms.
Be as it may, the symbolism and political message is clear enough. Critics in Seoul have already voiced concern that the redeployment signals wavering US commitment to Northeast Asian security while Israel-driven Washington prioritizes Middle Eastern crises. South Korea may officially accept the decision: it cannot block it, anyway, meaning: when strategic priorities collide, secondary allies must adjust.
This development should also be understood within the broader global consequences of the Iran war. I recently wrote about how the conflict is generating worldwide repercussions, from oil market volatility to regional instability across Eurasia. Iran has demonstrated resilience and the risk of a very prolonged conflict is real enough.
The THAAD redeployment illustrates precisely that overstretch. In addition to its neo-Monroeist pivot to the American continent (see Cuba and Venezuela, not to mention the war on drugs in Mexico), Washington now finds itself balancing commitments in the Middle East, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, this takes place while confronting adversaries across all these regions simultaneously (and the line between adversary and “ally” is often blurred, as we have seen with Greenland). The limits of missile defence assets in any case have become visible. Systems deployed in one theatre cannot be instantly replicated elsewhere.
From Seoul’s perspective, the implications are quite serious. The peninsula remains one of the most militarized regions in the world, and any perceived weakening of the missile defence architecture may alter strategic calculations. Even if the gap proves temporary, the political signal still matters.
One may recall that during Trump’s first administration tensions with North Korea briefly eased through direct diplomacy. Whatever one thinks of those negotiations, they demonstrated that engagement could lower immediate risks. By contrast, the Biden years largely abandoned that approach, treating negotiations primarily through the lens of denuclearization demands that Pyongyang of course had little incentive to accept.
As I argued previously, a more realistic approach to the Korean Peninsula (even from an American perspective) would recognize that North Korea’s nuclear capability is a permanent strategic fact and, accordingly, seek mechanisms to manage it rather than try to eliminate it.
In that context, regional dynamics have evolved rapidly. Cooperation between Russia and North Korea, for instance, has expanded within a broader Eurasian strategic landscape.
Meanwhile, Washington’s own Indo-Pacific strategy has already contributed to an accelerating missile race across the region. Deployments and defence initiatives involving Japan, the Philippines, Australia and others have intensified the militarization of the region, thereby raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation.
The redeployment of THAAD demonstrates a hard truth: even this expanding network cannot fully compensate for limited resources.
The irony is that the Korean Peninsula itself has been drawn into Washington’s evolving alliance architecture. Discussions about an “AUKUS-plus” framework including South Korea, along with debates about nuclear-submarine cooperation, illustrate how Seoul has been encouraged to deepen military integration with US-led structures. Yet the current episode suggests that alliance commitments remain quite conditional when global crises emerge elsewhere, especially given the complexity of the US-Israeli special relationship.
No wonder some Asian policymakers increasingly consider multi-alignment strategies. Countries such as Indonesia have already experimented with more flexible diplomacy, maintaining relations across rival blocs rather than relying exclusively on one security patron. For many emerging states navigating the new Cold War environment, such pragmatism appears reasonable.
That being said, the Iran war will likely accelerate that very trend. Washington’s decision to escalate alongside Israel has already produced worldwide economic and strategic repercussions, as mentioned. Energy markets are volatile, shipping routes face disruption, and regional tensions extend from the Persian Gulf to Eurasia. The redeployment of missile defences from South Korea is yet another example of how this conflict reverberates globally. For US allies, it also shows that, when Washington engages in simultaneous confrontations, priorities shift rapidly, to say the least.
Seoul has responded cautiously, emphasizing alliance stability and minimizing public criticism. Diplomatically, that restraint is understandable. Yet strategically the lesson should not be ignored.
If the United States is willing to redeploy critical defences from the Korean Peninsula in order to support a Middle Eastern war, Asian governments may conclude that diversification of partnerships is prudent or necessary. Reliance on a single security provider, especially one as unpredictable as Washington, becomes rather risky in an era of global instability.
To sum it up, the THAAD episode is a geopolitical signal in itself. It tells the world how overburdened Washington has become, how quickly alliance priorities can shift, and how urgently Asian states must rethink their strategic autonomy.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#Asia #Eurasia #Geopolitics #Iran #IranIsraelWar #MiddleEast #SouthKorea #TheGulf #USA
Russia’s Collective Security Vision For The Gulf Is Now A Realistic Possibility
Russia’s Collective Security Vision For The Gulf Is Now A Realistic Possibility
The Third Gulf War is radically reshaping the Gulf Kingdoms’ perceptions of American reliability and leading them to consider the need to negotiate a post-war regional security arrangement with Iran.
Reuters reported that “Behind the scenes, resentment is mounting in Gulf Arab capitals at being drawn into a war they neither initiated nor endorsed but are now paying for economically and militarily”. They added that “At the same time, analysts say the war has left Gulf states reassessing both their security dependence on Washington and the prospect of eventually engaging Tehran on new regional security arrangements — even as trust in Iran has collapsed.” That would be the best outcome for everyone.
It was assessed here at the start of the Third Gulf War after Putin’s calls with regional leaders that one of the goals that his envisaged mediation aims to achieve is for the Gulf Kingdoms to rescind the permission that they gave the US to use their territories and airspaces for attacking Iran. That would force the US into the dilemma of defying them at the risk of rupturing their relations or acceding to this new regional military reality and then pursuing what would likely be a (Russian–mediated?) compromise with Iran.
As surreal as it may seem, Lindsey Graham of all people arrived at a very similar conclusion last week. He wrote on X, “why should America do a defence agreement with a country like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that is unwilling to join a fight of mutual interest?… Hopefully Gulf Cooperation Council countries will get more involved as this fight is in their backyard. If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it? Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”
The US military’s departure from the Gulf would solve three problems at once: Iran would no longer be threatened by these forces; the Gulf Kingdoms would be safer since Iran wouldn’t attack them anymore for hosting them; and the US wouldn’t have to defend partners that have proven themselves to be freeloaders. Far from the security vacuum that critics imagine would follow, the Gulf Kingdoms and Iran could begin work on a three-phased regional security plan mediated by their shared Russian partner.
The end goal is for the Gulf Kingdoms and Iran to agree to Russia’s long-proposed Collective Security Concept for the region that readers can learn more about in detail here. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also recently referenced it when articulating Russia’s official position towards the Third Gulf War and its hopes for the direction in which the region will go afterwards no matter how unlikely it might now seem to some. Two preliminary steps are required, however, which will now briefly be touched upon.
The first is what can be described as a Gulf Non-Aggression Pact (GNAP), the specifics of which remain to be negotiated but would reasonably include limits on where certain military assets can be deployed, codes of conduct, and crisis communication channels, et al. Once this is agreed to, and it admittedly won’t be an easy task, then Iran could join the Saudi-Pakistani alliance like it’s reportedly considered doing since late last year. This can then form the core of Russia’s envisaged collective security bloc.
To review, the military-political sequence that Russia hopes to mediate in the Gulf is a cessation of hostilities through a series of reasonable mutual compromises, the departure of the US military from the region, GNAP, Iran joining the Saudi-Pak alliance, and then a collective security bloc forming afterwards. Up until the Third Gulf War began, most would have dismissed this strategic vision as a political fantasy, but Reuters’ recent report suggests that this is now a realistic possibility for the region’s post-war future.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#ArabWorld #Geopolitics #GulfCooperationCouncil #Iran #IranIsraelWar #MuslimUmmah #Pakistan #Russia #SaudiArabia #USA
Mathrubhumi English
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Mustafa Sarigul