DragonForce Ransomware Cartel are claiming credit for attacks on Marks and Spencer, Co-op and Harrods and say more victim orgs are coming https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-02/-dragonforce-hacking-gang-takes-credit-for-uk-retail-attacks

#threatintel #ransomware

I'm going to make this the new ongoing megathread for DragonForce Ransomware Cartel's attack on UK retailers as they're all connected.

Why it matters: these are some of the UK's largest retailers, think Target or some such in a US sense.

Prior threads

M&S: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114381946765071799

Co-op: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114426688834113446

Harrods:
https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114433519351165250

Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog@cyberplace.social)

Marks and Spencer dealing with.. ransomware? https://infosec.exchange/@d4rkshell/114381922723370326

Cyberplace

The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner are using social engineering for entry.

Defenders should urgently make sure they have read the CISA briefs on Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ as it's a repeat of the 2022-2023 activity.

Links: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/CSRB_Lapsus%24_508c.pdf

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/aa23-320a_scattered_spider_0.pdf

I would also suggest these NCSC guides on incident management: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/incident-management

and effective cyber crisis comms: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/effective-communications-in-a-cyber-incident

Co-op Group have now admitted a significant amount of member (customer) information has been stolen by DragonForce Ransomware Cartel, saying they "accessed data relating to a significant number of our current and past members" - around 20 million people. The Membership database, basically. That includes home addresses and phone numbers etc.

Up until now Co-op hadn't even used the words cyber or threat actor, referring to an "IT issue" and "third party" in comms.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crkx3vy54nzo

Co-op hackers stole 'significant' amount of customer data

The firm previously said there was 'no evidence that customer data was compromised'.

BBC News
DragonForce Ransomware Cartel attacks on UK high street retailers: walking in the front door

The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner and attacking UK high street retailers are using social engineering for entry. I think it’s in the public interest to break down what is…

DoublePulsar

Regarding IOCs around the UK retailer activity - there’s loads doing the rounds, and they’re almost all not useful.

Eg hundreds of dynamic VPN IPs from 2022. If you google them you’ll find them on vendor blogs from years ago for Scattered Spider - people are recycling in panic and passing around in panic.

Don’t hunt on random IOCs. IP addresses change. Strengthen foundational controls. Review sign in logs for abnormal activity etc.

Pass the bong
Co-op confirms data theft after DragonForce ransomware claims attack

The Co-op cyberattack is far worse than initially reported, with the company now confirming that data was stolen for a significant number of current and past customers.

BleepingComputer

One of M&S’ biggest suppliers have said they have reverted to pen and paper for orders due to M&S lacking IT.

Additionally, M&S staff are raising concern about how they will be paid due to lack of IT systems.

M&S are over a week into a ransomware incident and still don’t have their online store working.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgnyplvdv8o

#threatintel #ransomware

M&S supplier back to pen and paper after cyber attack

What's going on behind the scenes in the aftermath of the cyber attack on M&S.

By the way, this is absolutely terrible advice for dealing with a major and high visibility ransomware incident.
There's a report on ITV News that Co-op member data is available on the Dark Web(tm), but as far as I know this isn't accurate. DragonForce's portal hasn't been available for over a week.

Here's the ITV News report anyhoo, logline: "ITV News understands the the ongoing cyberattack faced by the supermarket has worsened since Friday, impacting the ordering system, drivers and warehouse staff."

https://www.itv.com/news/2025-05-03/worsening-cyberattack-shuts-down-co-op-orders-itv-news-understands

Sunday Times has a piece looking into ransomware incident at Marks and Spencer. It's pretty good, goes into their contain and eradicate focus.

"By shutting down parts of the IT estate, Higham’s team had worked to prevent the attack from spreading, but had also stopped parts of its digital operations from functioning. This was considered a worthy trade-off."

One error in the article - lack of recovery doesn't mean no ransomware paid. Paying is not quick restoration.

https://www.thetimes.com/business-money/companies/article/m-and-s-cyber-attack-ms-klrnxvwq6

Inside the M&S meltdown: 3am meetings and £40m a week in lost sales

Two weeks after a cyberattack engulfed the retailer, the disruption is continuing — and threatening to undermine its hard-won turnaround

The Sunday Times
A wrote a piece about paying ransoms does not equal quick restoration - in fact, quite often it makes things worse. https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-the-myths-experts-tell-board-members-03d5e1d1c4b7
Big Game Ransomware: the myths experts tell board members

There’s a piece in The Sunday Times today about the DragonForce ransomware incident at Marks and Spencer which caught my eye. It’s a great piece, e.g. it looks at M&S containing the threat to…

DoublePulsar

Great NCSC piece by @ollie_whitehouse

I’d add - block by Entra policy specifically High risk logins (below is too FP prone), and SOC monitor them. SOC playbook = account probably compromised. How?

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/incidents-impacting-retailers

Incidents impacting retailers – recommendations from the NCSC

A joint blog post by the NCSC’s National Resilience Director, Jonathon Ellison, and Chief Technology Officer, Ollie Whitehouse.

Sky News quote a source in M&S head office saying Marks and Spencer have no ransomware incident plan so they are making it up as they go along apparently, with staff sleeping in the office and communicating via WhatsApp.

M&S dispute this, saying they have robust business continuity plans.

https://news.sky.com/story/amp/mands-had-no-plan-for-cyber-attacks-insider-reveals-with-staff-left-sleeping-in-the-office-amid-paranoia-and-chaos-13361359

M&S 'had no plan' for cyber attacks, insider claims, with 'staff left sleeping in the office amid paranoia and chaos'

Sky
BBC News has a look at teenagers phoning helpdesks and pretending to be the CISO. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4grn878712o
Beware phony IT calls after Co-op and M&S hacks, says UK cyber centre

The NCSC urges firms to check IT help desk "password reset processes" as hackers target retailers.

One of the points of exploitation of large orgs is they usually outsource their Service Desk to somewhere cheap offshore who don’t know the org staff, and when you call and say your name, they normally put big all caps bold red warning if the person is a VIP, eg C suite, so they get VIP service - ie anything goes.

Co-op Group appear to be trying to course correct with their cyber incident comms.

They’re calling it a cyber incident now, and have put a statement on the front page of their website, along with an FAQ. They haven’t yet emailed members (they should). Edit: they’ve started emailing members.

https://www.coop.co.uk/cyber-incident

Pardon Our Interruption

It sounds like the situation at Co-op has got worse. They’ve stopped taking card payments in some stores, it’s cash only. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/05/06/co-op-shops-stop-taking-card-payments-amid-cyber-attack/
Co-op shops stop taking card payments amid cyber attack

Stores display handmade signs to warn customers they can only pay in cash after hackers hit retailer

The Telegraph

People are also taking to social media to post pictures of apparently emptying store shelves.

The Co-op website claims it is down to "technical issues".

Contactless payment has been fixed at all Co-op Group stores.
One thing for media covering the Co-op thing - attackers are not impersonating IT help desks to gain access. They’re impersonating *staff* calling in to the IT help desks - they’re different things.

Co-op Group are redirecting supplies from their urban stores to remote and island locations due to stock shortages.

The article mentions their EDI platform is suffering “technical issues”. https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2025/05/co-op-reroutes-stock/

Co-op reroutes stock to rural stores amid cyber attack disruptions - Retail Gazette

The Co-op is redirecting food and drink supplies to stores in rural and remote areas in a bid to protect isolated communities from shortages following a serious cyber attack.

Retail Gazette

I just did a Shodan Safari on Co-op - basically all their Windows and Linux systems in their core DCs at network boundary are down, it's not just EDI. It's been like that for just under a week, prior to that things were still online.

I feel really bad for them as it's a great org. Also their CEO is basically the only one who stood up like this for trans people.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/05/04/ill-protect-trans-people-to-the-end-vows-co-op-boss/

‘I’ll protect trans people to the end,’ vows Co-op boss

Interview: Shirine Khoury-Haq says non-binary people bring a ‘massive business benefit’

The Telegraph

If you're wondering about Marks and Spencer - I just did a Shodan Safari of their network boundary, Palo-Alto GlobalProtect VPN remote access access is still offline, 15 days later.

Online orders are still not working, and the store stock checker is disabled now.

Co-op have paused all non-essential products in stores https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2025/05/co-op-non-essential/
Co-op pauses deliveries of non-essential items amid cyber attack - Retail Gazette

Co-op has paused its orders of non-essential products amid the fallout from its cyber attack.

Retail Gazette
Every detail in this article is wrong. The M&S incident had nothing to do with hybrid working.
Marks and Spencer’s online shopping is still offline 3 weeks later. It is thought they have lost around £63m so far, excluding IR, BCP and ransom payment costs. https://www.drapersonline.com/news/ms-online-shopping-outage-enters-third-week
M&S had a significant amount of data stolen btw, but they’ve opted not to tell customers or staff.

@GossiTheDog Not sure if it is related, but M&S shuttered a flag-ship store without notice and earlier than planned on May 7th.

🔗 Marks and Spencer suddenly closes Aberdeen’s flagship St Nicholas branch after more than 80 years in city centre https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/news/aberdeen-aberdeenshire/6750909/marks-and-spencer-shuts-st-nicholas-branch/

https://archive.ph/q8IqV

Marks and Spencer suddenly closes Aberdeen's flagship St Nicholas branch after more than 80 years in city centre

Going ahead of schedule, retail bosses have now moved women's clothing and home furniture to their newly upgraded store at Union Square.

Press and Journal
×

DragonForce Ransomware Cartel are claiming credit for attacks on Marks and Spencer, Co-op and Harrods and say more victim orgs are coming https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-02/-dragonforce-hacking-gang-takes-credit-for-uk-retail-attacks

#threatintel #ransomware

I'm going to make this the new ongoing megathread for DragonForce Ransomware Cartel's attack on UK retailers as they're all connected.

Why it matters: these are some of the UK's largest retailers, think Target or some such in a US sense.

Prior threads

M&S: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114381946765071799

Co-op: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114426688834113446

Harrods:
https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114433519351165250

Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog@cyberplace.social)

Marks and Spencer dealing with.. ransomware? https://infosec.exchange/@d4rkshell/114381922723370326

Cyberplace

The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner are using social engineering for entry.

Defenders should urgently make sure they have read the CISA briefs on Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ as it's a repeat of the 2022-2023 activity.

Links: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/CSRB_Lapsus%24_508c.pdf

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/aa23-320a_scattered_spider_0.pdf

I would also suggest these NCSC guides on incident management: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/incident-management

and effective cyber crisis comms: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/effective-communications-in-a-cyber-incident

Co-op Group have now admitted a significant amount of member (customer) information has been stolen by DragonForce Ransomware Cartel, saying they "accessed data relating to a significant number of our current and past members" - around 20 million people. The Membership database, basically. That includes home addresses and phone numbers etc.

Up until now Co-op hadn't even used the words cyber or threat actor, referring to an "IT issue" and "third party" in comms.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crkx3vy54nzo

Co-op hackers stole 'significant' amount of customer data

The firm previously said there was 'no evidence that customer data was compromised'.

BBC News
DragonForce Ransomware Cartel attacks on UK high street retailers: walking in the front door

The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner and attacking UK high street retailers are using social engineering for entry. I think it’s in the public interest to break down what is…

DoublePulsar

Regarding IOCs around the UK retailer activity - there’s loads doing the rounds, and they’re almost all not useful.

Eg hundreds of dynamic VPN IPs from 2022. If you google them you’ll find them on vendor blogs from years ago for Scattered Spider - people are recycling in panic and passing around in panic.

Don’t hunt on random IOCs. IP addresses change. Strengthen foundational controls. Review sign in logs for abnormal activity etc.

Pass the bong
Co-op confirms data theft after DragonForce ransomware claims attack

The Co-op cyberattack is far worse than initially reported, with the company now confirming that data was stolen for a significant number of current and past customers.

BleepingComputer

One of M&S’ biggest suppliers have said they have reverted to pen and paper for orders due to M&S lacking IT.

Additionally, M&S staff are raising concern about how they will be paid due to lack of IT systems.

M&S are over a week into a ransomware incident and still don’t have their online store working.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgnyplvdv8o

#threatintel #ransomware

M&S supplier back to pen and paper after cyber attack

What's going on behind the scenes in the aftermath of the cyber attack on M&S.

By the way, this is absolutely terrible advice for dealing with a major and high visibility ransomware incident.
There's a report on ITV News that Co-op member data is available on the Dark Web(tm), but as far as I know this isn't accurate. DragonForce's portal hasn't been available for over a week.

Here's the ITV News report anyhoo, logline: "ITV News understands the the ongoing cyberattack faced by the supermarket has worsened since Friday, impacting the ordering system, drivers and warehouse staff."

https://www.itv.com/news/2025-05-03/worsening-cyberattack-shuts-down-co-op-orders-itv-news-understands

Sunday Times has a piece looking into ransomware incident at Marks and Spencer. It's pretty good, goes into their contain and eradicate focus.

"By shutting down parts of the IT estate, Higham’s team had worked to prevent the attack from spreading, but had also stopped parts of its digital operations from functioning. This was considered a worthy trade-off."

One error in the article - lack of recovery doesn't mean no ransomware paid. Paying is not quick restoration.

https://www.thetimes.com/business-money/companies/article/m-and-s-cyber-attack-ms-klrnxvwq6

Inside the M&S meltdown: 3am meetings and £40m a week in lost sales

Two weeks after a cyberattack engulfed the retailer, the disruption is continuing — and threatening to undermine its hard-won turnaround

The Sunday Times
A wrote a piece about paying ransoms does not equal quick restoration - in fact, quite often it makes things worse. https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-the-myths-experts-tell-board-members-03d5e1d1c4b7
Big Game Ransomware: the myths experts tell board members

There’s a piece in The Sunday Times today about the DragonForce ransomware incident at Marks and Spencer which caught my eye. It’s a great piece, e.g. it looks at M&S containing the threat to…

DoublePulsar

Great NCSC piece by @ollie_whitehouse

I’d add - block by Entra policy specifically High risk logins (below is too FP prone), and SOC monitor them. SOC playbook = account probably compromised. How?

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/incidents-impacting-retailers

Incidents impacting retailers – recommendations from the NCSC

A joint blog post by the NCSC’s National Resilience Director, Jonathon Ellison, and Chief Technology Officer, Ollie Whitehouse.

Sky News quote a source in M&S head office saying Marks and Spencer have no ransomware incident plan so they are making it up as they go along apparently, with staff sleeping in the office and communicating via WhatsApp.

M&S dispute this, saying they have robust business continuity plans.

https://news.sky.com/story/amp/mands-had-no-plan-for-cyber-attacks-insider-reveals-with-staff-left-sleeping-in-the-office-amid-paranoia-and-chaos-13361359

M&S 'had no plan' for cyber attacks, insider claims, with 'staff left sleeping in the office amid paranoia and chaos'

Sky
BBC News has a look at teenagers phoning helpdesks and pretending to be the CISO. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4grn878712o
Beware phony IT calls after Co-op and M&S hacks, says UK cyber centre

The NCSC urges firms to check IT help desk "password reset processes" as hackers target retailers.

One of the points of exploitation of large orgs is they usually outsource their Service Desk to somewhere cheap offshore who don’t know the org staff, and when you call and say your name, they normally put big all caps bold red warning if the person is a VIP, eg C suite, so they get VIP service - ie anything goes.
@GossiTheDog we have this VIP setting. However it is not used that way for us. We use it to track if you're an asshole. So it's more like the different color bands for cats at a shelter. This one is known to be aggressive, exercise extreme caution when engaging/escalate quickly to someone else who can.

@catatonicprime @GossiTheDog we hang up on users that get aggressive, etc.

Lol who the fuck is gonna sit there and take shit from anyone?

@GossiTheDog While in #BandQ today, the staff said they'd been having "some IT Issues like M&S"

Not sure if this was the staff just making a parallel of "generic IT issues" or if there has been some incident they haven't admitted yet

@GossiTheDog I mean "lying about it and living in crisis mode" is a continuity plan right?
@GossiTheDog Let me guess, the robust plan is to make it up as they go along and keep systems down for at least a week?

@GossiTheDog This is basically the plan for most businesses in reality.

It's fine to talk about stuff being "widely known best practice," but when IT shows up with big expenses for backups and security, the MBA's always decide it's more important to rightsize the headcount and operate lean. Many IT departments report up through an MBA and not a technical person, and many IT people are terrible at communicating risk dramatically enough to get money.

@GossiTheDog What’s the Mike Tyson quote? “Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face”?
@GossiTheDog the business continuity plans are so robust they've been successfully stopping the CFO's desk from wobbling for the past fourteen years.
@GossiTheDog After watching hours of the COVID UK Inquiry and the Post Office Horizon Inquiry, anyone saying something is "robust" is lying to cover their ass.
@GossiTheDog If you don’t test it properly, it doesn’t count. See also failover and backups.

@GossiTheDog The thing that gets me is that the two statements are probably true for the people who said them. The Security group may have wargamed and prepared for malware attacks, and done so in a way that no one else in the technical stack even noticed happening (beyond some new agent installs being requested). So when the attack comes, the Security plan swings into action and no one outside of Security knows what it is or has practiced it.

This is high visibility. Executives step in to make Declarations, complicating the response. This is an incident big enough to need sub-commands to track various workflows, reporting up to a rotating incident command. Everyone wants to help, the workflows aren't well defined yet, and people help on their own authority (thanks to Command not having a clear picture yet and guiding where help would be good) and maybe make things worse in a few spots.

We had a plan.
It is chaos.
Both are true.

@GossiTheDog @ollie_whitehouse
Do egress filtering (esp. for servers) with alerting.
If there is unknown communication, then you have either a misconfiguration or a problem.

Keep critical IT infrastructure (network, firewalls, SAN/NAS, virtualisation, backups) separated from Active Directory.

Do not couple internet-facing systems (including VPN and M365) with your local AD.

@GossiTheDog @ollie_whitehouse One Entra Conditional Access policy to block high risk logins, a second policy to block high risk users. You most likely want to do both, and need to do them in separate policies

@GossiTheDog I agree with most of your arguments. (In fact, the only one I take exception with is comparing ransomware with climate change. Ransomware is a much more real and urgent problem.) Those are pretty much arguments I've used myself when advising customers hit by ransomware not to pay.

But, ultimately, it's the company's decision. Even if the company makes the wrong decision, the government shouldn't be the one who decides for them.

See also this:

https://www.coveware.com/blog/2025/4/29/the-organizational-structure-of-ransomware-threat-actor-groups-is-evolving-before-our-eyes

"Decryption tools are worse than they’ve ever been."

The organizational structure of ransomware groups is evolving rapidly.

The Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model has not recovered from law enforcement disruption, and the entrance of novice actors along with non-Russian state-linked cybercriminals has led to uncertain outcomes for victims.

Coveware: Ransomware Recovery First Responders
@GossiTheDog @bontchev was going to post that link, I believe it too. I remember even years ago the Irish Health Service was given decryption keys and still struggled for months and months to recover data.
@GossiTheDog superb summary. Surprising it still hasn't been made mandatory to report incidents, and clearly payments to criminal groups should have been outlawed before now. You'd have thought that would easily have fallen foul of the existing anti-money laundering/anti corruption regs.
@GossiTheDog it's good to make that known, i remember reading pieces about how professional the "commercial" side of these groups were and how companies found it so compeling to pay for the "service", that gave me an impression of a much better argument for doing so (with the downside that it does fund crime and rewards it).
@GossiTheDog I caught a typo similar to ones I make, hope this helps.
"Travelex aren’t alone. When I covered the Capita ransomware, they paid quietly paid"
maybe delete one of the "paid"s
@GossiTheDog My thought after reading this is very old school.
When the first indication appears, shut everything down. I have seen banks do this, and watched tellers calmly tell customers "I'm sorry, but the system is temporarily shut down" and start from there.
If the breach is stopped quickly enough, you may have a chance.
Also, what about off site storage, that would not be accessible to the attacker?
Ultimately, the decision is a risk management decision, to evaluate as quickly as you can
@GossiTheDog it absolutely blows my mind that *anybody* pays ransomware attackers off, *ever.* Taking your lumps is better even WITHOUT the fact that you're literally funding them to continue attacking people, and that eventually (if not much, MUCH sooner) they're going to come right back to YOU again for another handout. Very likely, for the same damn attack you just paid them to keep quiet about in the first place.
Inside the M&S meltdown: 3am meetings and £40m a week in lost sales — The Times and The Sunday Times

Stuart Machin had been looking forward to a long weekend. It was Easter Saturday and the chief executive of Marks & Spencer had retired to his south London home for the evening, after a long day inspecting the aisles of his local M&S branch — something of a Machin pastime. Suddenly, his phone flashed with a call from his head of digital and technology, Rachel Higham, telling him that M&S’s IT systems were not functioning as normal. Neither knew it for certain then, but M&S was under attack by

@GossiTheDog I'm not sure people realise that "members" are mutual owners, but "customers" are anyone using co-op services, whether members or not. Not sure which are in the data breach - perhaps both? I think the members' db is probably separate.
@annehargreaves @GossiTheDog it's very unlikely they hold a database of customers that aren't members, as they don't do online ordering. If you get their loyalty card, you're a member.
@georgelund @GossiTheDog Well you could be a customer of eg the funeral service, in which case they would have your details I guess.

@GossiTheDog It's terrible advice for any major incident, ransomware or not!

Do these morons learn nothing from history?

@distinctdipole if there's one thing we can learn from history, it is that nobody ever learns anything from history.

@GossiTheDog

@distinctdipole @GossiTheDog They certainly did not study the Norsk Hydro playbook for dealing with high impact incidents.
@GossiTheDog "PR advisor" sounds like the *absolute last* person you should take advice from on any matters regarding infosec TBH
@GossiTheDog are they talking about Oracle? 😂
@GossiTheDog oh the thread loaded, I'm caught up
@GossiTheDog Sounds like a ransomware episode I dealt with last year... We were told to shut up, clean up, and pretend like it never happened. 
@GossiTheDog You'd think Dido Harding would know better by now...
@GossiTheDog He should fire that PR advisor for not doing a proper job.
@GossiTheDog “a former chief executive at another firm and had to deal with a data breach” is an awkward way to say “overpaid jackass who was fired for his handling of a data breach”
@GossiTheDog the PR advisor probably believes they were told everything.
@GossiTheDog ...that is a surprising amount of technical detail for a news report, I like 

@GossiTheDog UK cyber security at private firms tends to be very poor on average but social engineering remains the hacker's most effective tool.

Slack and Teams access in particular seems like a large attack vector. I believe the Twitter hack a few years back - when it was Twitter - was facillitated by superuser creds being pinned to a slack channel.

@GossiTheDog "Advanced Persistant Toerags", as Ian Levy would put it. Basics don't sell boxes, and when the narrative is controlled by the box-sellers, the basics get neglected.
@tryst @GossiTheDog so true. It's tough trying to run a security program that focuses on the basics. That doesn't sound sexy to many execs and board members, but that's where the defenses lie