Kevin BeaumontDragonForce Ransomware Cartel are claiming credit for attacks on Marks and Spencer, Co-op and Harrods and say more victim orgs are coming https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-02/-dragonforce-hacking-gang-takes-credit-for-uk-retail-attacks
I'm going to make this the new ongoing megathread for DragonForce Ransomware Cartel's attack on UK retailers as they're all connected.
Why it matters: these are some of the UK's largest retailers, think Target or some such in a US sense.
Prior threads
M&S: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114381946765071799
Co-op: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114426688834113446
Harrods:
https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114433519351165250
Kevin Beaumont (@[email protected])
Marks and Spencer dealing with.. ransomware? https://infosec.exchange/@d4rkshell/114381922723370326
The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner are using social engineering for entry.
Defenders should urgently make sure they have read the CISA briefs on Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ as it's a repeat of the 2022-2023 activity.
Links: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/CSRB_Lapsus%24_508c.pdf
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/aa23-320a_scattered_spider_0.pdf
I would also suggest these NCSC guides on incident management: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/incident-management
and effective cyber crisis comms: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/effective-communications-in-a-cyber-incident
Co-op Group have now admitted a significant amount of member (customer) information has been stolen by DragonForce Ransomware Cartel, saying they "accessed data relating to a significant number of our current and past members" - around 20 million people. The Membership database, basically. That includes home addresses and phone numbers etc.
Up until now Co-op hadn't even used the words cyber or threat actor, referring to an "IT issue" and "third party" in comms.
New by me - breaking down the attacks on UK highstreet retailers
Regarding IOCs around the UK retailer activity - there’s loads doing the rounds, and they’re almost all not useful.
Eg hundreds of dynamic VPN IPs from 2022. If you google them you’ll find them on vendor blogs from years ago for Scattered Spider - people are recycling in panic and passing around in panic.
Don’t hunt on random IOCs. IP addresses change. Strengthen foundational controls. Review sign in logs for abnormal activity etc.
Bleeping Computer have more on the Co-op breach https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/co-op-confirms-data-theft-after-dragonforce-ransomware-claims-attack/
One of M&S’ biggest suppliers have said they have reverted to pen and paper for orders due to M&S lacking IT.
Additionally, M&S staff are raising concern about how they will be paid due to lack of IT systems.
M&S are over a week into a ransomware incident and still don’t have their online store working.
By the way, this is absolutely terrible advice for dealing with a major and high visibility ransomware incident.
There's a report on ITV News that Co-op member data is available on the Dark Web(tm), but as far as I know this isn't accurate. DragonForce's portal hasn't been available for over a week.
Here's the ITV News report anyhoo, logline: "ITV News understands the the ongoing cyberattack faced by the supermarket has worsened since Friday, impacting the ordering system, drivers and warehouse staff."
Sunday Times has a piece looking into ransomware incident at Marks and Spencer. It's pretty good, goes into their contain and eradicate focus.
"By shutting down parts of the IT estate, Higham’s team had worked to prevent the attack from spreading, but had also stopped parts of its digital operations from functioning. This was considered a worthy trade-off."
One error in the article - lack of recovery doesn't mean no ransomware paid. Paying is not quick restoration.
https://www.thetimes.com/business-money/companies/article/m-and-s-cyber-attack-ms-klrnxvwq6
A wrote a piece about paying ransoms does not equal quick restoration - in fact, quite often it makes things worse. https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-the-myths-experts-tell-board-members-03d5e1d1c4b7
VessOnSecurity@GossiTheDog I agree with most of your arguments. (In fact, the only one I take exception with is comparing ransomware with climate change. Ransomware is a much more real and urgent problem.) Those are pretty much arguments I've used myself when advising customers hit by ransomware not to pay.
But, ultimately, it's the company's decision. Even if the company makes the wrong decision, the government shouldn't be the one who decides for them.
See also this:
"Decryption tools are worse than they’ve ever been."
The organizational structure of ransomware groups is evolving rapidly.
The Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model has not recovered from law enforcement disruption, and the entrance of novice actors along with non-Russian state-linked cybercriminals has led to uncertain outcomes for victims.
[realhackhistory@home]#@GossiTheDog @bontchev was going to post that link, I believe it too. I remember even years ago the Irish Health Service was given decryption keys and still struggled for months and months to recover data.