Kevin BeaumontDragonForce Ransomware Cartel are claiming credit for attacks on Marks and Spencer, Co-op and Harrods and say more victim orgs are coming https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-02/-dragonforce-hacking-gang-takes-credit-for-uk-retail-attacks
I'm going to make this the new ongoing megathread for DragonForce Ransomware Cartel's attack on UK retailers as they're all connected.
Why it matters: these are some of the UK's largest retailers, think Target or some such in a US sense.
Prior threads
M&S: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114381946765071799
Co-op: https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114426688834113446
Harrods:
https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/114433519351165250
The individuals operating under the DragonForce banner are using social engineering for entry.
Defenders should urgently make sure they have read the CISA briefs on Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ as it's a repeat of the 2022-2023 activity.
Links: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/CSRB_Lapsus%24_508c.pdf
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/aa23-320a_scattered_spider_0.pdf
I would also suggest these NCSC guides on incident management: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/incident-management
and effective cyber crisis comms: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/effective-communications-in-a-cyber-incident
Co-op Group have now admitted a significant amount of member (customer) information has been stolen by DragonForce Ransomware Cartel, saying they "accessed data relating to a significant number of our current and past members" - around 20 million people. The Membership database, basically. That includes home addresses and phone numbers etc.
Up until now Co-op hadn't even used the words cyber or threat actor, referring to an "IT issue" and "third party" in comms.
New by me - breaking down the attacks on UK highstreet retailers
Regarding IOCs around the UK retailer activity - there’s loads doing the rounds, and they’re almost all not useful.
Eg hundreds of dynamic VPN IPs from 2022. If you google them you’ll find them on vendor blogs from years ago for Scattered Spider - people are recycling in panic and passing around in panic.
Don’t hunt on random IOCs. IP addresses change. Strengthen foundational controls. Review sign in logs for abnormal activity etc.
Bleeping Computer have more on the Co-op breach https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/co-op-confirms-data-theft-after-dragonforce-ransomware-claims-attack/
One of M&S’ biggest suppliers have said they have reverted to pen and paper for orders due to M&S lacking IT.
Additionally, M&S staff are raising concern about how they will be paid due to lack of IT systems.
M&S are over a week into a ransomware incident and still don’t have their online store working.
By the way, this is absolutely terrible advice for dealing with a major and high visibility ransomware incident.
There's a report on ITV News that Co-op member data is available on the Dark Web(tm), but as far as I know this isn't accurate. DragonForce's portal hasn't been available for over a week.
Here's the ITV News report anyhoo, logline: "ITV News understands the the ongoing cyberattack faced by the supermarket has worsened since Friday, impacting the ordering system, drivers and warehouse staff."
Sunday Times has a piece looking into ransomware incident at Marks and Spencer. It's pretty good, goes into their contain and eradicate focus.
"By shutting down parts of the IT estate, Higham’s team had worked to prevent the attack from spreading, but had also stopped parts of its digital operations from functioning. This was considered a worthy trade-off."
One error in the article - lack of recovery doesn't mean no ransomware paid. Paying is not quick restoration.
https://www.thetimes.com/business-money/companies/article/m-and-s-cyber-attack-ms-klrnxvwq6
A wrote a piece about paying ransoms does not equal quick restoration - in fact, quite often it makes things worse. https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-the-myths-experts-tell-board-members-03d5e1d1c4b7
Great NCSC piece by @ollie_whitehouse
I’d add - block by Entra policy specifically High risk logins (below is too FP prone), and SOC monitor them. SOC playbook = account probably compromised. How?
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/incidents-impacting-retailers
Sky News quote a source in M&S head office saying Marks and Spencer have no ransomware incident plan so they are making it up as they go along apparently, with staff sleeping in the office and communicating via WhatsApp.
M&S dispute this, saying they have robust business continuity plans.
BBC News has a look at teenagers phoning helpdesks and pretending to be the CISO. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4grn878712o
One of the points of exploitation of large orgs is they usually outsource their Service Desk to somewhere cheap offshore who don’t know the org staff, and when you call and say your name, they normally put big all caps bold red warning if the person is a VIP, eg C suite, so they get VIP service - ie anything goes.
Co-op Group appear to be trying to course correct with their cyber incident comms.
They’re calling it a cyber incident now, and have put a statement on the front page of their website, along with an FAQ. They haven’t yet emailed members (they should). Edit: they’ve started emailing members.
It sounds like the situation at Co-op has got worse. They’ve stopped taking card payments in some stores, it’s cash only. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/05/06/co-op-shops-stop-taking-card-payments-amid-cyber-attack/
People are also taking to social media to post pictures of apparently emptying store shelves.
The Co-op website claims it is down to "technical issues".
Contactless payment has been fixed at all Co-op Group stores.
One thing for media covering the Co-op thing - attackers are not impersonating IT help desks to gain access. They’re impersonating *staff* calling in to the IT help desks - they’re different things.
Co-op Group are redirecting supplies from their urban stores to remote and island locations due to stock shortages.
The article mentions their EDI platform is suffering “technical issues”. https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2025/05/co-op-reroutes-stock/
I just did a Shodan Safari on Co-op - basically all their Windows and Linux systems in their core DCs at network boundary are down, it's not just EDI. It's been like that for just under a week, prior to that things were still online.
I feel really bad for them as it's a great org. Also their CEO is basically the only one who stood up like this for trans people.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/05/04/ill-protect-trans-people-to-the-end-vows-co-op-boss/
If you're wondering about Marks and Spencer - I just did a Shodan Safari of their network boundary, Palo-Alto GlobalProtect VPN remote access access is still offline, 15 days later.
Online orders are still not working, and the store stock checker is disabled now.
Co-op have paused all non-essential products in stores https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2025/05/co-op-non-essential/
Every detail in this article is wrong. The M&S incident had nothing to do with hybrid working.
Marks and Spencer’s online shopping is still offline 3 weeks later. It is thought they have lost around £63m so far, excluding IR, BCP and ransom payment costs. https://www.drapersonline.com/news/ms-online-shopping-outage-enters-third-week
M&S had a significant amount of data stolen btw, but they’ve opted not to tell customers or staff.
Paul Chambers🚧@GossiTheDog Not sure if it is related, but M&S shuttered a flag-ship store without notice and earlier than planned on May 7th.
🔗 Marks and Spencer suddenly closes Aberdeen’s flagship St Nicholas branch after more than 80 years in city centre https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/news/aberdeen-aberdeenshire/6750909/marks-and-spencer-shuts-st-nicholas-branch/
