Big #security improvement for #openSUSE #FDE; pcr-oracle is being replaced by #systemd-pcrlock, which stores policy in #TPM2 non-volatile RAM and protects against rollback attacks. Time to migrate! 🔐 #Linux https://news.opensuse.org/2026/03/11/dropping-pcr-oracle/
Dropping pcr-oracle in user space Full Disk Encryption

Introduction In user space Full Disk Encryption (FDE), as opposed to the boot loader based FDE, developers for openSUSE supported signed policy and NVIndex p...

openSUSE News

Do we have a GUI for systemd-cryptenroll allowing people to change enrolled passphrases to unlock their LUKS partition ?

Better yet something which is capable of enrolling the tpm2 module and a fido2 key.

#linux #systemd #systemd-cryptenroll #python #gtk #yubikey #fido2 #tpm2 #security #debian #gui #desktop

I just configured my #Fedora laptop to use the #TPM2 chip to unencrypt my #LUKS partitions instead of having to enter the passphrase on every boot. And I'm wondering, why didn't I do that sooner? 

Acabo de configurar mi instalación e #Fedora para que descifre mis particiones #LUKS usando el chip #TPM2 en vez de que tenga que meter la frase de paso en cada inicio, y me estoy preguntando, ¿por qué nabos no lo hice antes?  

#Linux

#openSUSE is dropping pcr-oracle in Full Disk Encryption #FDE. systemd-pcrlock now handles #TPM2 policy, fixing rollback attacks and simplifying maintenance. Migration is just two commands! 🔒🐧 Find out more. #Linux https://news.opensuse.org/2026/03/11/dropping-pcr-oracle/
Dropping pcr-oracle in user space Full Disk Encryption

Introduction In user space Full Disk Encryption (FDE), as opposed to the boot loader based FDE, developers for openSUSE supported signed policy and NVIndex p...

openSUSE News

Talking about #TPM2 again at a new venue #scale23x

https://www.socallinuxexpo.org/scale/23x/presentations/enhancing-tpm-security-linux-kernel

I don't think they record but I promise to do a blog post really soon about how to use the exported null name to verify the #TPM in your booted OS is secure.

Enhancing TPM security in the Linux Kernel | SCALE

The Southern California Linux Expo (SCALE) is North America’s largest community-run open source conference.

@lug_nuernberg Great Meme 🫶 #TPM2 was a child once - for a better understanding, may I add this great animation to your thread? I think it's worth viewing ❤️

https://youtu.be/mLoIcdIu_Kk?si=YULJHV9WXf56U_OZ
#trustedcomputing #tcpa

TCPA - Trusted Computing Platform Alliance

YouTube
RT @[email protected]
GRUB 2.14 launches in Jan 2026, fixing the Year 2038 bug and adding Argon2, TPM 2.0, and EROFS support for the ultimate Linux boot security. https://securityonline.info/defeating-the-epochalypse-grub-2-14-arrives-to-save-linux-from-year-2038/ #GRUB214 #Linux #Bootloader #Y2038 #CyberSecurity2026 #OpenSource #TPM2 #Argon2 #TechNews #GNU
Defeating the Epochalypse: GRUB 2.14 Arrives to Save Linux from Year 2038

GRUB 2.14 launches in Jan 2026, fixing the Year 2038 bug and adding Argon2, TPM 2.0, and EROFS support for the ultimate Linux boot security.

Daily CyberSecurity

Okay I think I have a better handle on the workflow now. There's 4 hierarchies of trust and you only care about the storage one for my purposes. You can deterministically derive a parent key that's unique to your application based on non confidential secrets. Then from there you can start adding child keys, which when loaded into the module under the parent context can be used to wrap-encrypt your actual key used for decrypting whatever from disk. I'm not quite sure if or why the additional child key is needed but it makes sense you would have some additional indirection beyond the deterministic root key.

There's places to put in particular stuff like a pin or password so you can tie in a user there or just hard code it (or omit, in some cases?).

Anyways, I suppose all this is to achieve that if someone tries to decrypt your stuff with a different TPM it won't work.

I do wonder if you could use the determined root key public certificate to enrol a device as trusted and so long as the server sent you whatever encrypted using the public key it knwlew you'd only get access to it without hardware changes. Though that gets tricky, probably where the attestation/vendor truest hierarchy comes in.

#TPM #TPM2

With #GRUB2-BLS now the default in #Tumbleweed, boot entries live as individual files under /boot/efi/loader/entries and are managed automatically. A cleaner, future-ready approach to boot management is here. Learn more #TPM2 #openSUSE https://news.opensuse.org/2025/11/13/tw-grub2-bls/
GRUB2-BLS in openSUSE Tumbleweed is now the default

openSUSE Tumbleweed recently changed the default boot loader from GRUB2 to GRUB2-BLS when installed via YaST. This follows the trend started by MicroOS of ad...

openSUSE News