Kommentar – Familienunternehmer und AfD: Gefährliche Normalisierung in Deutschland

Der Verband der Familienunternehmer lädt AfD-Vertreter ein und normalisiert damit eine Partei, die selbst international als extrem gilt. Die Lobbyisten untergraben damit demokratische Prinzipien.

Süddeutsche Zeitung

📜 A really gentle and diplomatic (re-)introduction to CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD) by the BBC. Still, better than nothing.

Media coverage of UFWD and its work esp. in foreign countries can be seen as a useful barometer of media's appeasement level wrt. PRC China / CCP; the treatment of Tibet (even mentioning its very name which the CCP is trying to eradicate) is another.

To understand all this, one first needs to understand something about human nature. Trusting people and societies tend to, by default, consider other people and societies having some level of trustworthiness as well.

Likewise societies were people can't generally trust one another adopt that modus operandi themselves and don't easily believe anyone to be trustworthy. Global corruption indices act as a rough guideline here.

Now, the CCP is an extremely and inherently #paranoid organization that sees enemies everywhere. They are particularly paranoid about existential threats and after seizing power in China in 1949 they psyched and propagandized themselves as the only and irreplaceable organization (read: dictatorship) that can not only keep the old imperial state forcefully together but also to restore the "Middle Kingdom" to its rightful historical (mythical) position as the greatest power under heaven.

When the Chinese communists realized that actual communism (under dictatorship) was fucking useless after Mao Zedong's decades of nominal communist "internationalism" (where the empire's "ethnic peoples" had nominal rights or even nominal "autonomy"! Repression, massacres and famines were simply written out of history), the CCP was in desperate need for a "raison d'etre" or a reason to justify its very existence.

Enter national-socialism, a form of ethno-centric nationalism under dictatorship. Party cadres who could access foreign books learnt how a relatively small Nazi-Germany managed to mobilize the entire state to defeat the gigantic and communist Soviet Union with relative ease...!

(Of course what really happened was that after December 1941 (Pearl Harbour) when the USA was pulled into WWII it was only America's absolutely mindblowing amount of "Lend-Lease" military aid to Soviets (look it up!) that turned the tide against the nazis... but the points about "effectiveness" of nazism vs communism couldn't be ignored.)

CCP cadres also learned how the German nazis had used "legalism" devised by Carl Schmitt to justify *everything* the State would do as "legal". Absolutely everything. What's not to love! Ethnic supremacism? Check!

After 1989 (Tiananmen) and then the 1991 crumbling of the Soviet-russia empire the new war front that emerged was based on acquitition of technology and money as essential ingredients. No longer a hermetically sealed dictatorship, the CCP would pull in foreign industrialists and financiers to engage and entangle in "win-win" projects while starting to send its loyalty-checked subjects overseas by the million to study and bring about technological revolution in the PRC.

This is where the UFWD begins to emerge as *the* key department for the CCP. Its tentacles would not only keep the expatriate Chinese students (and increasingly businessmen; and they are invariably men) in line politically, but the UFWD would facilitate and focus their tasking and the transfer of data where they really wanted it. With increased foreign exposure came opportunities to influence and corrupt any and all useful foreign idiots in politics, science, business, finance...

With the newly re-adopted ethno-centrism ("Han chauvinism") another key target for UFWD was the large diaspora of ethnic Chinese emigre settlers in foreign countries. There are particularly large Chinese "communities" in most South-East Asian countries where, ironically, they are sometimes viewed similarly as the Jews ahd been at the other end of the continent; a society within society, depending on murky ancestral networks and controlling business and finance well beyond their numbers...

(NB. After playing friend and extracting all technology and science it could from Israel, CCP easily threw them under the Arab islamic bus because the latter are, for now, far more useful allies in CCP's wider war against democracy worldwide, an existential threat...)

The UFWD would effectively take over these old ethnic networks and harness them to serve business and industry of their "motherland" turned CCP Party-State.

This is just the mere rough outline of United Front's responsibilities, but it's not hard to see why CCP really considered it a "magic weapon".

⚠️ The best published research on this massive organization with global reach is done by #ASPI and #Merics.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c878evdp758o

#CCP #china #PRC #UnitedFront #UFWD #carlschmitt #nazism #BBC

United Front Work: What does China's 'magic weapon' of influence do?

The UFWD is a decades-old - and increasingly controversial - arm of China's Communist Party. What does it do?

Ready to vote in Election 2024 ?
If you are still deciding, take a listen to our latest podcast to hear what FF, FG and SF have to say about 'The Other Important Issues'

Spotify
https://spoti.fi/3COzuWA

Apple
https://apple.co/4fMDGEG

SoundCloud
https://on.soundcloud.com/SvR8T1XXWHcptBqDA

Blog
https://bit.ly/4i9JklS

#GE24, #FiannaFail, #FineGael, #SinnFein, #Defenddemocracy, #AuctionPolitics, #CriticalThinking, #ETNC, #MERICS, #RSF, #Russia, #China, #Taiwan, #Vote, #Ukraine, #ForeignPolicy, #PressFreedom

Election 2024 - The Other Important Issues

Perspectives with Neilo · Episode

Spotify

Um im Wettbewerb mit 🇨🇳 zu bestehen & erfolgreich kooperieren zu können, brauchen wir mehr #China-Kompetenz. Wir fördern das Projekt #ChinaTechObservatory von #MERICS, damit wir über 🇨🇳 Fortschritte in kritischen Technologien & die Folgen informiert sind.

https://merics.org/en/china-tech-observatory

China Tech Observatory | Merics

☝️ 🤯 So essentially in the #EU, "we see the 🇨🇳☭ CCP assets manipulating public opinion in the European Union.... but have no mandate to do anything about it..." 😬

"Countries are *individually* unwilling to call out Chinese propaganda and disinformation campaigns..." 👀 ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

#CCP #china #winwin #propaganda #disinformation #ForeignForces #russia #MERICS #EuropeanUnion #democracy #natsec #foreignpolicy
@merics

Another news story by Tom's Hardware: ☭🇨🇳 Chinese hackers steal chip designs from major Dutch semiconductor company — perps lurked for over two years to steal NXP's chipmaking IP

Related: A leading European research group @merics focusing on the "PRC" — which recently had its staff *sanctioned* by the Chinese Communist Party 🤷🏻‍♂️ (i.e. really the PRC) — wrote a great report on CCP's cyberwarfare which unsurprisingly is on a massive scale.

https://infosec.exchange/@demi7en/111461981613415755

#NXP #MERICS #China #CCP #PLA #chimera #cybersecurity #infosec #espionage #natsec #Netherlands

https://www.tomshardware.com/news/chinese-hackers-steal-chip-designs-from-major-dutch-semiconductor-company

@Frederik_Borgesius

demï7en 🎗 (@[email protected])

⬆️ Great @[email protected] report: 📜 “Here to stay” – Chinese state-affiliated hacking for strategic goals "🇨🇳 China is the most important source of cyber attacks in the world, 2000-2023" 「Key findings ☭ Chinese hacking poses a risk to Europe’s long-term prosperity. It is becoming more sophisticated and follows strategic goals of China’s government. ☭ China is a major source of cyberattacks against Europe. While not all Chinese threat actors have clear ties to China’s government, there is considerable evidence of links to it for many of them, suggesting some degree of state affiliation and sponsorship. ☭ China rearranged its hacking capabilities to make attribution more difficult and to increase the combat-readiness of the People’s Liberation Army. Institutional changes have created a more flexible and sophisticated state-affiliated hacking scene. ☭ Chinese threat actors typically attack for long-term access. As opposed to the disruptive ones carried out by Russian actors or the moneymaking ones carried out by North Korean actors, Chinese attacks are more strategic. ☭ Chinese threat actors focus on a smaller number of high-value targets and reuse the same exploits for different target types. It is more difficult to spot them as they use edge devices like routers and techniques designed to avoid detection. ☭ China has not engaged in disruptive attacks so far, but it is building up capabilities that it could later use for disruption. Its use of cyber ranges and its targeting of critical infrastructure for long-term access suggests that China is setting up for future disruptive activity, posing a risk for Europe.」 「1.1 China’s cyberattacks are increasing and becoming more sophisticated With more economic activity moving online, cyberattacks are gaining relevance. Globally, the European Commission estimates cyberattacks to cost EUR 5.5 trillion.1 Cyberattacks are estimated to have cost German companies EUR 223 billion, or 6 percent of Germany’s GDP, in 2021.2 That same year, 86 percent of German companies suffered a cyberattack that led to some damage, according to one survey. 」 https://merics.org/en/report/here-stay-chinese-state-affiliated-hacking-strategic-goals #MERICS #China #CCP #PLA #cybersecurity #infosec #espionage #natsec

Infosec Exchange

⬆️ Great @merics report: 📜 “Here to stay” – Chinese state-affiliated hacking for strategic goals

"🇨🇳 China is the most important source of cyber attacks in the world, 2000-2023"

「Key findings

☭ Chinese hacking poses a risk to Europe’s long-term prosperity. It is becoming more sophisticated and follows strategic goals of China’s government.

☭ China is a major source of cyberattacks against Europe. While not all Chinese threat actors have clear ties to China’s government, there is considerable evidence of links to it for many of them, suggesting some degree of state affiliation and sponsorship.

☭ China rearranged its hacking capabilities to make attribution more difficult and to increase the combat-readiness of the People’s Liberation Army. Institutional changes have created a more flexible and sophisticated state-affiliated hacking scene.

☭ Chinese threat actors typically attack for long-term access. As opposed to the disruptive ones carried out by Russian actors or the moneymaking ones carried out by North Korean actors, Chinese attacks are more strategic.

☭ Chinese threat actors focus on a smaller number of high-value targets and reuse the same exploits for different target types. It is more difficult to spot them as they use edge devices like routers and techniques designed to avoid detection.

☭ China has not engaged in disruptive attacks so far, but it is building up capabilities that it could later use for disruption. Its use of cyber ranges and its targeting of critical infrastructure for long-term access suggests that China is setting up for future disruptive activity, posing a risk for Europe.」

「1.1 China’s cyberattacks are increasing and becoming more sophisticated

With more economic activity moving online, cyberattacks are gaining relevance. Globally, the European Commission estimates cyberattacks to cost EUR 5.5 trillion.1 Cyberattacks are estimated to have cost German companies EUR 223 billion, or 6 percent of Germany’s GDP, in 2021.2 That same year, 86 percent of German companies suffered a cyberattack that led to some damage, according to one survey. 」

https://merics.org/en/report/here-stay-chinese-state-affiliated-hacking-strategic-goals

#MERICS #China #CCP #PLA #cybersecurity #infosec #espionage #natsec

“Here to stay” – Chinese state-affiliated hacking for strategic goals

Key findings Chinese hacking poses a risk to Europe’s long-term prosperity. It is becoming more sophisticated and follows strategic goals of China’s government. China is a major source of cyberattacks against Europe. While not all Chinese threat actors have clear ties to China’s government, there is considerable evidence of links to it for many of them, suggesting some degree of state affiliation and sponsorship. China rearranged its hacking capabilities to make attribution more difficult and to increase the combat-readiness of the People’s Liberation Army. Institutional changes have created a more flexible and sophisticated state-affiliated hacking scene. Chinese threat actors typically attack for long-term access. As opposed to the disruptive ones carried out by Russian actors or the moneymaking ones carried out by North Korean actors, Chinese attacks are more strategic. Chinese threat actors focus on a smaller number of high-value targets and reuse the same exploits for different target types. It is more difficult to spot them as they use edge devices like routers and techniques designed to avoid detection. China has not engaged in disruptive attacks so far, but it is building up capabilities that it could later use for disruption. Its use of cyber ranges and its targeting of critical infrastructure for long-term access suggests that China is setting up for future disruptive activity, posing a risk for Europe. , 1. Introduction 1.1 China’s cyberattacks are increasing and becoming more sophisticated With more economic activity moving online, cyberattacks are gaining relevance. Globally, the European Commission estimates cyberattacks to cost EUR 5.5 trillion.1 Cyberattacks are estimated to have cost German companies EUR 223 billion, or 6 percent of Germany’s GDP, in 2021.2 That same year, 86 percent of German companies suffered a cyberattack that led to some damage, according to one survey.3 As many cyberattacks are not publicized, how many originate in a particular country is hard to establish. Public information about Chinese cyber activities has become difficult to come by. Until about 2015, there were increasing media reports about Chinese cyberattacks.4 Since then, China has worked to keep its capabilities hidden, but there is ample evidence that it is a significant and growing source of cyberattacks. In addition, while most cyberattacks are carried out by criminal actors that only want to make money, China’s ones are more strategic and pose a risk to Europe’s long-term prosperity. While the involvement of China’s government cannot be proven in all instances, some involvement is likely given its continuous quest to control the country’s cyberspace and cyber actors. Many of the Chinese threat actors have been shown to have direct ties to the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, or to a lesser extent the Ministry of Public Security. There is also solid evidence that the government financially supports the threat actors carrying out the attacks described here. According to the European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC), China was the country responsible for the largest number of cyberattacks worldwide between 2005 and 2023 with 240, followed by Russia with 158. China-originating hackers were responsible for attacks on 1,120 out of a total of 6,335 victims while Russia was responsible for 605. German companies are seeing increased attacks from China. In 2021, 30 percent of them said they had been attacked from China; in 2022, the figure was 43 percent.5 For example, in 2019, the Chinese hacking group Winnti was found to have attacked major German corporations for years. It had started out targeting the gaming industry to make money and moved on to technology and pharmaceutical companies, and then in 2022 it started attacking government institutions and embassies.6 It was so omnipresent in German companies that one cybersecurity expert joked that “[a]ny DAX [Germany’s most important stock market index] corporation that hasn’t been attacked by Winnti must have done something wrong.”7 Chinese hacking activities have not only increased; they have also become more sophisticated. In the United States, indictments by the Department of Justice, statements by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and reports by cybersecurity firms show this. Chinese hacking was originally focused on high-volume phishing campaigns8 but it has become increasingly focused on long-term and targeted attacks.9 In Europe, governments and, especially, intelligence services have slowly acknowledged this problem. The 2021 report of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Verfassungsschutz, stated: “In Germany, politics and bureaucracy, economy, science and technology, as well as the military are the main goals of Chinese espionage. To realize its ambitious industrial policy, China uses espionage in business and science.”10 In 2021, NATO, the EU, Australia, and New Zealand publicly attributed the hacking of the Microsoft Exchange Server to China’s Ministry of State Security.11 The group Microsoft identified as the attacker, Hafnium, targeted several industries to exfiltrate information and, after gaining access, installed additional malware to facilitate long-term access.12 Data sources and methods The attribution of cyberattacks to a specific state or non-state actor is a major challenge. While IPv6, the latest version of the Internet Protocol (IP), usually allows for source identification, threat actors routinely route attacks via different locations, and often only the last “hop” (the location immediately before the target) can be identified. This was the case, for example, when China-originating hackers attacked Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2022. While the majority of source IP addresses involved were Chinese, some were Russian. Attackers also often use compromised hosts. Even when it is possible to trace the IP addresses to the ultimate sources, this is not proof of involvement of governments, which do not tend to have complete control over their cyberspace. The basis for attribution could be a shared operating procedure (often called TTP, for tactics, techniques and procedures), email addresses, shared vulnerabilities, and exploits (that is, attacks that have only been used by one threat actor). Additional factors can help attribution to a specific country, such as IP addresses located in government buildings and used during working hours. A match between an attack and a government’s known goals is the weakest basis for attribution, and using it risks skewing data. This study therefore looks only at those hacks and APTs that have been linked to China’s government by multiple independent sources that weigh several characteristics, such as the vulnerability that was exploited, the time of the attack and the scale of the involved network and compare this “fingerprint” with the profile of known APTs. Because attribution is difficult, the research for this report analyzed EuRepoC – a collection of data from an independent European research consortium on cyber conflict – to place China’s involvement in hacking in global context. For individual cases, the research relies on reports by independent cybersecurity firms like Mandiant. Included in this analysis are only those hacks that were either attributed by multiple cybersecurity firms or by a democratic government with information on why this attack was attributed to a state actor. The research also included the threat actor cards produced by Thailand’s Electronic Transactions Development Agency and Fraunhofer FKIE’s Malpedia of threat actors. The data gathered is likely to undercount attacks originating from democracies, including the United States. 1.2 Chinese hacking serves strategic goals like technological innovation With President Xi Jinping’s expansion of the definition of national security to include economic and technological security, hacking by Chinese state-affiliated actors now serves national strategic goals. This includes technological innovation, gaining information for mergers and acquisitions, targeting dissidents, and traditional espionage against foreign governments. In 2014, China’s ambassador to the United States said, when explaining why cyber activity against commercial secrets is the same as national security espionage: “How can you distinguish from activities that will hurt national security without hurting the nation’s commercial interests?”13 Europe’s prosperity relies in no small part on its technology and innovation strength. Technological innovation is also increasingly driving geopolitical, economic, and military competition. Meanwhile, China, labeled a systemic rival by the EU, is in a race for technology supremacy with the West.14 In 2020, Xi described science and technology as the main battlefield of the economy.15 In the new system of “holistic innovation” and “all-of-state system,” he said, everyone is supposed to come together to serve China’s innovation needs. China has used legal and illegal ways to induce knowledge and technology transfer.16 Its toolbox includes requiring technology transfer for market access, joint venture requirements for investment in China, and weak protection of intellectual property.17 Chinese firms have tried to poach talent, notably in the semiconductor industry. For instance, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation has recruited engineers from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company on a large scale, at least doubling their salary.18 On the illegal side there is economic espionage. This year, a chip executive went on trial in South Korea for stealing Samsung secrets that would be used to build a factory in China.19 The Dutch semiconductor company, ASML has alleged a that IP theft by a former employee was a “plot to get technology for the Chinese government” and has won this lawsuit.20 Huntsman Corp, a US chemicals maker, argues that its trade secret were stolen in the course of a government-mandated regulatory approval process.21 Hacking is a major illegal way through which China gains access to critical technology. Germany’s Verfassungsschutz has stated that “especially German high-tech companies and world market leaders are in sight of most likely Chinese espionage.”22 According to it, these espionage activities are guided by national and global initiatives of China’s government. These government initiatives set out very specific strategic goals in technology. For example, the Made in China 2025 program aims to make the country a producer of high-tech goods, to increase the share of indigenous fundamental technology, and to increase informatization in the economy.23 Since its inception in 2016, and thus throughout the trade and technology war with the United States, China’s focus on indigenous innovation and science and technology has increased. Western cybersecurity firms and government agencies agree that China’s targeting of industries for hacking has aligned with the strategic priorities in its Five-Year Plans. In 2005, the US intelligence community expressed worry about Chinese spies “poking into all sorts of American technology to compete with the U.S.”24 One example was the 2005 Titan Rain campaign that targeted technology restricted from export to China from the United Kingdom and the United States, in addition to targeting defense contractors and the US Department of Defense.25 Titan Rain also revealed the state-private nexus in China’s technology system. In 2011, it was reported that “many US firms whose business revolves around intellectual property complain that their systems are now under constant attack.”26 In 2014, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey said: “For too long, the Chi-nese government has blatantly sought to use cyber-espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned industries.”27 In 2021, the US government alleged that one hacking campaign originating in Hainan targeted many key technology companies in the West.28 This was reported by Mandiant, a cybersecurity company that identified the first large-scale Chinese state-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) actor – Unit 61398 of the PLA (also called APT1) – as responsible. The industries targeted were aligned with strategic priorities listed in China’s Five-Year Plan.29 Europe has also increasingly become worried about Chinese economic espionage through hacking. Germany’s first China strategy, adopted in July 2023, states that “Espionage activities targeting Germany continue to increase, particularly in cyberspace.”30 In the Netherlands, the intelligence agencies have warned about Chinese cyberattacks, stating that “the crown jewels of the Dutch economy are in danger.”31 In its latest annual report, the General Intelligence and Security Service called China “the biggest threat to the Netherlands’ economic security,” and its director-general said that “the Chinese use cyber as a weapon, cyber as a way to commit espionage.”32 1.3 China rearranges its hacking capabilities to make attribution more difficult China rearranged its hacking capabilities to make attribution more difficult. States have long relied on proxies for cyberattacks to benefit from their expertise and to make attribution more difficult.33 Autocracies tend to use proxies more but these are often quite firmly entrenched in their state bureaucracy and only have limited autonomy, as is the case with China, making their designation as proxy contested.34 Chinese cyber espionage started in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose units often conduct economic in addition to political and military espionage. In 2009, for instance, a State Department cable claimed that a series of attacks could be traced back to the PLA’s Third Department, which oversaw China’s electronic eavesdropping at the time.35 Public naming-and-shaming and US indictments of Chinese hackers became frequent, especially between 2009 and 2015. Due to most hackers being based in the PLA directly, China’s government could not plausibly deny its direct involvement. In 2015, Xi and President Barack Obama signed an agreement that China and the United States would not engage in commercial cyber espionage.36 This was followed by short-term decrease in Chinese hacking, although it is unclear how much of this was due to China honoring the agreement and how much to a change in its approach. A reshuffle in China’s military in 2015 – when the Strategic Support Force (战略支援部队) was formed to centralize all PLA space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities37 – made evaluating the effectiveness of the agreement difficult. There has been a considerable increase in the volume and sophistication of Chinese hacking since 2016. Even before this, some of China’s cyber hacking reportedly had moved to the private sector and a vast “elite satellite network of contractors at front companies and universities that work at the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security.”38 Since 2015, this “freelance cyber army” has been guided by the Ministry of State Security, which is officially a full-spectrum intelligence agency, while the PLA has shifted to combat-oriented activities.   , 2. Hackers serve the party state in several domains An analysis of the EuRepoC data reveals that, between 2005 and 2021, more than 78 percent of cyberattacks attributed to a Chinese threat actor were for data theft (for comparison, the figure for Russia was 60 percent).39 Half of these also included “hijacking with misuse” (taking control of a computer to be able to run commands or change something on its disk), which often also ultimately serves for data stealing in Chinese attacks conducted by state-affiliated actors. APT1’s attacks on US targets between 2006 and 2013 are one example of hijacking that ultimately served to ensure that the PLA unit had continuous access to “steal broad categories of intellectual properties.”40 Often, Chinese threat actors try to stay undetected by only transferring small amounts of data. They analyze the data on-site and only transfer what is relevant.41 For example, the Winnti group attacks transferred only internal technology documentation, code-signing certificates (that allow supply-chain attacks), and source code.42 State institutions were the most important targets of attacks (with 32 percent). Critical infrastructure, corporate institutions, and science institutions were also very important ones, with the defense, energy, and telecommunications industries as well as military institutions targeted more frequently. 2.1 Chinese attacks target government departments and tech companies Chinese threat actors have a diverse set of targets but these mirror and support the priorities of China’s leadership, such as those outlined in the Five-Year Plan. They include dissidents, patent holders, and corporate and state counterparts in international negotiations. Chinese hackers have supported Chinese state-owned enterprises in trade negotiations by breaching the networks of important US firms like U.S. Steel and SolarWorld.43 For example, RedAlpha is best known for targeting Tibetans in exile but the infrastructure it uses (including servers and IP ranges) has also been used for hacking foreign governments. In several cases, government institutions were targeted during periods of dialogue with China. Some actors seem to focus on specific strategic sectors. APT40, for instance, targets research projects at universities relating to naval capabilities, especially government-sponsored projects.44 Others, like APT24, focus on traditional espionage and stealing documents with political significance.45 Many collect information with political relevance as well as IP-related information in key industries. In 2018, RedAlpha targeted Daimler AG one day after the company cut its profit outlook as a result of growing tensions between China and United States.46 All of this supports the argument that these activities originating from China are state-affiliated.47 Attacks for intelligence collection before imminent events, not only high-level visits but also mergers and acquisitions talks, has been observed consistently. For example, a significant increase in Chinese scanning activity was observed in Alaska in 2018, just before a trade delegation from the US state was due to travel to China.48 This pattern has also been observed with the likes of Germany and Belt and Road Initiative countries.49 2.2 China’s government is carrying out a campaign for cyber-espionage The fact that many attacks originate in China is not necessarily evidence of government action. Given that China has 25 percent of the global online population and hosts many online servers with no or minimal protection, it is not surprising that many attacks originate in the country or can be traced back there.50 However, based on EURepoC data, the research by international cybersecurity firms, and advisories from intelligence agencies, it is clear that China’s government is carrying out a deliberate campaign to obtain intelligence using hacks. Sustained campaigns like Titan Rain show how an attack vector or exploit travels through China’s hacking scene and is shared between actors. If one of the actors involved is identified as a Chinese government one, this makes it likely that all the others are also state-affiliated, especially taken together with analysis of their TTP, their targets, and open-source intelligence about specific hackers.51 There is also evidence that Chinese hacking groups obtain information about targets from government sources. The 2021 Vulnerability Disclosure Law requires that all companies, including cybersecurity and hacking companies, operating in China need to report any vulnerabilities to the authorities within two days. Two days is often not enough time for companies to patch a vulnerability,52 and, according to Microsoft, the increased use of zero-days (previously unknown exploits) by China-based actors is likely connected to this requirement.53 This suggests some level of coordination between government defensive and offensive forces. Many Chinese threat actors have multiple roles. They conduct espionage of foreign government actors and conduct economic espionage of foreign private-sector actors, especially in areas of strategic importance for the state. Some also use the same tools and resources for personal profit. This further muddies the water for attribution. APT41, the most prolific threat actor identified with 16 attacks, has conducted state-sponsored espionage as well as “financially motivated activity potentially outside of state control.”54 Since the Chinese authorities have regularly cracked down on criminal hackers, such activities suggest that the Ministry of State Security might not have as much control over some hacking groups as it would like to have.55 2.3 China’s government tries to increase control over hackers The risk associated with the existence of proxies and a freelance cyber army has become apparent to China’s government. After Chinese hacktivists going by the name Honker or Red Hacker(红客) attacked the US embassy in Belgrade 1999 following the US bombing of the Chinese embassy there, the government became more serious about reining in its hackers.56 The government has made efforts to phase out criminal freelancers. In 2015, the Operation Clean Internet included some internationally active threat actors among its targets for arrest.57 China’s government is trying to restrict hackers to national hacking competitions instead of international ones. In 2017, the founder of China’s largest cybersecurity company, Qihoo 360, publicly criticized Chinese citizens travelling overseas for hackathons. In 2018, the organizers of Pwn2Own, an important international cybersecurity competition, announced that Chinese citizens could no longer participate in the contest due to domestic Chinese regulation.58 Chinese hacking teams still place fourth on CTFTime, the largest international “Capture the Flag” platform internationally. Since 2018, the Tianfu Cup, a more real-world contest than many Western ones, has been hosted in China by major Chinese cybersecurity companies as well as Alibaba, Baidu, and Huawei.59 Modified exploits showcased at this event have been used by Chinese authorities to surveil the Uyghur population.60 The government has also stepped up its efforts to educate a huge cyber workforce that is also loyal to the Chinese Communist Party to shore up both cyber security and hacking without posing threats to the Party.61 The National Cybersecurity Center in Wuhan, an institution with a large campus set up to train cybersecurity workers, to incubate cybersecurity companies, and to conduct research, is a good indication of the significance the party-state gives to cybersecurity. Private-sector actors have also stepped up their education efforts, as their cyber job adverts show. There is a lot of demand for competition and “Capture the Flag” designers, and there has been a surge in domestic hacking competitions.   China’s government now has a firm grip on Chinese hackers, who often work for it through a series of shell companies loosely affiliated with regional branches of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) instead of being directly in the PLA hierarchy. Some of these hackers and contractor companies also contribute to domestic repression and support the Ministry of Public Security in obtaining evidence to use in interrogations, wiping devices, and censorship.62 Staying on the party’s good side allows some of these hackers to conduct financially motivated side activities, although regular crackdowns make this riskier.63 , 3. Chinese threat actors attack for long-term access A broader range of institutions and hackers has become part of China’s hacking landscape over the past decade, but their goals have been consistent. A key one is to value long-term access to targets above short-term rewards, which applies for the PLA, the MSS, and their proxies. This makes detection more difficult. This fits well with the Strategic Support Force’s goal of “perpetual mobilization” and the PLA’s concept of peacetime-wartime integration (平战一体) since long-term access could be used for destructive purposes in the event of a conflict.64 It is also a sign of relatively stable APT groups that manage to update their toolsets and check access: APT30, for instance, has good version control, allowing it to keep a history of its programs, and it has used the same tools for years. Every couple of weeks, it logs into each captured computer and updates its tools to ensure the same version is running on each target.65 3.1 Chinese threat actors try to stay undetected Chinese state-affiliated threat actors try to stay undetected, and a lot of their hacking is designed to be invisible so as to secure long-term access to their targets. APT1, for instance, has maintained access to networks for an average of 365 days, and it has been able to stay in some networks for up to five years.66 Threat actors use different techniques to make detection difficult, unlike in the case of, say, ransomware attacks, which end as soon as they are detected.67 Chinese attacks for long-term access could be used for disruptive attacks in the future. Some have been shown to leave behind disruption software; for instance, in the US power grid.68 In the analysis of EuRepoC data, 28 percent of Chinese attacks targeted critical infrastructure. The figure is 29 percent for Russia, which is known to conduct disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure. While Chinese threat actors have not moved to disruption to date, China has set up cyber ranges to conduct disruption tests, and all indications point to it building up capability to disrupt in the future.69 A 2023 attack on US critical infrastructure was attributed by Microsoft to the Chinese threat actor VoltTyphoon, which the company said intended “to perform espionage and maintain access without being detected for as long as possible.”70 VoltTyphoon tried to hide its attack in typical administrator activity, known as “living off the land.” It also proxied its network traffic through compromised devices owned by private users or small companies. This shows that this kind of living-off-the-land activity is very difficult to detect regardless of how secure the target’s IT is as long as there are smaller companies and private user devices that can be hijacked. Network devices like routers are means to keep Chinese attacks invisible.71 For example, Mandiant has identified in the case of one specific vulnerability of one router that there were organizations in the US defense, government, telecommunications, high tech, education, transportation, and financial sectors that were targeted.72 As long as there are such insecure edge devices, including not only network devices but also local, small servers, Chinese threat actors can continue to capture them for hacking.73 3.2 Chinese attacks are less visible than those of other authoritarian countries Almost 50 percent of the attributed attacks in the EURepoC data were from four authoritarian countries: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The 2022 report of Germany’s Verfassungsschutz identified China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey as the four main threat actors targeting the country.74 Each of these countries has a sizable state-affiliated hacking community and uses hacking for traditional government espionage, but they differ in their other activities. For example, while North Korean hackers engage in traditional espionage like stealing data from the South Korean army, most of their hacks focus on short-term financial gain. Around half of North Korea’s foreign-currency income is reportedly from cyberattacks.75 Hackers employ ransomware, rob banks, and steal cryptocurrency from online exchanges. As Internet access is extremely limited in the country, North Korean hackers usually have been highly cultivated by the authorities.76 By contrast, Russian hackers focus more on disruptive attacks. More than 30 percent of attributed Russian state-affiliated attacks included some disruption, and many were specifically designed to disrupt, like the NotPetya attack on Ukraine’s infrastructure in 2017. Russian and North Korean attacks are thus often more easily detected. Iranian hackers are mostly active at the regional level and for political statements. Chinese hackers have used cryptocurrency attacks, although their timing suggests that they were moonlighting when doing so: the attacks were usually carried out after 6 pm, while data-theft attacks were carried out during working hours. Chinese hackers do not use ransomware much. When they do, it tends to be to disguise more targeted data theft. For instance, the threat actor EmissaryPanda used known vulnerabilities to make an IP theft attack look like a ransomware one, persisting in the system for months with only minimal activity.77 In another operation, the targets were a pharmaceutical company, a law firm, aerospace and defense firms, and electronic component designers and manufacturers, in line with strategic priorities of China’s government.78 , 4. Chinese hacking attacks are here to stay China is an important source of cyberattacks on Europe and Germany. Institutional changes have created a more flexible and sophisticated state-affiliated Chinese hacking scene. Chinese hackers participate less in international forums, and now need to share vulnerabilities with China’s government before sharing them with other governments or the threatened company. China has a growing incentive for data theft and exfiltration as it increasingly sees itself in conflict with the West and technology is one of the cornerstones of this conflict. IP theft and persistent access by Chinese actors are already dangerous to Europe and Germany. In addition to economic and technology espionage, Chinese threat actors also target critical infrastructure, often simultaneously for espionage and long-term access for possible future disruptions. China seems to be preparing for future disruptions; for instance, during a possible Taiwan conflict. Not all attacks originating from China can be attributed directly to its government. However, many long-term Chinese threat actors have been identified as government sponsored. In addition, Chinese attacks become more frequent and intense around visits and planned mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities of Chinese firms, further justifying their attribution to China’s government. Chinese attacks are strategic with threat actors typically attacking for long-term access and often targeting a smaller number of high-value targets. This makes these attacks less visible, while their use of edge devices like routers makes detection even more difficult. Europe’s prosperity relies on maintaining an edge in technology. Recent cases of ransomware in Europe and Germany show that cybersecurity needs to be improved. Securing the most innovative firms against cyber espionage should be a high priority. Germany, with its many companies with valuable IP, faces additional hurdles in this regard as its smaller Mittelstand companies have fewer resources to spend on cybersecurity.79 The activities of Chinese hackers in European networks are here to stay, and Europe should be prepared to face this threat over the long term. These attackers often use the same technique for a variety of different targets in different countries over a long time. The recent focus on preventing ransomware should be complemented by an equal focus on long-term challenges. Because Chinese hackers try not to be detected and do not disrupt, they are often underestimated in Europe. , Options for action European governments should define what constitutes strategic, critical, and important technology: China’s intellectual property theft through hacking is especially harmful where it attacks foundational technology. Knowing what technology is most critical to Europe’s prosperity allows governments and private business to better prioritize resources. The EU has just defined a critical technology list, and cybersecurity should be included in the risk assessment being taken out for these technologies. European government agencies should study the Chinese domestic hacking scene, investment and capabilities: A good understanding of the Chinese hacking scene will provide a good idea of threat actors’ likely targets, tactics, and priorities. This should include tracking China’s aspirations and capabilities through the likes of cybersecurity curricula in schools and job adverts. European governments need to better understand Chinese attack patterns and prepare accordingly: Chinese threat actors support Chinese government visits and M&A activities. Governments should ensure that cybersecurity is strengthened around visits, and that companies are aware of the risks when considering M&A and other strategic partnerships with Chinese firms in strategic sectors. European governments, the EU, and NATO should identify likely hacking targets by studying the priorities of China’s government: Chinese hacking follows government priorities closely, so understanding these when it comes to technology can help better define likely targets in Europe. European governments should provide additional training and resources to likely or critical targets: Since their resources are limited, governments should provide additional training and resources to those targets that are most likely or most critical. This includes infrastructure companies and companies that have foundational technology. Government and private actors in EU and NATO countries should share intelligence on attacks: Chinese threat actors often use the same toolkit across multiple targets and years, in different industries and countries. Sharing intelligence can help detect Chinese intrusions earlier. Trust needs to be established for companies to be willing to share their cybersecurity incidents. They need to be assured the government will not be using the disclosed vulnerabilities in cyberattacks themselves.   Endnotes 1 | European Commission (2022). “Cyber Resilience Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future.” Retrieved October 23, 2023, from https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber-resilience-act 2 | Dennis Schirrmacher (2022). “Studie: (Cyber-)Attacken kosten deutsche Unternehmen 203 Milliarden Euro.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from heise online https://www.heise.de/news/Studie-Cyber-Attacken-kosten-deutsche-Unternehmen-203-Milliarde-Euro-7251239.html 3 | Sabrina Flemming (n.d.). Wirtschaftsschutz 2021. 19. 4 | Perlroth, Nicole (2021). “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.” The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html 5 | Bitkom e.V. (n.d.). “203 Milliarden Euro Schaden pro Jahr durch Angriffe auf deutsche Unternehmen | Presseinformation | Bitkom e. V.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from https://www.bitkom.org/Presse/ Presseinformation/Wirtschaftsschutz-2022 6 | Tanriverdi, Hakan, Svea Eckert, Jan Strozyk, Maximilian Zierer, & Rebecca Ciesielski (2019). “Winnti: Attacking the Heart of the German Industry.” Retrieved July 10, 2023, from BR24 https://web.br.de/ interaktiv/winnti/english/ 7 | Patrawala, Fatema (2019). “Winnti Malware: Chinese hacker group attacks major German corporations for years, German public media investigation reveals.” Retrieved July 10, 2023, from Packt Hub https://hub.packtpub.com/winnti-malware-chinese-hacker-group-attacks-major-german-corporations-for-years/ 8 | Perlroth, Nicole (2021). “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.” The New York Times. Retrieved from  https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html 9 | Mandiant (2023). “Stealth Mode: Chinese Cyber Espionage Actors Continue to Evolve Tactics to Avoid Detection.” Retrieved July 24, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/chinese-espionage-tactics 10 | Verfassungsschutz (2022). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021. 11 | Wilkie, Christina (2021). U.S., NATO and EU to blame China for cyberattack on Microsoft Exchange servers. Retrieved from NBC https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/19/nato-and-eu-launch-a-cyber-security-alliance-to-confront-chinese-cyberattacks.html 12 | Microsoft 365 Security Intelligence (2021). “HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits.” Retrieved July 13, 2023, from https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ 13 | PRC Embassy (2014). “Ambassador Cui Tiankai’s Interview with the Foreign Policy_Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America.” Retrieved August 22, 2023, from http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgzc/201411/t20141107_4900884.htm 14 | Sahin, Kaan, & Barker, Tyson (2021). “Europe’s Capacity to Act in the Global Tech Race | DGAP.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/europes-capacity-act-global-tech-race 15 | Xinhua (2020). “Xi Focus: Xi stresses development of science, technology to meet significant national needs - Xinhua | English.news.cn.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/12/c_139361891.htm 16 | Olcott, Eleanor, Davies, Christian, & Jung-a, Song (2023). “The South Korean ‘master’ of chips accused of sharing secrets with China.” Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/fc7f6ea0-08f6-40f3-897f-e723cff9fd8c 17 | EU China IPR Helpdesk (2021). “Technology Transfer to China - Guidance for Busineses.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from https://intellectual-property-helpdesk.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/Technology_Transfer_to_China_Guide.pdf 18 | Recorded Future (2022). “Semiconductor Companies Targeted by Ransomware | Recorded Future.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.recordedfuture.com/semiconductor-companies-targeted-by-ransomware 19 | Yang, Heekyong, & Park, Ju-min (2023). “Trial starts for Korean chip executive accused of stealing Samsung secrets for China factory.” Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/technology/tri- al-starts-korean-chip-exec-accused-stealing-samsung-secrets-china-factory-2023-07-12/ 20 | Thompson, Adrienne (2022). “Engineer Who Fled Charges of Stealing Chip Technology in US Now Thrives in China.” Retrieved September 28, 2023, from Center for Security and Emerging Technology https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/engineer-who-fled-charges-of-stealing-chip-technology-in-us-now-thrives-in-china/ 21 | Wei, Lingling & Bob Davis (2018). “How China Systematically Pries Technology From U.S. Companies.” Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-systematically-pries-technology-from-u-s-companies-1537972066 22 | Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (n.d.). “Wirtschafts-/ Wissenschaftsschutz.” Retrieved August 24, 2022, from BundesamtfuerVerfassungsschutz http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/wirtschafts-wissenschaftsschutz/wirtschafts-wissenschaftsschutz_node.html 23 | Wübbeke, Jost & Mirjam Meissner, Max J. Zenglein, Jacqueline Ives, Björn Conrad (2016). “Made in China 2025 | Merics.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from MERICS https://merics.org/de/studie/made-china-2025-0 24 | Thornburgh, Nathan (2005). “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies.” Time. Retrieved from https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1098961-2,00.html 25 | Thornburgh, Nathan (2005). “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies.” Time. Retrieved from https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1098961-2,00.html 26 | Grow, Brian & Mark Hosenball (2011). “Special report: In cyberspy vs. cyberspy, China has theedge.” Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-cyberespionage-idUS-TRE73D24220110414 27 | NBC News (2014). “U.S. Charges China With Cyber-Spying on American Firms.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/u-s-charges-china-cyber-spying-american-firms-n108706 28 | United States Department of Justice (2021). “Four Chinese Nationals Working with the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaign Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information, Including Infectious Disease Research.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-chinese-nationals-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion 29 | Mandiant (2013). “APT1 | Exposing China’s Cyber Espionage Units.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt1-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units 30 | Bundesregierung (2023). Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. 31 | Stu Sjouwerman (n.d.). “Dutch Intelligence Agencies Warn About Chinese and Russian Cyber Espionage.” Retrieved August 21, 2023, from https://blog.knowbe4.com/dutch-intelligence-agencies-warn-about-chinese-and-russian-digital-cyber-espionage 32 | Corder, Mike (2023). “Dutch intel agency paints grim picture of multiple threats.” Retrieved August 21, 2023, from AP News https://apnews.com/article/intelligence-netherlands-terrorism-threat-russia-china-dutch-cyber-attack-277fb0dc4203cbe6fbbc7ad8476b4184 33 | Harnisch, Sebastian & Kerstin Zell-Schabath (2023). Sicherheit durch Verschleierung. Warum Regierungen Proxies in Cyberkonflikten einsetzen 2023. Retrieved from https://bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/blog/forschung-dsf-no-57/ 34 | Harnisch, Sebastian & Kerstin Zell-Schabath (2023). Sicherheit durch Verschleierung. Warum Regierungen Proxies in Cyberkonflikten einsetzen 2023. Retrieved from https://bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/blog/forschung-dsf-no-57/ 35 | Grow, Brian & Mark Hosenball (2011). “Special report: In cyberspy vs. cyberspy, China has the edge.” Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-cyberespionage-idUS-TRE73D24220110414 36 | Elsa B. Kania & John K. Costello (2018). “The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations.” The Cyber Defense Review, 3(1), 105–122. 37 | Costello, John, & McReynolds, Joe (2018). “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era.” China Strategic Perspectives, 13. 38 | Perlroth, Nicole (2021). “Inside China’s vast network of hackers and how it became a prime cyber threat to the US.” The Economic Times. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/inside-chinas-vast-network-of-hackers-and-how-it-became-a-prime-cyber-threat-to- the-us/articleshow/84575103.cms?from=mdr 39 | According to MERICS analysis of EURepoC data. 40 | Mandiant (2013). “APT1 | Exposing China’s Cyber Espionage Units.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt1-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units 41 | Fire Eye (2015). APT30 and the Mechanics of a Long-Running Cyber Espionage Operation. Retrieved from https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf 42 | Tom “Hollywood” Hegel (2018). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20180504222638/; https://401trg.pw/burning-umbrella/ 43 | Department of Justice (2014). “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage.” Retrieved January 26, 2023, from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor 44 | Mandiant (n.d.). “Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups & Threat Actors.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups 45 | Mandiant (n.d.). “Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups & Threat Actors.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups 46 | Insikt Group (2018). “Chinese Cyberespionage Originating From Tsinghua University Infrastructure | Recorded Future.” Retrieved July 6, 2023, from https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-cyberespionage-operations 47 | rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/ files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf 48 | Alfred Ng (2018). “Chinese hackers targeted US agencies during trade talks.” Retrieved August 21, 2023, from https://www.cnet.com/news/politics/chinese-hackers-targeted-us-agencies-during-trade-talks/ 49 | Insikt Group (2018). “Chinese Cyberespionage Originating From Tsinghua University Infrastructure | Recorded Future.” Retrieved July 6, 2023, from https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-cyberespionage-operations 50 | Ron Deibert (2008). “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network.” Information Warfare Monitor. 51 | Intrusion Truth (Group) (n.d.). “Intrusion Truth – 入侵真相.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https:// intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/ 52 | Dakota Cary (2021). “China’s new software policy weaponizes cybersecurity research” [Text]. Retrieved July 19, 2022, from The Hill https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/564318-chinas-new-software-policy-weaponizes-cybersecurity-research/ 53 | Micorosoft (2023). Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2022. 54 | Mandiant (n.d.). “Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups & Threat Actors.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/insights/apt-groups 55 | Intrusion Truth (Group) (n.d.). “Intrusion Truth – 入侵真相.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/ 56 | Cary, Dakota (2021). “China’s next generation of hackers won’t be criminals. That’s a problem.” Retrieved July 13, 2023, from TechCrunch https://techcrunch.com/2021/11/12/chinas-next-generation-of-hackers-wont-be-criminals-thats-a-problem/ 57 | Intrusion Truth (Group) (n.d.). “Intrusion Truth – 入侵真相.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/ 58 | Hauke Gierow (2018). Chinese hackers are expected to put their country first | Merics. Retrieved from https://merics.org/en/analysis/chinese-hackers-are-expected-put-their-country-first 59 | https://web.archive.org/web/20230205165552/; https://www.tianfucup.com/ (n.d.). Retrieved July 14, 2023. 60 | Patrick Howell O’Neill (2021). “How China turned a prize-winning iPhone hack against the Uyghurs | MIT Technology Review.” Retrieved July 14, 2023, from https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/05/06/1024621/china-apple-spy-uyghur-hacker-tianfu/ 61 | Cary, Dakota (2021). "China’s National Cybersecurity Center: A Base for Military-Civil Fusion in the Cyber Domain". CSET Analysis. 62 | Intrusion Truth (Group) (n.d.). “Intrusion Truth – 入侵真相.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/ 63 | Cary, Dakota (2021). “China’s next generation of hackers won’t be criminals. That’s a problem.” Retrieved July 13, 2023, from TechCrunch https://techcrunch.com/2021/11/12/chinas-next-generation-of-hackers-wont-be-criminals-thats-a-problem/ 64 | Ministry of Defense (2022). Eastern Theatre Command concentrates on strengthening joint efforts (东部战区着力强化联合作战指挥能力建设). Retrieved from https://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/dbzq/4921131. html 65 | Fire Eye (2015). APT30 and the Mechanics of a Long-Running Cyber Espionage Operation. Retrieved from https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf 66 | Mandiant (2013). “APT1 | Exposing China’s Cyber Espionage Units.” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt1-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units 67 | Unit 42 (2023). “Threat Brief: Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Attributed to Insidious Taurus (aka Volt Typhoon).” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from Unit 42 https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/volt-typhoon-threat-brief/ 68 | Siobhan Gorman (https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085). “Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies.” 69 | “Downrange: A Survey of China’s Cyber Ranges” (n.d.). Retrieved July 13, 2023, from Center for Security and Emerging Technology https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/downrange-a-survey-of-chinas-cyber-ranges/ 70 | Intelligence, Microsoft Threat (2023). “Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from Microsoft Security Blog https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/ 71 | Mandiant (2023). “Suspected Chinese Threat Actors Exploiting FortiOS Vulnerability (CVE-2022- 42475).” Retrieved February 6, 2023, from https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/chinese-actors-exploit-fortios-flaw 72 | “APT41 Initiates Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits” (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2023, from Mandiant  https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits 73 | itayc (2023). “The Dragon Who Sold His Camaro: Analyzing Custom Router Implant.” Retrieved July 24, 2023, from Check Point Research https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/the-dragon-who-sold-his-camaro-analyzing-custom-router-implant/ 74 | Verfassungsschutz (2023). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2022. 75 | Muncaster, Phil (2023). “North Korea Makes 50% of Income from Cyber-Attacks: Report.” Retrieved July 9, 2023, from Infosecurity Magazine https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/north-korea-makes-50-income/ 76 | Caesar, Ed (2021). “The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army.” The New Yorker. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/26/the-incredible-rise-of-north-koreas-hacking-army 77 | HvS Consuling AG (n.d.). “Spione, die sich als Hacker tarnen.” Retrieved July 10, 2023, from https://www.hvs-consulting.de/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27/ 78 | Jai Vijayan (2022). “Chinese APT Group Likely Using Ransomware Attacks as Cover for IP Theft.” Retrieved July 10, 2023, from Dark Reading https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/chinese-apt-ransomware-attacks-cover-ip-theft 79 | Knickmeier, Susanne (2018). Wirtschaftsspionage, Konkurrenzausspähung: “Jedes dritte Unternehmen ist betroffen. Schützen Sie Ihr Know-how!” https://doi.org/10.30709/2018-005   Acknowledgements The author thanks Wendy Chang for additional research and Jeroen Groenewegen-Lau and Mikko Huotari for feedback.

Merics

Good research by #MERICS on CCP's use of sanctions against its #democratic enemies.

The real fun bit comes at the very end: "Unofficial measures".

What this means of course is that because the CCP is a *#dictatorship*, they can really do whatever they want!

CCP's "law" is just a #legalistic facade, just like it was in #Nazi #ThirdReich where the Chinese "communists" in fact copied #legalism from. 🤔

"How China imposes sanctions — A guide to the evolution of Beijing’s new policy tool"
https://merics.org/en/report/how-china-imposes-sanctions

「China has to date adopted unilateral sanctions that:

☭ came in response to perceived violations of its red lines and national interests,
☭ did not show any signs of any signs of adopting secondary sanctions,
☭ often came as a mix of official and unofficial measures (i.e., measures that are not officially announced and/or adopted by the central government).

The last point makes China’s sanctions policy challenging to respond to. Not only is litigation complicated when non-official measures are adopted, they can also bolster official sanctions, while remaining plausibly deniable. China wants to create the perception that its punitive measures are difficult to predict, in order to discourage other countries’ from sanctioning.」

Unavoidably the paper uses the usual euphemisms wrt. the #neverelected CCP dictatorship. For instance "national interests" of the CCP regime are often diametrically opposed to the interests of its silenced and manipulated subjects, a.k.a "the people". CCP ≠ China

"...and you may ask yourself: 'How did we get here!?' "

#PRC #CCP #beijing #china #unitedfront #AxisOfDespots #appeasement #nixon #kissinger #MFN #WTO

How China imposes sanctions

, Key findings Geopolitical changes have led China to strengthen own unilateral sanctions. The trade conflict with the US and the sanctions imposed in 2021 by the EU, the UK, and the US for human-rights abuses in Xinjiang and the imposition of sanctions on Russia were three pivotal moments in the shaping of China’s approach to sanctions. The 39 cases of sanctions imposed by China between 2012 and 2023 analyzed in this report show that Chinese sanctions and countersanctions have been following a clear path. The number of sanctions unilaterally adopted by China has risen sharply since 2018. The great majority target US individuals, groups of people or companies and have come in response to the perceived meddling in Beijing’s internal affairs, specifically Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan. This clear trend in the Chinese sanction regime is unlikely to change much in the future. The measures most frequently adopted are closely connected to the type of targets: asset freezes, visa bans and bans on cooperation with Chinese entities mainly target individuals; export and import controls are used for companies. China’s ability to develop financial sanctions remains limited for now, ongoing policy debates in China show a keen interest in developing a legal basis for them. The Unreliable Entity List and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law are the two main policies used by China to impose official sanctions. But China’s sanctions often came as a mix of official and unofficial measures. , Introduction As the EU considers imposing sanctions against Chinese companies that have violated the sanctions imposed on Russia, it is vital to understand how China may respond to such measures. There are two recent examples of a growing number of sanctions that China has been imposing against entities and individuals in the US and the European Union: In August 2022, China sanctioned Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications Agnė Vaiciukevičiūtė for visiting Taiwan. Eight months later, it sanctioned US Congressman Michael McCaul after he met Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. It froze any assets and property he might have had in China and forbade organizations and individuals in the country from carrying out any transactions with him. The opacity and the combination of official with unofficial sanctions feed the impression of unpredictability, which might in turn deter other actors from imposing sanctions on China to begin with. However, there is a pattern to be detected in Chinese adoption of sanctions and countersanctions. Official sanctions have been a less prominent tool for China than its public and not-so-public attempts at economic coercion. A major reason for this is that China is a relatively new player in the unilateral sanctions game. China has only recently started developing policy tools for the adoption of sanctions. It now has a more solid legal framework to issue sanctions and countersanctions and that it imposes them much more frequently than in the past. The trade conflict with the United States that started in 2018 was a pivotal moment, even if measures imposed by China at the time were not technically sanctions. The sanctions imposed in 2021 by the EU, the UK, and the US for human-rights abuses in Xinjiang were another milestone. China swiftly imposed countersanctions and fast-tracked the adoption of a new framework in the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) in 2021. The AFSL and other policies leave the Chinese leadership considerable discretion to decide when sanctions are called for, what individuals and entities will be targeted and what measures will be imposed. However, China’s unilaterally imposed sanctions show a high degree of consistency when it comes to sanctions triggers, targets and measures. With a view to the currently increasing geopolitical tensions involving China, it is important to better understand China’s approaches to sanction-making. To add to the existing literature tracking China’s sanctions policy, this report seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate about how China’s approach may evolve by bringing together 39 cases of sanctions imposed by the central government between 2012 and 2023. The measures include six instances of sanctions adopted through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), five cases of sanctions imposed in the course of the US-China trade conflict and 28 cases of sanctions adopted unilaterally by China. , China learns about imposing sanctions in the UN Security Council The UNSC is the forum in which Beijing first found itself an active participant in sanctions-making. As permanent member, China has veto power over any decision put before this international body, including the adoption of sanctions. Since Xi Jinping became Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has continued its tradition of supporting most sanctions proposed to the UNSC. For example, in 2014 it voted in favor of resolution 2140 that imposed asset freezes, travel bans and a targeted arms embargo against “people who threaten peace and stability in Yemen”. In 2015, it voted in favor of resolution 2206 setting the same terms for actors in South Sudan. However, China has repeatedly opposed UNSC sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Syria and fellow UNSC member Russia. Beijing’s veto power often allowed it to stop measures in preparatory negotiations, rather than at the voting stage, making it more difficult to identify its influence. Figure one shows that China consistently backed a trickle of UNSC sanctions before adopting an ever-growing number of unilateral sanctions after the beginning of the US-China trade conflict. These measures are part of a very specific framework and need to be differentiated from other unilateral sanctions China imposed in recent years which have been adopted by China as official sanctions and “simply” as limiting measures in response to US’ own limiting measures. Exhibit 1 , Geopolitical tensions have changed China’s perception of sanctions The trade row initiated by the Trump administration was a game changer in China’s approach to sanctions. To respond to the tariffs and export controls imposed by the US, China from 2018 to 2019 adopted a series of restrictive measures in retaliation against Washington. Although there is an argument to be made that China has long viewed sanctions as a US geopolitical tool, its attitude towards imposing sanctions changed as the US began the trade row. If anything, the trade conflict was a symptom and an acceleration of geopolitical tensions between the US and China – and imposing sanctions became key for each side to express itself. To this day, China’s unilateral sanctions target entities and individuals in the US far more than any other actor. To China, sanctions thus are not just about punishing the violation of international or domestic rules nor are they exclusively about signaling discontent or punishing actors who take positions that are not of Beijing’s likes. Developments during and after the beginning of the trade conflict tell us that, to China, sanctions have become a tool in the geopolitical struggle against the US in particular. The imposition of sanctions against Russia after it attacked Ukraine spurred concerns in Beijing that it could be next. This has fueled an intense debate in China about how to improve resilience against foreign sanctions. Proposals have been tabled for a Chinese legal framework enabling the imposition of financial sanctions and anti-sanctions. However, the scenario of China imposing financial sanctions seems unlikely given the considerable legal and structural hurdles Beijing is facing. , How China developed and adopted its sanctions toolbox The fact that China punishes perceived infractions against its core interests is not new. However, the number of instances in which China adopted unilateral sanctions has jumped only in the past few years. Although foreign actors violated China’s interests and red lines before 2018, it did not resort to unilateral sanctions. For example, in 2009, China only cancelled an annual summit with the EU in response to the planned meeting between then French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama, but at the time refrained from taking other punitive measures. China still uses these diplomatic measures today, but it is reasonable to imagine a similar situation being met by measures such as sanctions on individuals in the French administration or the country’s companies, as it has been the case for senior US and EU officials visiting Taiwan. The US-China trade conflict appears to have given Beijing the necessary experience and confidence to strengthen unilateral sanctions and start imposing them more frequently. In December 2019, China sanctioned five US-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocating for democracy and human rights in response to US support of protesters in Hong Kong. The official reason given was that these NGOs supported “anti-China plotters who messed up Hong Kong through various means, aiding and abetting them in extreme violent criminal acts and inciting Hong Kong independence separatist activities”. Most of the unilateral sanctions that followed the trade conflict came in response to episodes in which China perceived foreign actors to be threatening China’s national interest or crossing red lines. Many of these tend to be moveable, but matters such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang are set items on the list of issues that will most likely spur unilateral sanctions from China in the future. Exhibit 2 China today is more confident and capable to substitute or complement diplomatic signals or reprimands with official sanctions. The number of unilateral sanctions imposed by China has skyrocketed since 2020 – even without taking into consideration unofficial sanctions-like measures, for example, like the import bans adopted towards Australia and Lithuania. , China prefers to target single companies and individuals China has since 2019 shown a growing preference for sanctions that target individuals, single companies, and nationwide groups or institutions, as shown in figure three. China appears to like this method because, firstly, sanctions against individuals, especially high-level figures, have a strong signaling effect and only a limited impact on China’s economy. Secondly, they can be divisive as they limit any adverse impact to the sanctioned entity and do not affect a broader group or entire industry. That means China does not undermine the relationship with other entities and limits potential retaliation. In the end, Beijing can impose sanctions at a relatively low cost. Exhibit 3 Notable examples of this policy include sanctions against: the then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and the Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications, Agnė Vaiciukevičiūtė, both of whom visited Taiwan in August 2022 four US individuals and the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China following US sanctions against Chinese officials for the violation of human rights in Xinjiang eleven US individuals following the US sanctions on Chinese officials for undermining democracy in Hong Kong a number of US companies and individuals in October 2020 for arms sales to Taiwan (including the CEOs of the US defense companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon) ten individuals and four entities in the EU, nine individuals and four entities in the UK and US and Canadian parties in March 2021 in response to Western sanctions on Chinese entities and individuals for human rights violations in Xinjiang. That list of sanctioned entities includes MERICS. An important trait of recent Chinese sanctions is that Beijing has often not specified what measures the sanctions include. Of the 28 cases of unilateral sanctions, 12 were imposed without China disclosing any details. For example, the sanctions it imposed against EU’s entities and individuals in March 2021 do not specify exactly what these sanctions entailed. , China is filling up its sanctions toolbox Over the course of the last decade, visa bans, asset freezes and banning cooperation with Chinese entities have become China’s most common measures of unilateral sanctions. Exhibit 4 The US dollar’s role as the global trading currency gives Washington vast power when imposing sanctions. Is there an equivalent in Beijing’s arsenal? Arguably, China’s main strength is its large market and manufacturing productions, and thus, the strongest measure are import and other restrictions to limit or close off market access. Records of China’s unilateral sanctions show Beijing has seldom used official sanctions to impose import restrictions. Since 2018, China has adopted import restrictions on four occasions, three of them during the trade row with the US. The other instance was in 2023, when China imposed import and investment bans on Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies in response to the companies exporting arms to Taiwan. Visa and travel bans are among the preferred measures adopted by China. Since 2018, China has imposed visa and travel bans 17 times (this includes the refusal of licenses to operate in China). For instance, the Chinese National Radio and Television Administration in 2021 declined to renew BBC World News’ annual license and banned it from broadcasting. Bans on cooperation with Chinese entities have been adopted 14 times. The practice reached a peak in 2021, when eight sets of sanctions included bans on cooperation. An example of that would be the sanctions that China imposed in December 2021, when the US State Department and the Treasury Department announced the addition of five deputy directors of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong to the US sanctions list under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act. Asset freezes have been adopted seven times. Most recently, they were imposed in April 2023 on actors engaging with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-Wen during her visit to the US: Sarah May Stern, Chair of the Hudson Institute Board of Trustees; John P. Walters, President and CEO of Hudson Institute; John Heubusch, former Executive Director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute; and Joanne M. Drake, Chief Administrative Officer of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation. In addition, China has imposed arms embargoes four times within the framework of UNSC sanctions. Manufacturing production is another main asset China may add to its sanctions toolbox. So far, it has imposed official export restrictions only once – against Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies when it put import restrictions on the two companies. Part of China’s economic success has been driven by foreign companies producing in the country for export. Although this in theory gives Beijing huge leverage, it has been reticent about imposing export restrictions for two reasons. China can already control exports of goods – and capital – more tightly than market economies. And its economy still relies on export production, especially in sectors with overcapacity such as iron and steel, cement, glass, aluminum, solar panels, and equipment for power generation. , China’s main policy tools: The Unreliable Entity List and the Anti-foreign Sanctions Law China maintains a high degree of flexibility about the target and timing of sanctions, using an array of measures that may well never be communicated. To do this, it relies on its Unreliable Entity List and Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. The two authorities mainly responsible for imposing sanctions and defining specific measures are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Foreign Commerce (MOFCOM) – although both parts of the process remain difficult to trace. The Unreliable Entity List (UEL) includes foreign entities on which China can impose limiting or punitive measures in response to behavior that is contrary to its national interest. As a response to growing number of Chinese companies being added to the US Entity List, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced the establishment of its own blacklist in 2019. The scope and functioning of the list are described in the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List published in 2020 by MOFCOM. For example, article 10 sets out a range of measures to punish businesses, which include fines, trade and investments restrictions and prohibitions, as well as restrictions and bans on work, entry, and residence visa. China used the newly adopted UEL for the very first time on February 16, 2023, when it included in the list two US companies: Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFLS), was adopted in June 2021 after the legislative process was accelerated in response to the March 2021 imposition of sanctions by the US, EU, UK and Canada against Chinese officials and entities for the violation of human rights in Xinjiang. The fact that Beijing was already working on the bill before the sanctions of March 2021 signal that Beijing was aware it needed to protect itself against possible foreign sanctions. However, despite the name, the AFSL is more than a policy tool to symmetrically respond to sanctions as shown by the possible targets and measures listed in the legal text. Targets include individuals and organizations directly or indirectly involved in the formulation, decisions about, or implementation of sanctions and in “discriminatory measures against Chinese citizens/interference with China’s internal affairs”. The wide-ranging and loosely defined nature of the measures shows how China views and approaches sanctions. Any interference in what China views as internal affairs, which includes Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan, can be met with unilateral sanctions. Such a framing is not only used to justify the asymmetric imposition of sanctions, but also suggests that Beijing views the imposition of sanctions as including both official as well as unofficial sanctions. The adoption of official and unofficial policies makes it particularly difficult for other countries to track and respond to Chinese sanctions. Sanctions according to China’s vague definitions can not only target individuals in organisations, but even their spouses and immediate family. The inclusion of families is a practice that precedes the AFSL and remains in use in the context of all Chinese sanctions. For example, the measures targeting Nancy Pelosi explicitly include “her immediate family”. In 2020, China announced sanctions on 28 US individuals for their purported interference in its internal affairs – and the sanctions were said to apply to the family members, too. Article 12 of the AFSL introduces an element of insecurity for foreign businesses in China. It allows Chinese citizens and organizations to sue for damages individuals and organizations who implement or assist in the implementation of the discriminatory measures taken by a foreign country. However, as of April 2023, there are no records of China making use of this provision. Article 6 of the law lists measures that can be taken: refusal of a visa to enter China, deportation from the country, banning of financial transactions and cooperation with Chinese entities, and seizure of assets. This list of measures can be expanded at any time on a case-by-case basis. The adoption of such broad and flexible criteria in the law coupled with Beijing’s tendency not to always announce what the sanctions entail in terms of targets and measures create a climate of insecurity and unpredictability. The objective of such unpredictability may very well be to deter foreign sanctions and/or keep foreign companies in China from abiding to potential foreign sanctions. China has applied the anti-foreign sanctions law a number of times since its adoption. For example, in July 2021, it imposed sanctions on several US individuals (including former US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross) and organizations in response to US sanctions on Chinese officials in Hong Kong. In December 2022, China imposed sanctions against Miles Yu Maochun, principal China policy advisor on the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The measures came in response to US sanctions on human rights issues related to Tibet in 2022. The two officials and close family members were banned from obtaining entry visas, had any assets they had in China frozen, and were barred from having contacts with entities in China. The AFSL has certainly provided China with a legal framework to impose unilateral targeted sanctions and “mainstreamed” the process to do so. On the other hand, China’s selection of targets and measures has not changed noticeably from the regime before the AFSL existed. , What to watch: China’s sanction regimes will combine manifold approaches The number of sanctions unilaterally adopted by China has risen sharply since 2018. The great majority target US individuals, groups of people or companies and have come in response to the perceived meddling in Beijing’s internal affairs, specifically Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan. This clear trend in the Chinese sanction regime is unlikely to change much in the future. The measures most frequently adopted are closely connected to the targets: asset freezes, visa bans and bans on cooperation with Chinese entities mainly target individuals. Export and import controls are used for companies. China’s ability to develop financial sanctions remains limited for now, ongoing policy debates in China show a keen interest in developing a legal basis for them. However, China has to date adopted unilateral sanctions that: came in response to perceived violations of its red lines and national interests, did not show any signs of any signs of adopting secondary sanctions, often came as a mix of official and unofficial measures (i.e., measures that are not officially announced and/or adopted by the central government). The last point makes China’s sanctions policy challenging to respond to. Not only is litigation complicated when non-official measures are adopted, they can also bolster official sanctions, while remaining plausibly deniable. China wants to create the perception that its punitive measures are difficult to predict, in order to discourage other countries’ from sanctioning. But the patterns are visible, and keeping a close eye on China’s future behavior in devising sanctions is needed for adequate responses.

Merics
Unter Xi Jinping greift die Partei verstärkt in Chinas Wirtschaft ein. Für den Staats- und Parteichef ist der Kapitalismus fehlbar und die Kontrolle der Partei über Privat-Unternehmen unverzichtbar. Wohin steuert China?
Geschäft im Käfig: 30 Jahre "sozialistische Marktwirtschaft" in China | DW | 29.03.2023
#China #Planwirtschaft #Marktwirtschaft #XiJinping #LiQiang #DengXiaoping #LiPeng #MERICS
Geschäft im Käfig: 30 Jahre "sozialistische Marktwirtschaft" in China | DW | 29.03.2023

Unter Xi Jinping greift die Partei verstärkt in Chinas Wirtschaft ein. Für den Staats- und Parteichef ist der Kapitalismus fehlbar und die Kontrolle der Partei über Privat-Unternehmen unverzichtbar. Wohin steuert China?

DW.COM
#introduction: Looking to connect with economists/ political scientists/ journalists interested in Asia/China/EU-China. Affiliated through work, fellowship or governance with #HKUST, #Bruegel #EAI at #NUS #MERICS #RIELCANO #IE #EMI at #CORNELL #NATIXIS,