Ton Lansink2d ago
1/11
Why do modern nations lose wars? Not on the battlefield. In the political arena. A thread based on the academic literature. 🧵
#War #Strategy #Geopolitics #MilitaryHistory
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
2/11
#1 No clear political goal. Clausewitz: war is politics by other means. Without a translatable political objective, military victory means nothing. Confirmed empirically by Mearsheimer (1983) and Pape (1996).
#Clausewitz #GrandStrategy #MilitaryStrategy #IR
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
3/11
#2 Overconfidence kills. States systematically overestimate their own superiority and underestimate the enemy’s adaptability. Documented by Dominic Johnson (2004). Pattern: Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.
#Overconfidence #Cognitivebias #Vietnam #Iraq #Afghanistan
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
4/11
#3 Asymmetry of motivation. Andrew Mack (1975): the stronger party has less to lose. Political costs of a long war fall hardest on the stronger side. The weaker party doesn’t need to win. It only needs to survive.
#Asymmetry #Insurgency #SmallWars #Counterinsurgency
Show threadTon Lansink
5/11
#4 Domestic support erodes. Mueller (1973): public backing drops in direct proportion to casualties, regardless of military results. This killed support for Vietnam. It is directly relevant to Iran today.
#PublicOpinion #HomeFront #Iran #VietnamWar #Casualties
Mar 15 at 1:10pmWeb
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
6/11
#5 Intelligence failure by design. Strategic surprises rarely result from lack of information. They result from cognitive bias: policymakers filter out everything that challenges their assumptions. (Handel & Wirtz)
#Intelligence #StrategicFailure #CognitiveBias #NationalSecurity
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
7/11
#6 Air power does not win wars alone. Pape (1996) studied every major air campaign from 1917 to 1991. Conclusion: tactical air superiority does not automatically produce strategic outcomes or political capitulation.
#Airpower #Bombing #MilitaryDoctrine #StrategicStudies
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
8/11
#7 No exit strategy. Record (1993) and Edelstein (2008): the absence of a defined endpoint structurally prolongs a war and worsens the cost-benefit ratio for the attacker. Every month without an endpoint is a loss.
#ExitStrategy #Occupation #Counterinsurgency #WarCosts
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
9/11
#8 Legitimacy deficit. Occupying powers lose when they offer no acceptable political alternative to the regime they fight. Betts (1995), Nagl (2002). Most underrated factor in the literature on Iraq and Afghanistan.
#Legitimacy #StateBuilding #Iraq #Afghanistan #Occupation
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
10/11
#9 Coalition incoherence. Tago (2007), Weitsman (2014): coalitions built around a dominant partner collapse when that partner shifts its objectives. Allies then recalculate their own interests.
#Alliances #Coalitions #NATO #ForeignPolicy #InternationalRelations
Show threadTon Lansink2d ago
11/11
Synthesis: military superiority is necessary but not sufficient. The decisive variables are political objective, public endurance, legitimacy, and the enemy’s capacity to adapt. Nations lose wars in politics, not in battle.
#Strategy #Geopolitics #MilitaryHistory #WarStudies #Clausewitz​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​