Turkey beyond Istanbul hits different when the sunsets look like this 🌅🏰

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How the American-Israeli War With Iran Is Alienating The Global South

Fuel, Food, And Fragility: How the American-Israeli War With Iran Is Alienating The Global South

By Uriel Araujo

The Global South faces rising inflation, food insecurity, and debt risks as the Iran war disrupts global markets. Oil price spikes and potentially tighter monetary policy in the West are bound to amplify economic strain. A growing sense of injustice should reshape geopolitical alignments.

The ripple effects of the American-Israeli war with Iran are now impossible to ignore. It has evolved into a systemic shock reverberating across energy markets, global finance, and food systems. The result, among other things, is a deepening alienation of the Global South and a further erosion of the already fragile credibility of the West-centered global order.

The economic fallout by now extends well beyond the Middle East: the war is reshaping trade routes, investment patterns, and geopolitical alignments across Eurasia and beyond, which makes the conflict a global inflection point.

Oil, predictably enough, is the first domino. The conflict has pushed prices upward, with immediate consequences for import-dependent economies. As of now, the war’s impact on global energy markets is already severe, thereby increasing transportation and production costs worldwide. For developing nations, this is a structural threat: higher fuel prices translate into inflationary pressure across entire economies, from agriculture to manufacturing.

The inflationary spiral does not stop there, though. Central banks in the Global North are now under pressure to raise interest rates to contain price increases. This familiar policy response carries devastating consequences for debt-ridden countries in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. As Frederic Schneider, a senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, warns, such tightening could trigger a new debt crisis in the Global South. Similar dynamics during previous crises led to lost decades of development.

Food security, in any case, is where the crisis might become existential. The energy shock is now feeding into agricultural production and distribution systems. Rising fertilizer costs, higher transport prices, and disrupted supply chains are creating the conditions for a global food crisis. Analysts already point to mounting risks of food shortages and price spikes, particularly in vulnerable regions.

For much of the Global South, the war’s meaning is thus blunt enough: it is a direct threat to livelihoods. No wonder discontent is growing. As Devex notes, countries far removed from the battlefield are already “feeling the pain” through rising costs and economic instability.

India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, is not a lone voice when he signals discomfort with the trajectory of the Western-led global order. His position reflects a broader sentiment: the Global South increasingly sees itself as bearing the costs of conflicts it did not choose. The parallels with the Western proxy war in Ukraine are quite striking. One may recall that sanctions and geopolitical maneuvering in that conflict (as I wrote back in 2022) were widely perceived across Africa and Asia as exacerbating food and energy crises.

Be as it may, the Iranian theatre introduces an additional strategic layer: Iran sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which a significant portion of global oil flows. Tehran’s recent offer of safe passage to BRICS countries signals an important geopolitical recalibration, with access to critical energy routes potentially being increasingly mediated through alternative political alignments rather than Western-dominated mechanisms.

This is where Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi’s assertion that “an attack on Iran is an attack on the BRICS” acquires meaning: this is no literal military doctrine, obviously, but a reflection of converging interests. Iran is, after all, a key node in Eurasian connectivity, energy flows, and emerging financial architectures. Destabilizing it thereby affects not just a single state but a broader network of countries seeking parallel alternatives and options to Western frameworks.

Indeed, the war is accelerating trends that were already underway. De-dollarization, non-alignment/multi-alignment, and the strengthening of multipolar institutions are gaining momentum. As I’ve argued, many Global South nations are, once again (as seen in the Ukrainian conflict) opting for strategic neutrality in order to protect their economic interests and avoid being drawn into great-power conflicts. The current crisis only reinforces that logic.

Meanwhile, Washington’s approach risks appearing increasingly out of step, to say the least. Reports indicate that US strategic resources are being diverted to sustain the conflict, even at the expense of other alliances, as is the case with South Korea. Such moves are sure to raise questions about priorities and commitments, even amongst traditional Western allies.

The credibility of the West-centered order, already weakened by perceived double standards, is therefore taking another hit. For many in the Global South, the pattern, again, is becoming blatantly clear: conflicts involving Western adversaries tend to generate global disruptions, while their costs are externalized onto poorer nations. This perception is politically consequential.

Thus, the question is no longer whether the war with Iran will reshape the global system, but how far that ongoing process will go. The answer depends on variables that remain uncertain. Yet one conclusion is difficult to escape: by triggering economic shocks, exacerbating food insecurity, and alienating vast swathes of the world, the conflict is inadvertently accelerating the transition toward a more fragmented and multipolar order. Whether Washington recognizes this shift is another matter entirely.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Putin’s Top Aide Patrushev: The Third Gulf War Could Destabilize Afro-Eurasia for Years

Putin’s Top Aide Patrushev: The Third Gulf War Could Destabilize Afro-Eurasia for Years

By Andrew Korybko

The “negative impacts on the agro-industrial complex in Asia, Africa, and Europe” can lead to widespread starvation, while “the shutdown of energy-intensive industries in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the European Union” can lead to widespread unemployment, with both sparking unrest.

Nikolai Patrushev is one of Putin’s oldest friends and has served as his top aide for over a quarter-century already. Although no longer Secretary of the Security Council, he’s still part of the administration and retains the president’s ear. That’s why his insight into significant matters like the Third Gulf War, which he just shared in a recent interview with Kommersant, is worth paying attention to. Patrushev believes that the conflict’s global systemic consequences will destabilize Afro-Eurasia for years.

In his words, “Operation ‘Epic Fury’ has effectively become the catalyst for the redistribution of the global energy market and the collapse of maritime logistics”, which is due to Gulf no longer functioning as one of the nexuses of the global economy after the damage to its infrastructure. As such, “Energy prices, freight rates for major container shipping lines, and insurance costs are rising. Global fertilizer exports are declining, negatively impacting the agro-industrial complex in Asia, Africa, and Europe.”

He added that “Energy supply restrictions will inevitably lead to the shutdown of energy-intensive industries in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the European Union”, which implies that the global economy will plunge into a protracted recession with no end in sight. The Third Gulf War has also backfired on the US by discrediting its reputation as a guarantor of its allies’ security, especially those that host its bases, as Iran continues pummelling the Gulf Kingdoms with retaliatory strikes.

Reflecting on the insight that Patrushev shared about the conflict’s consequences, the last-mentioned pertaining to the US’ reputational and regional interests are relatively more manageable since it could simply withdraw from the Eastern Hemisphere in the worst-case scenario of full-blown chaos. This contextualizes the National Security Strategy’s focus on restoring the US’ hegemony over the Western Hemisphere as a source of resources and markets for surviving and even thriving in that scenario.

Regrettably, the countries of Afro-Eurasia can’t shield themselves from Gulf-emanating global systemic instability like the US can, which will likely portend years of turmoil for many developed and developing countries alike. After all, any further large-scale damage to regional energy infrastructure – which is already expected to require lots of time to repair – risks taking even more of its resources off the market, thus leaving many countries without the means to meet their related needs.

The “negative impacts on the agro-industrial complex in Asia, Africa, and Europe” can lead to widespread starvation, while “the shutdown of energy-intensive industries in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the European Union” can lead to widespread unemployment, with both sparking unrest. Russia would probably be the only oasis of security and stability in the Eastern Hemisphere, but it could prioritize agricultural, fertilizer, and energy exports to its Chinese and Indian partners to help them too.

Be that as it may, Afro-Eurasia as a whole would still likely remain destabilized for years, all while the US retreats back to the Western Hemisphere to insulate itself from all this simultaneously with weaponizing the chaos for divide-and-rule purposes, so it’s impossible to predict how it could all end. To be clear, this is only the worst-case scenario and could still be averted in part, but the fact that Putin’s top aide Patrushev is already hinting about this ominously suggests that Russia is actively preparing for the worst.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Sacrificing Seoul For Tel Aviv: The Global Geopolitical Ripple Effects Of The Iran War

Sacrificing Seoul For Tel Aviv: The Global Geopolitical Ripple Effects Of The Iran War

By Uriel Araujo

The redeployment of THAAD defences from South Korea to the Middle East reflects the widening geopolitical shockwaves of the Iran conflict. While Seoul diplomatically seeks to minimize it, the episode highlights US strategic overstretch and shifting alliance dynamics. Across Asia, debates over security dependence and multi-alignment should intensify.

The ongoing war against Iran jointly pursued by Washington and Israel is already producing geopolitical ripple effects far beyond the Middle East. One of the most telling developments arguably emerged this week, with the partial redeployment of US missile defence systems from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East. Reportedly, elements of the THAAD system stationed in South Korea are being transferred to reinforce regional defences amid the escalating conflict in Iran.

The move, possibly accompanied by Patriot batteries, reflects Washington’s urgent need to reinforce missile defences around Israel and US assets in the Gulf, thus alarming sectors of the South Korean political and military elite.

This redeployment in fact also highlights a deeper structural problem: the United States is attempting to manage multiple theatres of confrontation simultaneously while possessing finite defensive resources. And the consequences are now being felt in Northeast Asia: from a “Western” point of view, removing or even partially relocating THAAD from South Korea arguably creates exposure by weakening the peninsula’s upper-tier ballistic missile defence, thereby potentially opening a high-altitude interception gap against North Korean missiles.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has publicly downplayed the issue, stating that deterrence remains credible thanks to layered defences, US troops on the peninsula, and existing alliance mechanisms.

Be as it may, the symbolism and political message is clear enough. Critics in Seoul have already voiced concern that the redeployment signals wavering US commitment to Northeast Asian security while Israel-driven Washington prioritizes Middle Eastern crises. South Korea may officially accept the decision: it cannot block it, anyway, meaning: when strategic priorities collide, secondary allies must adjust.

This development should also be understood within the broader global consequences of the Iran war. I recently wrote about how the conflict is generating worldwide repercussions, from oil market volatility to regional instability across Eurasia. Iran has demonstrated resilience and the risk of a very prolonged conflict is real enough.

The THAAD redeployment illustrates precisely that overstretch. In addition to its neo-Monroeist pivot to the American continent (see Cuba and Venezuela, not to mention the war on drugs in Mexico), Washington now finds itself balancing commitments in the Middle East, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, this takes place while confronting adversaries across all these regions simultaneously (and the line between adversary and “ally” is often blurred, as we have seen with Greenland). The limits of missile defence assets in any case have become visible. Systems deployed in one theatre cannot be instantly replicated elsewhere.

From Seoul’s perspective, the implications are quite serious. The peninsula remains one of the most militarized regions in the world, and any perceived weakening of the missile defence architecture may alter strategic calculations. Even if the gap proves temporary, the political signal still matters.

One may recall that during Trump’s first administration tensions with North Korea briefly eased through direct diplomacy. Whatever one thinks of those negotiations, they demonstrated that engagement could lower immediate risks. By contrast, the Biden years largely abandoned that approach, treating negotiations primarily through the lens of denuclearization demands that Pyongyang of course had little incentive to accept.

As I argued previously, a more realistic approach to the Korean Peninsula (even from an American perspective) would recognize that North Korea’s nuclear capability is a permanent strategic fact and, accordingly, seek mechanisms to manage it rather than try to eliminate it.

In that context, regional dynamics have evolved rapidly. Cooperation between Russia and North Korea, for instance, has expanded within a broader Eurasian strategic landscape.

Meanwhile, Washington’s own Indo-Pacific strategy has already contributed to an accelerating missile race across the region. Deployments and defence initiatives involving Japan, the Philippines, Australia and others have intensified the militarization of the region, thereby raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation.

The redeployment of THAAD demonstrates a hard truth: even this expanding network cannot fully compensate for limited resources.

The irony is that the Korean Peninsula itself has been drawn into Washington’s evolving alliance architecture. Discussions about an “AUKUS-plus” framework including South Korea, along with debates about nuclear-submarine cooperation, illustrate how Seoul has been encouraged to deepen military integration with US-led structures. Yet the current episode suggests that alliance commitments remain quite conditional when global crises emerge elsewhere, especially given the complexity of the US-Israeli special relationship.

No wonder some Asian policymakers increasingly consider multi-alignment strategies. Countries such as Indonesia have already experimented with more flexible diplomacy, maintaining relations across rival blocs rather than relying exclusively on one security patron. For many emerging states navigating the new Cold War environment, such pragmatism appears reasonable.

That being said, the Iran war will likely accelerate that very trend. Washington’s decision to escalate alongside Israel has already produced worldwide economic and strategic repercussions, as mentioned. Energy markets are volatile, shipping routes face disruption, and regional tensions extend from the Persian Gulf to Eurasia. The redeployment of missile defences from South Korea is yet another example of how this conflict reverberates globally. For US allies, it also shows that, when Washington engages in simultaneous confrontations, priorities shift rapidly, to say the least.

Seoul has responded cautiously, emphasizing alliance stability and minimizing public criticism. Diplomatically, that restraint is understandable. Yet strategically the lesson should not be ignored.

If the United States is willing to redeploy critical defences from the Korean Peninsula in order to support a Middle Eastern war, Asian governments may conclude that diversification of partnerships is prudent or necessary. Reliance on a single security provider, especially one as unpredictable as Washington, becomes rather risky in an era of global instability.

To sum it up, the THAAD episode is a geopolitical signal in itself. It tells the world how overburdened Washington has become, how quickly alliance priorities can shift, and how urgently Asian states must rethink their strategic autonomy.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Why Trump’s Iranian Strategic Mistake Is Redrawing The Global Map From Hormuz To Eurasia

Why Trump’s Iranian Strategic Mistake Is Redrawing The Global Map From Hormuz To Eurasia

By Uriel Araujo

Escalation with Iran is generating worldwide consequences. Oil market volatility, regional instability, and Eurasian security concerns beyond the Middle East highlight the broader geopolitical stakes. Iran’s resilience and the risk of prolonged conflict challenge Washington’s objectives. The war may thus prove far more costly than expected.

The past weekend offered, once again, a blunt reminder that the US-Israel war against Iran is not unfolding as many in Washington and Tel Aviv had hoped. Iranian missile and drone strikes have caused casualties inside Israel, while attacks on Gulf facilities and US allies have intensified. Reports of mounting US military casualties are circulating, even as the Pentagon attempts to limit details. Meanwhile, despite American naval deployments, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue, reducing tanker transits dramatically and basically keeping global energy markets on edge. Moreover, perhaps most importantly, Iran’s political system has not collapsed. The Islamic Republic stands in fact defiant and fully operational. This has wider consequences, even globally.

US President Donald Trump’s decision to escalate the conflict alongside Israel marked a dramatic departure from the “no more wars” narrative that used to energize his “MAGA” (“Make America Great Again”) political base. I’ve recently argued that entering a large-scale war against Iran could destroy this very political coalition. The core promise of “America First” was, after all, precisely to avoid endless Middle Eastern wars while rebuilding the American economy at home.

In June 2025, I warned that direct US intervention in an Iran-Israel war would likely send oil prices toward $120–$150 per barrel and push American gasoline prices into the politically dangerous $4–$5 per gallon range . Well, on Monday (March 9), Brent crude briefly surged past $119 per barrel, the highest level since June 2022

The spike followed weeks of escalating tensions and fears that the Strait of Hormuz could effectively close completely. At one point, tanker transits dropped from roughly two dozen per day to only a handful, while overall ship traffic through the Strait fell from about one hundred vessels daily to single digits. Prices have since retreated somewhat, hovering around $84–$86 on Tuesday, but the market remains extremely volatile. Energy traders are reacting to every military development, with options markets still betting on scenarios where crude climbs toward $135 or even $150.

Thus, even if oil stabilizes for now, the geopolitical risk premium is here to stay for as long as the conflict continues. Hormuz remains the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoint, and the attacks on Gulf infrastructure have added further uncertainty.

That being said, Trump may still try to extract advantages from the situation. Trump’s foreign policy style often is bluntly “transactional”. One just needs to point out how he has repeatedly attempted to leverage previous US aid to Ukraine in order to obtain political concessions (regarding rare-earth minerals and so on). Similarly, he has also angered the Israeli right with proposals such as his Gaza “development” plan.

In the context of the current war, a similar logic could emerge. Analysts have noted that the conflict is already costing Washington billions of dollars in munitions and logistical support. If the campaign drags on, Trump may seek to “reimburse” the United States by demanding expanded basing rights or economic concessions in the region. The US President, in his typical manner, has already floated the idea of “taking over” the strait.

In other words, if Washington and Tel Aviv were to declare victory, Trump could push for expanded US military bases, control of strategic infrastructure, and privileged access to Iran’s energy sector.

Such an outcome, in this scenario, would carry considerable strategic costs for Israel, naturally. A prolonged US military presence across Iranian territory would shift the regional balance in Washington’s favour. The Jewish state might then win the war (in this scenario) but find itself sharing the geopolitical spoils with its superpower ally: I’ve written before about how Trump was apparently seeking to “recalibrate” the complex US-Israeli relationship.

Be as it may, emerging reports already suggest divergences between Washington and Tel Aviv. Trump in any case already seems eager to limit the war’s duration due to domestic political risks and rising oil prices, while Israeli leaders seem determined to continue until Iranian military capabilities are fully degraded.

The stakes of course go beyond US and regional actors: China, for one thing, is being severely impacted, there being no broad exception for Chinese vessels in the Strait.

Moscow in turn has long regarded its Iranian ally as also a crucial buffer state helping stabilize Russia’s southern strategic arc. If the United States were to gain military access to Iran, the implications would thus be profound enough. American forces could, in such a scenario, position themselves near the Caspian basin, within logistical reach of the Caucasus and Central Asia and much closer to southern Russia. This would amount to further layers of the geopolitical “encirclement” of Russia.

In addition, from an American perspective, a weakened Iran would ripple across Eurasia: accelerating Western influence in the South Caucasus, also potentially pushing Central Asian states toward greater Western cooperation

A decisive US-Israeli victory, however, is very far from assured. Iran’s asymmetric capabilities (missiles, maritime disruption) remain potent, and prolonged Hormuz instability could inflict massive economic costs globally, thereby turning tactical wins into strategic failures.

And yet, there may be no easy exit, for the Rubicon has already been crossed, so to speak. The ongoing war may very well be Trump’s greatest strategic mistake (perhaps motivated by Israeli pressures, including blackmail – a possibility that even political scientist John Mearsheimer concedes). The consequences, however, should be global and long-lasting, with unpredictable enough outcomes.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

🏛️ The fortress city that made Alexander the Great give up ⚔️ Hidden gem near Antalya 🇹🇷

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How Likely Is It That The US Will Contain Turkiye After It’s Done With Iran?

How Likely Is It That The US Will Contain Turkiye After It’s Done With Iran?

By Andrew Korybko

It probably won’t since Turkiye helps advance American interests at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia in Iran, the Middle East-North Africa, and along Russia’s entire southern periphery.

The Wall Street Journal published an opinion piece last week titled, “An Urgent Need to Contain Turkey”, which warned that “If the Iranian regime falls, beware Ankara’s regional influence.” The author is Bradley Martin, who’s Executive Director of the Near East Center for Strategic Studies and used to be a Senior Fellow with the news and public policy group Haym Salomon Center and deputy editor for the Canadian Institute for Jewish Research. He also contributes to the Jerusalem Post and Jewish News Syndicate.

His credentials thus led to some interpreting his article as Israel lobbying the US to contain Turkiye after the end of the Third Gulf War that was sparked by their joint attack against Iran. Whatever one’s opinion about the intention of his latest article and his speculative ties with the State of Israel may be, he argues that Turkiye must ultimately be contained because it “opposes U.S. foreign policy and is a headache for its allies.” Several examples are cited in support of this claim for justifying his post-war policy proposal.

These are President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opposition to the US’ war against Iran, his government’s ties with ISIS during the apex of its power, and its weaponization of the 2015 Migrant Crisis against the EU. What Martin didn’t mention, however, is Erdogan’s belief that the US colluded with his late American-based rival Fethullah Gulen to orchestrate summer 2016’s failed coup attempt. Turkish-US relations are therefore much complicated than he made them seem.

His oversimplification of them is obviously due to him wanting to manipulate his targeted American audience into supporting Turkiye’s post-war containment, but the argument can be made that regardless of whatever one thinks about the abovementioned examples, Turkiye’s expansion actually helps the US. For starters, it could launch a military intervention in Iran on the grounds of either targeting armed Kurdish rebels that it considers to be terrorists or helping its ally Azerbaijan, which might intervene first.

Even if that scenario doesn’t transpire, Turkiye reportedly plans to join the so-called “Islamic NATO”, whose core presently consists of September’s mutual defence alliance between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Whether or not it formally does so, Turkiye can still coordinate with those two and Egypt (another country with which Saudi Arabia might enter into an alliance) across the broad Middle East-North Africa (MENA) space, with all four US allies (each to varying legal extents) advancing its aims there.

Even in the absence of the aforesaid, Turkiye is now poised to expand Western – including NATO – influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia through last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). Unaware readers can learn more about how TRIPP threatens Russia’s national security here, which links to five other analyses about this, but it’s suffice to say that this is arguably the next front for containing Russia.

These three roles make Turkiye one of the US’ most strategic allies due to its ability to advance American interests at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia. The US is accordingly unlikely to contain Turkiye after it’s done with Iran, but Israel might try to do so since it feels very uncomfortable with Turkiye’s rise as the most powerful Muslim country, possibly soon with its own ballistic missile and even nuclear programs too. Martin is therefore lobbying to advance Israeli interests over American ones even if unintentionally.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

One aspect of the #Iran war that has flown under the radar is the need for #Iran if #ColdWar 3.0 against #Moscow were to come to pass. #US will need #Iran to strike and destabilize the area around #CaspianSea, the soft under belly of #Russia and the heart of #EurAsia. With #AffPak region being a lost cause and #Turkey being geographically cut off from #CaspianSea basin, #Iran becomes crucial. #Iran also helps tackling #CPEC and interdicting oil flows from Central Asia into #PRC.

#Geopolitics