Daily Times - Latest Pakistan News, World, Business, Sports, LifestylePakistan and Afghan forces clash in Bajaur
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Voice of EastA Lasting Political Solution To The Afghan-Pakistani War Is Extremely Unlikely
A Lasting Political Solution To The Afghan-Pakistani War Is Extremely Unlikely
Neither wants to submit to the other’s polar opposite demands on the three issues central to their security dilemma, Afghanistan is incapable of conquering Pakistan, and Pakistan won’t accept the enormous costs that overthrowing the Taliban and indefinitely occupying Afghanistan would entail.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry disclosed last week that their country’s Special Envoy on Afghan Affairs “has been shuttling between Afghanistan and Pakistan” in an attempt to mediate a ceasefire in their nearly month-long war. This was followed by Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan telling local media that Russia “will be ready to consider such an opportunity if both sides simultaneously request mediation.” For as noble as their efforts are, a lasting political solution to this war is extremely unlikely.
The reason is simple, and it’s that the Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma has now arguably passed the point where their polar opposite demands on three interconnected issues can no longer be resolved through diplomacy, only military force. These issues are Afghanistan’s refusal to recognize the Durand Line, Afghanistan’s patronage of Islamabad-designated terrorist groups, and Pakistan’s status as the US’ “Major Non-NATO Ally”. They’ll now be briefly summarized to inform unaware readers.
Regarding the Durand Line, this is the British-imposed border between Afghanistan and the Raj that separated the Pashtuns, most of whom live in what’s now Pakistan but are the largest plurality in Afghanistan. Pakistan maintains that this is the international border while Afghanistan has agitated for decades to redraw it. The historical power asymmetries between them, especially today, segue into Afghanistan’s patronage of Islamabad-designated terrorist groups like the TTP and BLA.
The first are fundamentalist Pashtuns and the second are separatist Baloch, which are suspected of coordinating with each other despite serious differences over the spread of Pashtuns from their native part of Pakistan into Balochistan. From Afghanistan’s perspective, patronizing them is the only way to even the military balance with Pakistan, but this doesn’t justify their terrorist attacks. These two issues, the Durand Line and Afghanistan’s non-state allies, also serve to pressure Pakistan on its ties with the US.
Pakistan maintains that it’s free to partner with whoever it wants, but Afghanistan under its former communist rulers and now its second Taliban ones considers this an enduring threat to its sovereignty. April 2022’s US-backed post-modern coup against former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the new de facto military dictatorship’s obsequiousness towards Trump, and his repeated demand to return US troops to Bagram Airbase (which can only realistically occur with Pakistan’s complicity) reinforce this view.
The resultant Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma can only realistically be resolved by military force. The most likely outcomes are Pakistan ending the war upon being content with the number of targets destroyed and/or carving out a buffer zone on the other side of the Durand Line (either demilitarized and possibly subject to punitive strikes and/or controlled by allied militias). The Taliban probably won’t be dethroned, nor will they abandon their territorial claims, so any such solution(s) wouldn’t last.
Therein lies the crux of their security dilemma since neither wants to submit to the other, Afghanistan is incapable of conquering Pakistan, and Pakistan won’t accept the enormous costs that overthrowing the Taliban and indefinitely occupying Afghanistan would entail. The most that Pakistan can do is try to manipulate Trump into bombing the Taliban after he’s done with Iran, possibly arguing that this is the only way to return to Bagram, but he might not agree so this security dilemma might last indefinitely.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #Balochistan #China #Geopolitics #Pakistan #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP #USA
Russia’s Top UN Representative Reminded The World Of The West’s Responsibility To Afghanistan
Russia’s Top UN Representative Reminded The World Of The West’s Responsibility To Afghanistan
The US has a moral responsibility to return Afghanistan’s seized assets, but morality doesn’t guide US policy, let alone under Trump 2.0 given its Hyper-Realist approach of declaring and then advancing national interests.
Russia’s Permanent UN Representative Vasily Nebenzia gave a powerful speech about Afghanistan in early March. He condemned the West’s “attempts to advance a selective approach, with an emphasis on matters that Western donors are willing to discuss”, which he expects “will not lead to the desired result”. He told them that “if you truly want to help the women and girls of Afghanistan not just with words but with deeds, then help create conditions for them to live in a stable and developed country.”
This dressing-down was timely since Nebenzia added that his policy prescription is “especially important given a possible new wave of refugees who will have to return from neighbouring Iran amid armed aggression against it by the United States and Israel.” Estimates vary, but it’s thought that approximately 4-6 million Afghan refugees fled to Iran throughout the course of their country’s nearly half-century-long spree of conflicts, which also now includes the latest one with Pakistan.
Nebenzia touched upon that too by declaring that “We are concerned about the sharp escalation of armed clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, both countries are friends of ours. We are convinced that it is imperative to return the situation to the political and diplomatic track. We are ready to provide our friends with assistance and support. We also look forward to seeing a resumption of mutually beneficial interaction between them, including on counterterrorism issues.”
He also talked about Afghanistan’s terrorism and drug challenges, which he applauded the Taliban for attempting to tackle, but reaffirmed that it requires targeted support from the international community without any of the preconditions that the West and its donors demand if it’s to succeed. Therein lies the crux of Afghanistan’s post-occupation problems since the US is reluctant to provide this and also still holds the occupation-era government’s nearly $10 billion assets that it froze in late 2021.
Strings are attached to releasing this, however, such as the Taliban complying with its promise to assemble an ethno-regionally inclusive government and uphold the Western conception of women’s rights. The Taliban isn’t ready to do either, however, and its priority is to fight against the abovementioned scourges and poverty. Russia’s and other countries’ pragmatic help like India’s in spite of the Taliban’s broken promises is appreciated, but it’s not enough, ergo the need for US support too.
The US has a moral responsibility to return Afghanistan’s seized assets, but morality doesn’t guide US policy, let alone under Trump 2.0 given its Hyper-Realist approach of declaring and then advancing national interests. Nebenzia didn’t say so, but he seemed to imply that the US is advancing undeclared interests under the pretext of demanding concessions from the Taliban in exchange for aid, which might be aimed at prolonging and thus exacerbating Afghanistan’s instability till it becomes a regional crisis.
Some form of strategic damage might then be inflicted on Russia, China, and/or Iran, thus amounting to a plot to turn Afghanistan into an incubator of chaos that can then be exported for destabilizing US adversaries through unconventional means. Russia is aware of this as proven by Nebenzia mentioning that “We are committed to developing partnership ties with [Afghanistan] in all areas, including in regional security”, but the form that their regional security cooperation takes remains unclear for now.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #China #Geopolitics #Iran #Pakistan #Russia #USA
There’s A Good Reason Why Russia Is Closely Monitoring The Latest Afghan-Pakistani Clashes
There’s A Good Reason Why Russia Is Closely Monitoring The Latest Afghan-Pakistani Clashes
Russia envisages Afghanistan serving as the irreplaceable transit state for pioneering another North-South Transport Corridor, albeit this time between itself and Pakistan, but this master plan will remain unfulfilled as long as those two’s grievances against one another aren’t adequately addressed.
The latest clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are the most serious in decades, have prompted a flurry of reactions from Russian officialdom. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov expressed hope for a swift end to hostilities, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova echoed him, Special Advisor to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Russia could mediate between them if they agree, and the Security Council blamed the legacy of British imperialism. Moscow is clearly watching closely.
The reasons why are that it became the first country to officially recognize the restoration of Taliban rule over Afghanistan last summer, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif will visit Russia from 3-5 March, and both countries are integral to its grand strategic plans that were elaborated on here. In brief, Russia envisages pioneering another North-South Transport Corridor, albeit this time between itself and Pakistan, which therefore imbues Afghanistan with pivotal importance as the irreplaceable transit state.
The problem is that Afghanistan and Pakistan are locked in a dangerously escalating security dilemma. As regards Afghanistan’s grievances, it doesn’t recognize the imperial-era Durand Line that it considers to be an illegitimate partition of the Pashtun people that Kabul only agreed to back then under duress. It’s also very uncomfortable with Pakistan’s close ties with Trump, who said on several occasions that he wants to return US troops to Bagram Airbase, which can only realistically occur through Pakistan’s complicity.
From Pakistan’s side, Afghanistan’s reliance on unconventional warfare via terrorist-designated groups for furthering the abovementioned goals related to revising the Durand Line and deterring closer cooperation with the US are completely unacceptable. Officials and society alike also consider the Taliban to be extremely ungrateful since their survival during the US occupation of Afghanistan wouldn’t have been possible without Pakistani support. They also hate the Taliban’s newly close ties with India.
What Pakistan expected after the US withdrawal was that the Taliban would eschew violence for settling their disputes and not align with India, but the proud Taliban considered these demands to be equivalent to subordinating Afghanistan as a junior partner to Pakistan. The Taliban then ramped up attacks against Pakistan after Pakistan’s pro-US pivot following April 2022’s post-modern coup against former Prime Minister Imran Khan, which set into motion last fall’s war scare and the latest fierce clashes.
There’s now so much bad blood between the Afghanistan and Pakistan that it’s difficult to imagine a meaningful rapprochement anytime soon that adequately addresses each’s grievance against the other. Circling back to Russia, this throws a wrench in its master plan for ties with Pakistan, but it could also incentivize closer security (both anti-terrorist and conventional military) cooperation after the Putin-Sharif Summit since Pakistan is considered to be more important to Russia than Afghanistan is.
While such “military diplomacy” might advance Russia’s goal of obtaining greater access to Pakistan’s market of a quarter-billion people, India wouldn’t be too pleased with its special and privileged strategic partner if that happens. At the same time, some Russian officials might themselves be displeased with India’s reduced import of Russian oil under the threat of reimposed US tariffs depriving the Kremlin of billions of dollars a year in budgetary revenue, so such cooperation could also signal that if it happens.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #Geopolitics #Pakistan #Russia #Taliban #USA
Pakistan claims major losses inflicted in cross-border operation
Mathrubhumi EnglishPakistan security forces kill 300 Afghan Taliban and allied militants in Operation Ghazab lil-Haq, destroy 89 posts and 135 armored vehicles, while regional powers push for de-escalation. https://english.mathrubhumi.com/news/world/operation-ghazab-lil-haq-pakistan-claims-297-afghan-taliban-personnel-killed-tho2nz2j?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=mastodon #Pakistan #AfghanTaliban #OperationGhazabLilHaq #BorderClashes
Afghanistan 🇦🇫Quote from Pathan Bhai (@PathanBhaiii):
🚨BREAKING NEWS🚨
14 Pakistan Army Soldiers, Including a Senior Officer, Surrender to Afghan Forces.
#Afghanistan #AfghanTaliban #AfghanPakistanWar
Source: Pathan Bhai (@PathanBhaiii)
[ https://x.com/PathanBhaiii/status/2027473320325574965 ]
Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
By Uriel Araujo
The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.
South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.
As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.
The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.
There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.
There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activity, Baloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.
No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.
What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.
This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.
At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.
Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.
Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.
Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.
Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.
To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP
Pakistan seeks verifiable Afghan action on terrorism
Syeda Yasmeen Aftab AliMY VLOG: Afghanistan ka koi bhi mua'aday pay sign karnay say inkar| No talks? What next?
#afghantaliban #afghanistan #pakistan #peaceplan #refugees The possible peace plan between TTP/Afghan Govt & Pakistan at a deadlock. What next?
