A Lasting Political Solution To The Afghan-Pakistani War Is Extremely Unlikely

A Lasting Political Solution To The Afghan-Pakistani War Is Extremely Unlikely

By Andrew Korybko

Neither wants to submit to the other’s polar opposite demands on the three issues central to their security dilemma, Afghanistan is incapable of conquering Pakistan, and Pakistan won’t accept the enormous costs that overthrowing the Taliban and indefinitely occupying Afghanistan would entail.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry disclosed last week that their country’s Special Envoy on Afghan Affairs “has been shuttling between Afghanistan and Pakistan” in an attempt to mediate a ceasefire in their nearly month-long war. This was followed by Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan telling local media that Russia “will be ready to consider such an opportunity if both sides simultaneously request mediation.” For as noble as their efforts are, a lasting political solution to this war is extremely unlikely.

The reason is simple, and it’s that the Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma has now arguably passed the point where their polar opposite demands on three interconnected issues can no longer be resolved through diplomacy, only military force. These issues are Afghanistan’s refusal to recognize the Durand Line, Afghanistan’s patronage of Islamabad-designated terrorist groups, and Pakistan’s status as the US’ “Major Non-NATO Ally”. They’ll now be briefly summarized to inform unaware readers.

Regarding the Durand Line, this is the British-imposed border between Afghanistan and the Raj that separated the Pashtuns, most of whom live in what’s now Pakistan but are the largest plurality in Afghanistan. Pakistan maintains that this is the international border while Afghanistan has agitated for decades to redraw it. The historical power asymmetries between them, especially today, segue into Afghanistan’s patronage of Islamabad-designated terrorist groups like the TTP and BLA.

The first are fundamentalist Pashtuns and the second are separatist Baloch, which are suspected of coordinating with each other despite serious differences over the spread of Pashtuns from their native part of Pakistan into Balochistan. From Afghanistan’s perspective, patronizing them is the only way to even the military balance with Pakistan, but this doesn’t justify their terrorist attacks. These two issues, the Durand Line and Afghanistan’s non-state allies, also serve to pressure Pakistan on its ties with the US.

Pakistan maintains that it’s free to partner with whoever it wants, but Afghanistan under its former communist rulers and now its second Taliban ones considers this an enduring threat to its sovereignty. April 2022’s US-backed post-modern coup against former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the new de facto military dictatorship’s obsequiousness towards Trump, and his repeated demand to return US troops to Bagram Airbase (which can only realistically occur with Pakistan’s complicity) reinforce this view.

The resultant Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma can only realistically be resolved by military force. The most likely outcomes are Pakistan ending the war upon being content with the number of targets destroyed and/or carving out a buffer zone on the other side of the Durand Line (either demilitarized and possibly subject to punitive strikes and/or controlled by allied militias). The Taliban probably won’t be dethroned, nor will they abandon their territorial claims, so any such solution(s) wouldn’t last.

Therein lies the crux of their security dilemma since neither wants to submit to the other, Afghanistan is incapable of conquering Pakistan, and Pakistan won’t accept the enormous costs that overthrowing the Taliban and indefinitely occupying Afghanistan would entail. The most that Pakistan can do is try to manipulate Trump into bombing the Taliban after he’s done with Iran, possibly arguing that this is the only way to return to Bagram, but he might not agree so this security dilemma might last indefinitely.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

The Shadow Front: How the Iran Crisis Is Fuelling The New Af-Pak Conflict

The Shadow Front: How the Iran Crisis Is Fuelling The New Af-Pak Conflict

By Uriel Araujo

The deadly Kabul hospital strike signals a dangerous escalation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict. As global attention centres on Iran, a parallel crisis deepens. Economic isolation, insurgency, and regional rivalries are converging in an already volatile region.

While global attention remains focused on the escalating confrontation involving Iran, a far less reported but deeply consequential crisis is nonetheless unfolding. Last week’s deadly strike on a hospital in Kabul, the worst single incident thus far in the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict, made the news.

Michael Kugelman (a senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council) has described the Kabul hospital strike as emblematic of a conflict spiralling beyond control. He notes that tensions between the Pakistan authorities and the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan have intensified over Pakistan’s accusations that Kabul harbours Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants.

In response, Pakistan has escalated with airstrikes inside Afghan territory, thereby further normalizing a pattern of cross-border retaliation. Kugelman emphasizes that both sides face internal pressures that make de-escalation politically costly, even as the humanitarian toll rises. The risk of miscalculation is growing.

As I have previously argued, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is emerging as a new South Asia/Central Asia epicentre of instability, in what is being described as the new “Af-Pak” conflict. Earlier tensions between Iran and Pakistan had already demonstrated how quickly localized insurgencies can trigger interstate confrontation. In fact, as I wrote back in 2024, the reciprocal missile exchanges between Iran and Pakistan laid bare the underlying vulnerabilities in the region’s security framework.

Today the situation has deteriorated considerably. The ongoing war involving Iran has effectively isolated Afghanistan economically, as Mustafa Saqib (a visiting scholar at Rutgers University-Camden) argues. Trade routes through Iran, particularly via the Chabahar corridor, have been severely disrupted, choking Kabul’s already fragile economy. Thus, Afghanistan is becoming something of an economic island, with all the predictable consequences: rising prices, scarcity of essential goods, and increasing dependence on unstable cross-border trade with Pakistan.

The implications, however, go far beyond economics. The Iran crisis is actually amplifying the Af-Pak conflict in multiple manners.

Firstly, for one thing, it diverts global diplomatic attention, in a way. Mediators who might otherwise focus on Kabul and Islamabad are now mostly preoccupied with preventing a broader Middle Eastern war centred in Iran/Israel.

Secondly, Pakistan itself is under mounting pressure. As various analyses note, Islamabad is walking a “tightrope” (in Kamal Alam’s, a Fellow at The Institute for Statecraft, words) in the Iran conflict, balancing its ties with Tehran and its strategic alignment with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the US.

Saudi Arabia reportedly has sought stronger commitments from Pakistan under a 2025 defence pact, which raises fears of deeper entanglement. Some analysts speculate that the Saudi authorities in Riyadh would seek to “proxify” Pakistan into attacking Iran. Pakistan then appears overstretched.

This overstretch is particularly dangerous in Balochistan, a region that connects Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan through porous borders. This area has long been a hub for overlapping insurgencies. Groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Jaish al-Adl operate across borders, exploiting weak state control. The current Iran war has weakened Tehran’s grip over its Sistan-Baluchestan province, thereby emboldening such militant networks.

At the same time, Pakistan faces intensified insurgent activity at home. The BLA’s renewed campaign, alongside persistent TTP attacks, has strained security forces already engaged in cross-border operations in Afghanistan. Thus, a kind of feedback loop clearly emerges: external conflict weakens internal stability, which in turn reduces the capacity to manage external threats.

Adding another layer of complexity is the role of transnational jihadist groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and its “war” against Balochi separatists, for instance. The convergence of militant actors across the “Greater Balochistan” region creates fertile ground for coordinated attacks that could radiate outward into Central Asia, India, or beyond. ISKP has already demonstrated its reach with high-profile attacks, including inside Iran in recent years.

Economically, the dual crises are devastating. Border closures between Afghanistan and Pakistan, ongoing since late 2025, have already disrupted trade flows. With Iranian routes now compromised, Afghanistan’s options are severely limited. This isolation drives inflation and exacerbates humanitarian suffering. Refugee flows are also likely to increase, placing additional strain on neighbouring countries.

Geopolitically, the implications are equally troubling. Pakistan’s multi-front challenges reduce its strategic flexibility, particularly at a time when it must navigate complex regional dynamics involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US. As one analysis puts it, Islamabad risks being “stuck between allies” in the Iran conflict.

Meanwhile, broader regional initiatives, from energy corridors to infrastructure projects, face disruption. Saudi diplomatic consultations with regional partners, including Pakistan, highlight how seriously the escalation is being discussed across the region.

The US and Israel seem bent on setting the Middle East ablaze.  Washington’s disastrous decision to join the Israeli campaign against Iran has obvious repercussions beyond the Middle East, affecting the whole of Eurasia and global markets.

In this context, thus far, the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict remains the “other war the world is ignoring.” But for how long? The interplay between the Iran crisis and the Af-Pak theatre is not incidental; it is structural.

Each conflict clearly feeds into the other, thereby creating a cycle of instability that is very difficult to break. Underreported enough though it may be thus far, this interconnected crisis demands urgent attention from Eurasian actors and frameworks.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

🔥🪖 Baloch Rebels Attack Pakistani Soldiers | Insurgency in Balochistan | RCF

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#RealCombatFootage #RCF #War #Military #WorldNews #BreakingNews #Balochistan

RE: https://theblower.au/@MaxG/116277339205507142

The #Pakistan Army is an extension of the #US/#NATO/#UK/#IS/#EU imperialist machine and a nuclear weapons power in #Asia

#Balochistan @HaniBaloch

Quote from Khan Makoo (@Mr_Death313):

#Pakistan's govt has been fighting its OWN people from DAY ONE.

Occupied free #Balochistan.

Occupied free #Pashtun tribes (now KPK).

Built on their BLOOD. This isn't a country — it's an occupation machine.

#FreeBalochistan #PashtunLivesMatter #PakistanExposed

Source: Khan Makoo (@Mr_Death313)
[ https://x.com/Mr_Death313/status/2035609275150868527 ]

#Afghanistan

@un (United nations )your containers are being used against Baloch people in #Balochistan to prevent them from protesting.
This must be addressed.
@volker_turk @antonioguterres
#StopBalochGenocide

#Balochistan

If the Punjabi Army Can Kill 20 Baloch in Panjgur, the World Cannot Question Baloch Fighters Entering Punjab: Says Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch

Read more: english.zrumbesh.com/11791 #Balochistan #BLF #Punjab #Zrumbesh

In recent days, several women from #Balochistan were abducted by #Pakistani security forces in front of their families. One of them was presented by Sarfaraz Bugti as a suicide bomber after months, for a media trial. Now, where are the rest of the women?

The state oppression in #Balochistan is becoming increasingly severe.

#Balochistan

𝙀𝙣𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙘𝙚𝙙 𝘿𝙞𝙨𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙈𝙚𝙙𝙞𝙖 𝙈𝙖𝙣𝙞𝙥𝙪𝙡𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝘾𝙖𝙨𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙧𝙯𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝙕𝙚𝙝𝙧𝙞

March 18, 2026

Paank strongly condemns the enforced disappearance of Farzana Zehri from Khuzdar, Balochistan, on December 1, 2025. Her case reflects an alarming continuation of human rights violations in the region, where individuals particularly women are subjected to unlawful detention without due process.

#Balochistan