@threetails I mean, you can see that with the #Houti in #Yemen…

• That was just some side-gig of #Iran to "piss in the #KSA's front lawn"…

What people tend to ignore is that Iran is as populous as #Germany but more than double the area and also disliked by the #USA for repeatedly not just annoying it and it's partnerd, but literally threaten #Petrodollar dominance (originally wanting to sell #Oil for #Euro at the #Kish Oil Exchange's trading floor).

Coincidentially, the other #SCO members follow the chinese wisdom:

Do not interrupt your opponent whilst they do mistakes!

Obviously a weak #US benefits all those members - one way or another…

China Supports Iran in Safeguarding Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity

https://defensemirror.com/news/41230/China_Supports_Iran_in_Safeguarding_Sovereignty__Territorial_Integrity__Beijing

#China #Iran #WangYi #MiddleEast #USIran #Israel #Geopolitics #BRICS #SCO #OilTrade #WW3 #WorldWar3 #MiddleEast

Steel, Rail, And Oil: The Roadmap For A New Era In Russia-Pakistan Ties

Steel, Rail, And Oil: The Roadmap For A New Era In Russia-Pakistan Ties

By Andrew Korybko

For as promising as the opportunities that he discussed are, the US still wields a de facto veto over “Major Non-NATO Ally” Pakistan’s cooperation with Russia, so there might be limits to how far this realistically expands despite his optimism.

Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Albert Khorev spoke to TASS in early February on the subject of bilateral ties ahead of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Russia from 3-5 March. They didn’t publish his remarks as a single interview, however, but as five separate news items that can be read here, here, here, here, and here. They’ll now be summarized, albeit in a different sequence than they were published in order to more seamlessly facilitate the transition between his points.

Khorev declared Russia’s intent in “moving toward the practical implementation of large-scale joint projects, such as the revival of the Karachi Metallurgical Plant, the launch of rail transport between Russia and Pakistan, cooperation in hydropower, and the creation of joint production facilities for pharmaceuticals, including insulin.” Oil exploration and production are other promising fields, and the completion of work on all this is expected by the next meeting of the intergovernmental commission.

Russia is interested in expanding the scope of cooperation beyond the aforesaid sectors to include “improving transport connectivity, tourism, and information and communications technology.” The current priorities “include contacts in regional security and the fight against international terrorism, as well as coordinating efforts at multilateral forums, primarily the UN and the SCO.” There are also “good prospects for developing ties between the cities and regions of the two countries”.

On the institutional level, Khorev envisages intensifying cooperation with Pakistan in the SCO on anti-terrorism, regional connectivity, logistics, and industry and expanding cooperation to include “digital finance, fintech innovations, and green finance instruments.” He also declared Russia’s support for Pakistan’s bid to join BRICS’ New Development Bank, which he said would bring it closer to the group, though left unmentioned is the high likelihood of India vetoing this due to their well-known tensions.

Reflecting on everything, Khorev is quite upbeat about the state and future of Russian-Pakistani ties, which is natural due to him being the ambassador, but he might be even more optimistic than usual against the backdrop of credible concern that India will reduce its Russian oil imports under US pressure. The Pakistani market can never replace India’s no matter what the export may be, but tangible progress on entering the former could partially compensate for lost access to the latter, though there’s a catch.

“Major Non-NATO Ally” Pakistan voluntarily re-subordinated itself to the US after April 2022’s post-modern coup against former multipolar Prime Minister Imran Khan, and despite its displeasure with the Indo-US trade deal, Pakistan is unlikely to defy the US on any significant deals with Russia. For that reason, the US will likely retain its de facto veto on major aspects of Russian-Pakistani cooperation, which is responsible for why nothing has yet to come from their years-long oil and gas talks.

Nevertheless, Russia will still continue to explore all possible opportunities for cooperating with Pakistan since its diplomatic school doesn’t believe in being the first to abandon such prospects, which is proven by it still keeping the door open to the US and EU in spite of them arming Ukraine to kill Russians. This explains Khorev’s eagerness to expand all economic and other forms of cooperation with Pakistan, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Russia from 3-5 March provides the perfect chance to do so.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

4000-Abo-Spezial: Zeitreise ins Jahr 1999 mit Caldera OpenLinux 2.3

https://tube.tchncs.de/w/gHHTpwLADQXG2ZAkiiRaPj

Russia’s BRICS Sherpa Debunks Speculation About The Bloc Turning Into A Security Alliance

Russia’s BRICS Sherpa Debunks Speculation About The Bloc Turning Into A Security Alliance

By Andrew Korybko

The timing comes amidst continued dialogue with the US and its role in mediating between Russia and Ukraine, which could abruptly end if temperamental Trump’s threat perception of BRICS is once again exacerbated given how capricious he’s proven himself to be, ergo the need to assuage his fears.

Sergey Ryabkov, who serves as both Deputy Foreign Minister and BRICS Sherpa, recently clarified that “I would like to remind you that BRICS is not a military union and not a collective security organization with collective defence commitments. It has never been planned as such, and there are no plans to transform it for the purpose.” He also confirmed that “As far as the recent naval exercise in South Africa is concerned, BRICS members participated in it as sovereign nations. It was not a BRICS event.”

The first part refers to the speculation that BRICS will turn into a security bloc, the goal of which isn’t just absent from its statements but is also very difficult to achieve due to the membership of rival pairs like Egypt-Ethiopia and Iran-UAE. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s friend Pepe Escobar passed off as fact in an article for publicly financed Sputnik last September that “BRICS/SCO will eventually merge in the long term”, thus misleading many folks into thinking that BRICS has SCO-like security goals.

As for the second part of what he said, this relates to the spree of false reports about January’s drills off the South African coast, which many wrongly described as “BRICS naval drills” due to those being the only countries invited to participate. As was explained here, “South Africa allowed this false perception to spread as a symbolic act of defiance against Trump given his hatred of BRICS and to signal to the domestic audience that their country has friends across the world amidst its tensions with the US.”

Ryabkov is one of Russia’s top diplomats, its point man for BRICS, and a potential replacement for Lavrov whenever he retires, so his words about Russian foreign policy carry immense weight. This is especially relevant as regards BRICS, the portrayal of which within Russia’s “global media ecosystem” has hitherto been inordinately shaped by the soft power approach known as “Potemkinism”, or the creation of alternative realities for strategic purposes.

Sputnik arguably allowed Pepe to pass off as fact his speculation about BRICS eventually merging with the SCO for precisely this reason since the perceived authority associated with declaring this on one of Russia’s publicly financed international media flagships would lead to many assuming that it’s true. After Rybakov’s official clarification that no such plans exist nor ever have, however, it’s very possible that this aspect of “Potemkinism” – the creation of alternative realities about BRICS – might soon end.

That might not be an arbitrary decision, but a strategic one given the context. Trump threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS states in November 2024 and again in January 2025 due to his threat perception of the group. The US has since resumed talks with Russia and even begun mediating between it and Ukraine, but Trump is infamously capricious, so he might abandon these efforts if his threat perception of BRICS is once again exacerbated. Russia therefore has an interest in preemptively assuaging his fears.

To that end, it’s even reportedly considering a limited return to the dollar system as part of a grand compromise with the US, but Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that any such scenario requires the US to lift its prohibition on Russia’s use of that currency and it would then have to compete with others. In any case, the takeaway is that BRICS isn’t radically de-dollarizing nor turning into a security bloc, and Russia’s latest clarification of the latter reality is likely designed to placate temperamental Trump.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

By Uriel Araujo

The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.

South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.

As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.

The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.

There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.

There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activity, Baloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.

No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.

What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.

This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.

At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.

Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.

Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.

Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.

Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.

To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP

Three Reasons Why Russia’s Planned RIC Revival Is Unlikely

Three Reasons Why Russia’s Planned RIC Revival Is Unlikely

By Andrew Korybko

The Sino-Indo rapprochement is still in its infancy, their territorial disputes remain unresolved, and India is under lots of pressure from the US nowadays.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared during his first press conference of the year that Moscow wants to revive the Russia-India-China (RIC) format. In his words, “[RIC] still exists – though it has not convened in some time – but has not been disbanded. We are working to revive its activities.” For as well-intentioned as Russia’s plans are, and they make sense since those three are the engines of the global systemic transition to multipolarity, they’re unlikely to be fulfilled for three reasons.

First off, the incipient Sino-Indo rapprochement, which began with their leaders meeting at fall 2024’s BRICS Summit in Kazan and then again at last summer’s SCO Summit in Tianjin, is still in its infancy, revolving mostly around restrained rhetoric towards their unresolved territorial disputes and increased trade. Bilateral ties are moving in the right direction but they’re nowhere near resuming anything resembling the strategic cooperation that their leaders’ participation in another RIC Summit would imply.

The next point is that their unresolved territorial disputes place domestic pressure upon Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to eschew the aforesaid cooperation until they’re settled, ideally in India’s favour with China rescinding its claims and withdrawing from Indian-claimed territory. Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping twice in as many years was already a bold move in this domestic political context, but resuming strategic cooperation absent a resolution of their disputes might be a bridge too far.

And finally, India is also under lots of pressure from the US nowadays, which is due to Trump’s punitive tariffs on the pretext of India’s continued import of Russian oil and the US’ rapid rapprochement with its Pakistani nemesis. Participating in newly revived RIC talks with Putin and Xi amidst the ongoing Indo-US talks at this very sensitive moment could potentially provoke Trump and might thus lead to a further worsening of their ties. It would therefore be very surprising if Modi were to agree to this anytime soon.

Having explained the three reasons why Russia’s planned revival of the RIC format is unlikely, it nevertheless shouldn’t be ruled out that their respective leaders might meet on the sidelines of this year’s BRICS Summit in India and/or the SCO Summit in Kyrgyzstan. Something as superficial as them being photographed chatting with one another there could suffice as alleged proof that Russia is making progress on this goal even if their small talk has no significance beyond positive optics.

Such was the case on the sidelines of last year’s SCO Summit in Tianjin, which was interpreted by some as an “informal RIC meet” despite nothing of substance being discussed. Russia and the Alt-Media Community, both in general but especially the “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” therein, have an interest in presenting such talks as proof of RIC’s revival for ideological reasons. Premature declarations of this can lead to unrealistic expectations, however, which risk deep disappointment if this never actually happens.

All in all, multipolar processes would further accelerate to the benefit of the World Majority if RIC were revived, but this is unlikely to happen due to the complexity of Sino-Indo relations and US pressure upon India right now. Given the reasonable limits of Russian diplomacy, namely its representatives’ respectful unwillingness to share unsolicited solutions for resolving the Sino-Indo border disputes and inability to influence Indo-US ties, Lavrov’s goal of reviving RIC will probably remain unfulfilled for the time being.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#BRICS #China #Geopolitics #India #Russia #SCO #USA

Only Mbappe, Kane, Gordon, Osimhen and Haaland have scored more than Harvey Barnes in the Champions League this season. Barnes’ strike against PSV took his UCL tally to 5 for the season. In great form: 5th goal in 5 games all comps, following doubles against Leeds United in the Premier League and Bournemouth in the FA Cup. 12 goals since Oct 1.

BBC Radio Scotland this morning discussed his vibrant form and whether Barnes might receive – or answer – a call from Scotland. He's played once for England, 15 minutes against Wales at Wembley in 2020, but he's not cap-tied as that was a friendly and Fifa eligibility rules were loosened further in 2020. Born in Burnley, the 28-year-old qualifies for Scotland via his maternal grandparents under Fifa ancestry rules.

Back in November, Barnes didn’t rule out the idea when asked by Sky Sports. “No, of course it’s not,” when asked if the door to Scotland was closed. Steve Clarke subsequently suggested there might be talks in the New Year. No indication either way so far. But could Barnes’ possible arrival affect team harmony amongst those who did so brilliantly in qualifying? Probably not because Scotland are crying out for an attacker of Barnes’ calibre and because he’s such a personable individual.

He’d need to make a strong statement about his desire to represent the land of his maternal grandparents, not simply appear to be looking around because the door to the England dressing-room seems closed. Would Barnes get in England’s squad? Probably not, even with this form. He’s best position is left wing, cutting on to his right foot, and can also can play at centre-forward. England have strength in depth, especially wide.

Tuchel has Gordon and Rashford as his main left-flank options and could even seek to accommodate Rogers and Bellingham with Rogers off the left. Tuchel has Saka, Madueke and Bowen on the right. Foden, Palmer and Eze can play wide as well as 10. At centre-forward, he has the peerless Kane, also Watkins, possibly Delap, Calvert-Lewin and Solanke. If Barnes' form continues, and injuries intervene elsewhere, there will doubtless be more talk about Barnes and England.

He wouldn't start in the World Cup for England but he would for Scotland. He's shared a pitch with the Scots before. He played against Scotland at the 2017 Toulon Tournament (Under-20), scoring twice to knock them out in the semis. Barnes also played alongside Foden in an Under-21 Euros qualifying win over Billy Gilmour and co at Tynecastle in 2018.

Harvey Barnes is a big talent, in form, enjoying a run free from injuries, and the focus on him and who he represents is understandable. #ENG #SCO #NUFC