- The context -
The elephant in the room, which came charging in (26 December 2025), is #Israel ’s recognition of #Somaliland. Only weeks before, Israel made it public it had “certain communication” with #Somalia, an information denied by Mogadiscio but likely true, given Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s early and continued — arguably discreet — policy on the issue. Retrospectively, it might have been an open ultimatum by Israel, searching for a definite diplomatic victory in the Horn.
The context is complex and is situated within the wider #Iran-#Israel proxy war as well as the ongoing war in #Gaza. Israeli influence has been receding in #Africa, albeit rarely to a point of rupture (#Chad, #SouthAfrica). Meanwhile, Iran has dramatically expanded its footprint over the continent.

#Djibouti and #Sudan in particular have restored diplomatic relations (2023), even as now #Iran friendly Sudan promised to join the #AbrahamAccords in 2020 — but the price has likely risen very high in the context of the current civil war there. Israel’s recognition of #Somaliland might therefore be seen as impatience towards Sudan and a strategic pushback against Iranian influence in the Horn, an interpretation reinforced by #Israel ’s own reference to the Accords.

#Somalia

- Consequences for #Somaliland -
Proximity to #Yemen is naturally a factor, although the lack of a naval base close to that country has not hindered Israeli efforts against the #Houthis thus far. Neighbouring #Djibouti hosts an array of bases, including #US and Western ones.

This in turn could turn #Somaliland into a Houthi target, and one at an uncomfortably short distance from Houthi controlled territory. A concern amplified by a the landing of a stray Houthi missile landing in the Sool region (controlled by SSC, claimed by Somaliland) in May 2024.

#Somalia

That is if #Israel does plan on building a naval base there, an intention denied by #Somaliland, while Israel insists one reason it recognized the secessionist state is to counter Houthis in the #RedSea. A lower profile monitoring station, which seems a likelier option, would likely remain a target.
The site of said base/station would also be contentious, as a similar Ethiopian plan revived Gadabuursi-Issa tensions in the #Awdal (West) region of #Somaliland, and ignited a proxy war with former Somaliland ally #Djibouti. #FRUD now openly supports Somaliland, while Djibouti has been claimed to train Awdal militias on its soil. Awdal has very recently known its own Las Anod moment with non-Issa protests in capital Borama leading to security forces firing on the crowd (19 dead).

- #Israel ’s motives -
A proper naval base would further go directly counter to the interests of major regional powers, such as #Egypt and #SaudiArabia — for which reason projects of an Iranian base in #Sudan have failed and those of a Russian one have dragged on for years.

#Somalia #Russia #Iran

More largely, and not unlike #Ethiopia in 2024, #Israel seems to have underestimated #Somalia ’s newfound but yearly growing diplomatic clout on the world stage. Condemnations by the #AU, #EU, #UN, #EAC, #IGAD, #ArabLeague, #GCC, #OIC have been forthcoming, with #Azerbaijan, #Egypt, #Eritrea, #Qatar, #SaudiArabia, #Turkey and #Uganda taking the lead.
Both #Russia and #Ukraine have joined the chorus. #China ’s tight relationship to Mogadiscio is based on a perceived equivalence of #Somaliland and #Taiwan ’s status and each recognizing the other (since 2020). Both the #US and the #UK, regularly cited as likely to recognize Somaliland in their own time, have distanced themselves from the move. US President #Trump is largely uninterested in both #Somalia ’s and Somaliland’s fate.
Meanwhile, this has put further stress on #Israel ’s African-Arab-Islamic partners and other allies, prominently #Azerbaijan, #Egypt, #Jordan, #Morocco and #Qatar. #India, usually closely aligned with Israel, also had to intervene publicly in support to #Somalia ’s territorial integrity to quell rumours it would follow suit.

The official reason for #Israel ’s recognition of #Somaliland is the establishment of a strategic partnership with a stable, Western-friendly country on a wide range of issues. Since the beginning of the war in #Gaza, Israel’s engagement with African nations has been focused on a number of issues, including diplomatic support, replacement of Palestinian and foreign workers in the agriculture sector and the prospective resettlement of Gazans.

#Palestine #Somalia

A labour agreement, smaller in scale than those signed with #Malawi and #Kenya, could be in the works. The main fear however, successfully utilized by #Somalia to gather international support, is that the move had occurred in exchange for the illegal resettlement of a number of Gazans.

#Israel #Palestine #Gaza

Both #US and #Israel have prospected a number of countries throughout 2025, most of which are African, with this very purpose. Those include, #Somalia, #Puntland and #Somaliland. All of them have either denied these reports or walked back their support, including Somaliland after Israel’s recognition. The US now seem to have rolled back that policy as well.

#Palestine #Gaza

- Consequences for #Somalia -
In any case, a security agreement — which wouldn’t be limited to intelligence-sharing — is highly likely. #Somaliland is in the process of rebuilding its armed forces after the Las Anod fiasco, and as it is still embroiled in a war for control of Sool, Sanaag & Cayn, in the East of the country. #SSC-Khatumo, now rebranded as Somalia’s Northeast state, currently controls ca. 70% of its claimed territory.

That was one of the main purposes of the infamous MoU signed with #Ethiopia, currently under review by the new #Somaliland presidency, and for which Addis Abeba’s interest seems to have waned. Having lost #Djibouti ’s support over the same MoU, Somaliland naturally seeks security partners able to furnish it with sufficient support to reverse unionist gains.

#Somalia

The deal #Israel ’s recognition is a part of includes maritime security & blue economy. This comes in direct contradiction with #Somalia ’s own deal with #Turkey on the issue, and while a direct Turkey-Israel confrontation over #Somaliland ’s waters is highly improbable, the Turkish deal had been crafted in part to reassert Somali sovereignty over the same.
- #Somalia breaks with the #UAE -
#Israel ’s recognition should also be understood as a natural extension of the recent flare up in the Saudi-UAE geopolitical rivalry. This has long been coming over issues ranging from their common maritime border to impatience towards the evergrowing influence of #SaudiArabia ’s supposed ally,
including the control of major logistics hub — including Sokhna, Berbera (#Somaliland), Bosaso (#Puntland), Dar es Salaam & Maputo — and the building of a network of proxies, especially in North & East Africa — including in #Libya (#LNA), #Egypt, #Chad, #Sudan (#RSF), #SouthSudan, #Ethiopia, #Somalia (including #Puntland and #Jubaland) and Somaliland, and as well obviously as nearby #Yemen (#STC).
While Somali-#UAE relations had reached their apex under current Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud — which was the UAE’s candidate, a cold spell had overcome them after the rise in #Turkey ’s involvement in Somali politics, economy and security, now #Somalia ’s closest non-Western ally.
The obvious imperialistic aspects of the #UAE security deal (2023), the #Ethiopia-#Somaliland MoU (2024), the killing of Emirati soldiers in Mogadiscio (2024), #Somalia ’s tentative rapprochement with #Iran and later reviving of security ties with #SaudiArabia and #Qatar had brought the crisis to a point when Somalia asked for Saudi mediation in the bilateral crisis (2024).

The spectacular suspension by #Somalia of all agreements signed with the #UAE (12 January) as well as the latter’s suspected role in mediating #Israel #Somaliland talks should therefore not come as a surprise, especially after the recent revelations on their use of Bosaso (Puntland) to arm #Sudan ’s #RSF (July 2025) and on their exfiltration of #STC ’s leader al Zubaidi through Berbera and Mogadiscio (8 January).

#Yemen

- The way forward -
Meanwhile, #Puntland is caught between a rock and a hard place. A #UAE client state, it has long supported #SSC-Khatumo against #Somaliland, but its hopes of annexing the region have been thwarted by that region becoming the Northeast federal state.

#Somalia

Reinforced unionist, anti-#Israel sentiment also lessens #Puntland ’s leverage against Mogadiscio, which partly explains leader/president Deni’s silence. This is also the case for #Jubaland. It might therefore weaken their opposition to a national compromise on the constitution and elections to be held in 2026.

#Somalia

It is extremely unlikely that Israel may roll back its now announced recognition of #Somaliland. The question is rather now what have been the negotiated counterparts and which form a new #Israel Somaliland partnership might take, including crucially on defence and maritime security.

#Somalia

While uttering the usual threats, and protesting its resilience and unity — and #Israel ’s recognition might indeed also strengthen the new Northeast state and other unionists — #Somalia ’s president has already announced the only possible way forward: bilateral talks with #Somaliland.

But these are doomed to failure on any account, if they are not preceded by a needed, urgent, just step, which is the unconditional recognition of the Issaq #genocide (1987–1989), which is — understandably — both the core argument and main rationale behind #Somaliland ’s secessionism.

#Somalia