Ahead of the #TurkishElections, this Sunday, 2⃣ publications to better understand #Türkiye's foreign policy 👇
Start with our Chaillot paper deciphering the Russian-Turkish partnership: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/fire-and-ice
✍️ By @StasSecrieru, @sinikukka & @DimitarBechev
🐦🔗: https://n.respublicae.eu/EU_ISS/status/1656949728842588160
Continue with a Brief exploring #Türkiye's Black Sea strategy amidst the Russian-Ukrainian war: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sailing-through-storm
✍️ By @DimitarBechev
🐦🔗: https://n.respublicae.eu/EU_ISS/status/1656949730717343748
Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has once more turned the Black Sea into an arena of confrontation between a resurgent Russia and the West. The United States and the European Union have thrown their collective weight behind the defence of Ukrainian sovereignty, the military effort aimed at liberating Russian-occupied territories, and restoring Ukraine’s control over its territorial waters and economic zone in the Black and Azov Seas. As the conflict unfolds, Türkiye (1) remains very much a ‘swing actor’. Like the rest of NATO, it backs Ukraine. However, the Turkish leadership has refused to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, much less join the increasingly harsh sanctions imposed against Russia. Indeed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aspires to be a go-between in the conflict, mediating between the warring sides. At the same time, Türkiye is keen to exploit Russia’s weakness in order to expand its influence in and around the Black Sea. This Brief starts with a section exploring Türkiye’s pre-war geopolitical posture, both generally and with specific reference to the Black Sea. It then focuses on the Turkish response to the ongoing war in Ukraine and its evolution over time. The third part examines the role Türkiye plays in the Southern Caucasus, while the fourth section analyses the implications for the EU and the West more broadly. Lastly, the conclusion recapitulates the main findings and puts forward policy recommendations concerning the Union’s policy towards Türkiye.
(1/n)
For anyone wanting a deeper understanding of #Turkey's (#Türkiye) security and foreign policy in the #BlackSea region, I can highly recommend this piece by the #EUISS, the #EU's agency analyzing foreign, security and defence policy issues.
While I do share the following conclusion's findings, it can neither be in the #EU's nor #NATO's interest to accept the correct assertion as a given for the for the future. Even for #Türkiye,...
Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has once more turned the Black Sea into an arena of confrontation between a resurgent Russia and the West. The United States and the European Union have thrown their collective weight behind the defence of Ukrainian sovereignty, the military effort aimed at liberating Russian-occupied territories, and restoring Ukraine’s control over its territorial waters and economic zone in the Black and Azov Seas. As the conflict unfolds, Türkiye (1) remains very much a ‘swing actor’. Like the rest of NATO, it backs Ukraine. However, the Turkish leadership has refused to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, much less join the increasingly harsh sanctions imposed against Russia. Indeed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aspires to be a go-between in the conflict, mediating between the warring sides. At the same time, Türkiye is keen to exploit Russia’s weakness in order to expand its influence in and around the Black Sea. This Brief starts with a section exploring Türkiye’s pre-war geopolitical posture, both generally and with specific reference to the Black Sea. It then focuses on the Turkish response to the ongoing war in Ukraine and its evolution over time. The third part examines the role Türkiye plays in the Southern Caucasus, while the fourth section analyses the implications for the EU and the West more broadly. Lastly, the conclusion recapitulates the main findings and puts forward policy recommendations concerning the Union’s policy towards Türkiye.
(2/2)
...it is questionable if the perceived de-facto "#Russian-Turkish duopoly of power" would be desirable, as this could quite possibly be a return to the pre-20th century antagonism with #Russia.
Besides, this will now never come to pass.
As the article correctly points out, all none-#Russian countries in the NW of the #BlackSea will join the #EU in the medium term.
That said, while I agree with the current assessment of #Turkey's foreign-policy needs by....
(3/n)
...the #EUISS, I strongly oppose the view that the interests of all current + future #NATO members cannot be better aligned.
For #China, as it's policies in the #SouthChinaSea, the de-facto "#circumvallation" of #India, and its #BeltAndRoad Initiative, particularly in #Africa and other countries of the #GlobalSouth, has shown, "#multipolar world" means a #Chinese hegemony.
To think that being able to play a power broker between the two future superpowers, the...
(3/n)
...#US and #China, can be a viable strategy, as also #India has been thinking, maybe more with a "#Swiss neutrality" model in mind, will prove to be futile in the long run.
As the #US' and #China's antagonism deepens, the two countries stuck in the middle will simply not have anywhere near the economic resources to pursue such a strategy successfully. The necessary investments in military and high-tech (e.g. semiconductor fabs) are ever increasing. With an...
(4/n)
... inflation rate of over 40% and a mounting debt, as well as the need for imports, this is just wishful thinking by #Türkiye.
That said, what must be done given the millennia of joint cultural ties + history b/w #AsiaMinor + #Europe is to proceed in high-gear with #EU #membership talks in earnest on both sides.
It is true that #Eastern Turkey is not the same culturally as the #Mediterranean border region. The #Kurdish question is unresolved, but so was (and...
(5/n)
..still is) the #Ulster question), however such ethnic differences are much more easily resolved in a supranational construct, such as the #EU.
If #Turkey finds it way back to its secular, democratic routs of its founder, #Kemal #Atatürk, in today's turning-point national #elections, the historic antagonism between #Europe and #Turkey could finally be overcome.
As the article is quite long, I will post the main part of the conclusion I was...
(6/n)
...referencing to, here:
"Despite deepening divisions and the #Kremlin’s expansionism, #Türkiye will continue to maintain, to the extent that this is possible, equidistance from #Russia and the #West in order to assert its strategic autonomy. Although it will show support for #Ukraine, #Ankara will not be pushing for a full defeat of #Russia as this would diminish its own geopolitical weight and the leverage it holds vis-à-vis the #UnitedStates and..."
(7/n)
"...its #European allies. Regardless of whether #Erdoğan wins the presidential race in the spring or a new leader emerges, the current course of #Turkish foreign policy is unlikely to change significantly."*
*
https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sailing-through-storm
It is this sentence that IMO makes longlasting peace and stability in #Eastern #Europe impossible, that the other #NATO allies must not accept:
"...#Ankara..."
Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has once more turned the Black Sea into an arena of confrontation between a resurgent Russia and the West. The United States and the European Union have thrown their collective weight behind the defence of Ukrainian sovereignty, the military effort aimed at liberating Russian-occupied territories, and restoring Ukraine’s control over its territorial waters and economic zone in the Black and Azov Seas. As the conflict unfolds, Türkiye (1) remains very much a ‘swing actor’. Like the rest of NATO, it backs Ukraine. However, the Turkish leadership has refused to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, much less join the increasingly harsh sanctions imposed against Russia. Indeed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aspires to be a go-between in the conflict, mediating between the warring sides. At the same time, Türkiye is keen to exploit Russia’s weakness in order to expand its influence in and around the Black Sea. This Brief starts with a section exploring Türkiye’s pre-war geopolitical posture, both generally and with specific reference to the Black Sea. It then focuses on the Turkish response to the ongoing war in Ukraine and its evolution over time. The third part examines the role Türkiye plays in the Southern Caucasus, while the fourth section analyses the implications for the EU and the West more broadly. Lastly, the conclusion recapitulates the main findings and puts forward policy recommendations concerning the Union’s policy towards Türkiye.
(8/n)
"...will not be pushing for a full defeat of #Russia..."
IMO, if current strategies continue, the #RussianFederation's collapse is highly likely, unless the #GOP wins the #US #Elections2024.
Now is also the time to prepare for a post-war #Russia*, the #European regions of which IMO must quickly be integrated in the Western economic and security infrastructure, a renewed version of former #French President's vision, "#Europe from the #Atlantic to the #Urals".**
(9/9)
Further reading:
*
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/07/russia-ukraine-putin-collapse-disintegration-civil-war-empire/
**
De Gaule's speech:
https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00003521;jsessionid=E83E3C25FB18C2B000FBF97A6447FE5D
Strategic insights:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/economic-transition-in-central-and-eastern-europe/new-europe-from-the-atlantic-to-the-urals/BB2D2C4470AAB076C85BA8148E2E7CC7
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847704
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/about-a-europe-from-the-atlantic-to-the-urals/
EU Institute for Security Stud
HistoPol (#HP) 🏴 🇺🇸 🏴