https://pooladkhay.com/posts/first-kernel-patch/ #newbiecoder #linuxkernel #codingadventures #techstories #HackerNews #ngated
Finally organized my thoughts into a blog post around the state of hypervisors in my home lab, with some new hardware. I also called out a few nice features of XCP-NG and Proxmox that I discovered while I was evaluating both of them.
https://medium.com/@a.j.longchamps/home-lab-hardware-refresh-september-2025-edition-3e50767b63e1
#homelab #hardware #hypervisors #ansible #automation #debian #kubernetes #learning #tinkering #proxmox #xcpng #minisforum
A Fuzzy Escape - A tale of #vulnerability research on #hypervisors
Conceptual conflation, in a bunch of paragraphs.
This is not how it works.
https://thenewstack.io/bare-metal-kubernetes-the-performance-advantage-is-almost-gone/
Supposed "hard" limits can as well be enforced with #containerization. It is just less common and not necessarily desired.
And no, those limits are not hard, and no, #hypervisors do not guarantee isolation either - see e.g. all the recently revealed #VMWare bugs with integer overflows and underflows, array out-of-bound accesses etc..
⚠️ Just a reminder, folks:
The "container" movement on Linux emerged as a convenient way to manage different, possibly conflicting settings & dependencies for different apps on a machine. "Security" by sandboxing got tacked on later, and the quality of that isolation remains LOW regardless of all the trendy project names and acronyms that have filled that space.
Data centers' standard for high security consists of virtual machines (type 1 hypervisors) or separate dedicated hardware. Ain't no way, no how is a successful datacenter going to ask a giant, complex, contorted Linux or BSD (or hybrid Windows or Mac) kernel for sandboxing services to contain threats.
If you are using containers to enhance security – on any general-purpose machine – make sure they are running as VMs, or as sandboxes on a microkernel (not monolithic) architecture.
#infosec #security #containers #hypervisors #microkernel
Guillotine: Hypervisors for isolating malicious AI
https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.15499
As AI models become more embedded in critical sectors like finance, healthcare, and the military, their inscrutable behavior poses ever-greater risks to society. To mitigate this risk, we propose Guillotine, a hypervisor architecture for sandboxing powerful AI models -- models that, by accident or malice, can generate existential threats to humanity. Although Guillotine borrows some well-known virtualization techniques, Guillotine must also introduce fundamentally new isolation mechanisms to handle the unique threat model posed by existential-risk AIs. For example, a rogue AI may try to introspect upon hypervisor software or the underlying hardware substrate to enable later subversion of that control plane; thus, a Guillotine hypervisor requires careful co-design of the hypervisor software and the CPUs, RAM, NIC, and storage devices that support the hypervisor software, to thwart side channel leakage and more generally eliminate mechanisms for AI to exploit reflection-based vulnerabilities. Beyond such isolation at the software, network, and microarchitectural layers, a Guillotine hypervisor must also provide physical fail-safes more commonly associated with nuclear power plants, avionic platforms, and other types of mission critical systems. Physical fail-safes, e.g., involving electromechanical disconnection of network cables, or the flooding of a datacenter which holds a rogue AI, provide defense in depth if software, network, and microarchitectural isolation is compromised and a rogue AI must be temporarily shut down or permanently destroyed.