IMO, #NZPol Deputy PM and #AtlasNetwork Act Party leader David Seymour needs to be investigated and prosecuted for treason against the sovereignty of #Aotearoa #NewZealand. #GCSB #SIS
IMO, #NZPol Deputy PM and #AtlasNetwork Act Party leader David Seymour needs to be investigated and prosecuted for treason against the sovereignty of #Aotearoa #NewZealand. #GCSB #SIS
Will be interesting to see if this goes anywhere. .
One of the three lawyers who made the call, University of Auckland associate professor Treasa Dunworth, said the inspector-general of intelligence and security was thorough and she thought he would appreciate their argument that Government Communications Security Bureau and Security Intelligence Service intelligence might be making its way to Israel via the US.
"The National Cyber Security Centre ... has released a Review of its response to the 2021 email hacking of NZ members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC,...) and Professor Anne-Marie Brady, the well known China expert and critic. A number of problems were identified, both operational and (yet again) with regard to accountability and transparency, so I thought I would briefly summarise them."
#NZPol #CyberSecurity #GCSB #FiveEyes
https://www.kiwipolitico.com/2024/07/still-the-5-eyes-achilles-heel/
'Improper': NZ spy agency slammed for secretly hosting foreign spying
New Zealand’s international spy agency has been rebuked for hosting a foreign agency’s spy operation for several years without telling its minister, and without knowing whether doing so was contributing to military strikes overseas.... #newzealand #gcsb #5eyes #spying #surveillance #surveillancecapitalism #asiapacific #cia #worldnews
“The Inspector-General has found significant failings in the GCSB’s hosting of a foreign partner’s system”
There’s a PDF linked in this tweet from the NZ Inspector-General of Intelligence Services, vaguely detailing how (presumably: US, UK, AU or CDN) foreign spooks parked a spooky surveillance “capability” on NZ soil and ran it without telling anyone, nor (worse) keeping proper records. Both are typical* but the latter deserves calling out as it’s yet more evidence that private industry can’t trust Governments to hold back-doors or “golden keys” to encrypted messaging. Quotes:
5.3. The record-keeping of the decision process was poor and there are significant gaps, which have made it difficult to identify reasons for certain decisions, particularly whether concerns about the capability were mitigated by redrafts to the MOU. There appears to be no substantive written legal advice, despite the GCSB’s General Counsel being involved throughout the process.
5.4. Despite the then acting Director-General anticipating that the Minister responsible for the GCSB would be informed about the capability and possibly asked to approve GCSB hosting the system, this inquiry found no evidence of the Minister being told about the capability […]
7. I found that the capability operated at GCSB:
7.1. without adequate record keeping;
7.2. without due diligence by GCSB on the capability tasking requests;
7.3. without full visibility for GCSB of the capability tasking;
7.4. without adequate training, support or guidance for GCSB operational staff;
7.5. with negligible awareness of the capability at a senior level within GCSB after the signing of the MOU in 2012 and until the system was shut down in 2020;
7.6. with no apparent access for GCSB to the outcomes of the capability’s operation at GCSB;
7.7. without any auditing;
7.8. without the required review of the MOU;
7.9. without due attention to the possibility, recognised within the Bureau, that support for the capability could contribute to military targeting; and
7.10. without clarity, in consequence, as to whether data supplied by the GCSB to the capability did in fact support military action.
https://twitter.com/igisnz/status/1770562733332943101
The Inspector-General has found significant failings in the GCSB's hosting of a foreign partner's system. Read more here https://t.co/Zi8wa5OttB
— IGIS NZ (@igisnz) March 20, 2024
[*] as anyone who remembers the 1996 publication of this book already knows
There’s a PDF linked in this tweet from the NZ Inspector-General of Intelligence Services, vaguely detailing how (presumably: US, UK, AU or CDN) foreign spooks parked a spooky surveillance &#…