Infoblox Threat Intel

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We planned one report on Keitaro abuse, but we ran out of pages before we ran out of cases.
So here’s Part 2 of 3, a medley of threats that go well beyond AI‑investment scams.

Threat actors abuse Keitaro’s traffic distribution, cloaking, and rule engine to hide malicious landing pages behind geo and device-based filters. They stack bulletproof hosting and reverse proxies to add layers of indirection, making takedown and analysis harder. In this post, we share how we overcame this using multi‑protocol, multi‑vantage telemetry. We leveraged JA4+ web server fingerprints, DNS analytics, and Confiant’s visibility into advertising supply chain data to uncover Keitaro abuse and the delivery of malware downloaders, infostealers, weaponized RMMs, wallet drainer campaigns, scams, and email spam and advertising attack vectors.

If you hunt threats distributed via adtech, these indicators can be useful pivots. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/no-reach-no-risk-the-keitaro-abuse-in-modern-cybercrime-distribution/

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #ai #keitaro #adtech #tds #trafficdistributionsystem #cloaker #cloaking #landscape #malvertising #infostealer #rmm #remotemonitoringmanagement #downloader #malware #spam #airdrop #cryptocurrency #ja4 #ja4_fingerprinting

@svenk True!

Not sure it is the case in the emails we see though. The links themselves are not using HTTPs...
Also, from looking at this (old) example of the same kind of scam: https://urlscan.io/result/01975e33-1fda-77c6-966d-c9c4bb1fd0f4
It looks like the redirection to HTTPs fails.

Anyways, it would be interesting to see if you can get an SSL cert for those subdomains!

firstpremierhomewarranty.com - urlscan.io

urlscan.io - Website scanner for suspicious and malicious URLs

Seeing FQDNs like "mtmoqiuq.20.218.142.124.static.hostiran[.]name" and "sgrwnbid.172-202-98-170.cloud-xip[.]com", we first thought some ASNs could be exploited similarly to the ".ARPA abuse" we described in one of our recent blogs. Turns out we were overthinking it... This kind of "DNS abuse" is so straight forward... We're not sure it qualifies as DNS abuse...

Here is what is going on: Whatever IP address you prepend to "static.hostiran[.]name" creates a hostname which resolves to this IP... That is it! Same goes for cloud-xip[.]com!

We've seen these kinds of hostnames a lot in SPAM emails recently, like the one we screenshot below which loads an image from a CDN as a giant hyperlink. We aren't sure why malicious SPAM actors bother to use this trick in their email links... If they control an IP, they can use it directly in URLs. They don't need a domain name!? And it isn't like this bypasses a firewall... If their IP is blocked, queries to those FQDNs will be too...

Our best guesses are that:
- Using hostnames rather than IPs helps them bypass SPAM email detection?
- And / or it enables them to create "subdomains", which they seem to be doing to track something, either SPAM campaigns, or their victims.

Technically, this could be used to create lookalike FQDNs. Those examples look like random subdomains, but literally anything can be prepended to the IP, so the only limit is your imagination! Not the most convincing lookalike by any means... but we've seen worse!

Here is an example of how this can be abused to both, load content from literally any IP, and create low quality lookalikes:
https://urlscan.io/result/019d1b3d-b94e-70f9-aae7-ecf5a02e3c89/

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #spam #scam

Many of the other crypto phishing pages have been simpler lures:

try-trezcard[.]com
live-ledgerupdate[.]com
valid-ledgerlive[.]com
822037[.]help
support.devicerecovery[.]io

Our team at Infoblox is hopeful that with more public awareness about these ongoing campaigns from Poisonseed, hopefully fewer enterprise organizations and individuals will be impacted and we'll see a reduction in these attacks over the next year.

If you have any tips or leads on this campaign or others like it, please don't hesitate to ping our team! 🖖

There has also been seed phrase poisoning / crypto phishing efforts which have used domains targeting Trezor, Ledger, Coinbase and likely other wallets.

Somewhat surprisingly, a recent phishing site actually had a fake blog post from Trezor titled, "Address Poisoning Attacks are Surging – Here's How Your Trezor Now Protects You" which had substantial content likely written by AI, and further links on the page to a phishing portal.

writeup-blogtrezor[.]com

One interesting detail about the Poisonseed phishing campaign is that it appears different targeted users will get different phishing campaigns. There are far fewer examples but ActiveCampaign users have also been targeted on phishing sites like support-activecampaign[.]com

It seems based on the shifts in content the last few months that Poisonseed has seen success with these "Footer template phishing" emails, so this is definitely something to keep an eye on. Some of the Sendgrid phishing domains promoted during these campaigns includes:

usnw1-sgapi[.]com

ussw-sendgrid[.]com

priority-sgportal[.]com

In March 2026 they've also sent multiple phishing emails that claimed a "Women's History Month" footer would be added to all outgoing emails by default, and you merely need to login to disable it...
On March 1, 2026, the threat actors sent out a similar email claiming that an "Iran Awareness Footer" would be added to all outgoing emails and claiming, "If you'd prefer to not include it, you can easily disable it in your account preferences."
In February 2026 they sent another phishing email about a "LGBTQ+ Footer" being added to all outgoing communications:
In December 2025 they sent out a phishing email about a "Black Lives Matter Theme" which honored George Floyd claiming it was turned on by default and would merely need a quick login to disable the theme...