Let me get this straight...

The default setting for Signal on an iPhone allows law enforcement to see the content of all incoming messages, even after the app has been deleted? 🤔

https://www.404media.co/fbi-extracts-suspects-deleted-signal-messages-saved-in-iphone-notification-database-2/

@Mer__edith
Can we get a comment on this?

1) The default Signal setting to show message contents in push notifications seems... bad, assuming this article is accurate.
2) Does changing the in-Signal-app setting for Notification Content indeed prevent notifications from being stored anywhere, which by default contains incoming message bodies.

@Mer__edith
On the macOS side of things, we have confirmation that Signal notification contents get stored, even for disappearing messages

iOS sadly offers less visibility into what's going on. But the FBI probably appreciates that it's happening there too.

The default notification setting for Signal (on both iOS and macOS) ensures that potentially sensitive information leaks out of the Signal app. This is unfortunate.

When Disappearing Messages Don't Disappear

@wdormann @Mer__edith I was unaware notifications on iOS were stored in an on-device database even after they had been dismissed. That seems like an inefficient waste of storage - does anybody have a link to some Apple docs providing context about this database?
@tdpsk @Mer__edith
The problem is that such content is not included in unencrypted backups. So we mortals can't even confirm this, as we don't have access to full-device exploit tools such as Cellebrite.
@wdormann @Mer__edith from what I understand it was forensically recounstructed from storage, the database itself is non-persistent (on the software layer). So something Apple could solve in a future update, e.g. by regularly properly wiping that part of storage.
@tdpsk @Mer__edith
Right, why is this data persistent at all?
@wdormann @Mer__edith it should probably be changed but you also have to weigh this against how many people would try Signal, see that it lacks message previews, and go back to SMS.
@wdormann how the FBI could access the device notifications database?

@bsod
They had access to an unlocked device.

Unclear whether that was voluntary, through coercion, or through trickery like Cellebrite advertises.

@wdormann ok ... I wonder if changing this option would make any difference unless notifications are fully disabled 🤔
@wdormann I mean, before 2025 did the average mainstream user have the US government in their threat model?
@marypcbuk @wdormann The government has always been a threat to any left of center activists. The right planned their insurrection on public Facebook groups without precautions.
@wdormann Lockdown mode overrides this setting. Or if you don’t use lockdown mode (which is a bad choice) you should change it in Signal. @signalapp cannot account for iPhone’s default behaviour (keeping a record of notifications)

@omnicore @signalapp
Yeah, I've been on Lockdown Mode since it was released.

Do you have a reference for how this is the case?

@wdormann @signalapp On iPhones one cannot be certain…

@omnicore @signalapp
Regardless, even just testing things out on a clean test device, an iPhone with Lockdown Mode enabled still gets push notifications with the incoming message body.

So, color me skeptical that Lockdown Mode does anything regarding this.

@wdormann @signalapp And the push notification system is another concern. Realistically somebody should accept the battery drain penalty and use Signal on a phone without push notifications (on iPhones this is impossible)
@omnicore @wdormann @signalapp What I got from the article is what you said here: the weakness is in iPhone’s default behavior.

@grammasaurus @omnicore @signalapp

The screenshot I shared is from the Signal app itself, which chooses to include the message content in notifications.

So I'd say that both are at fault.

@wdormann @omnicore @signalapp That’s not at all what I see on my phone for the signal app.

I’m using iOS 18.1.1–maybe the latest version has changed a lot?

@grammasaurus @omnicore @signalapp
18.1.1, eh? If you don't install security updates, I wouldn't expect your experience to be like the rest of the world. 😂
@wdormann @grammasaurus @signalapp 18.1.1 !!! This is Darksword & Coruna material…

@wdormann The default setting for the iPhone by the US company Apple is to pass messages through to their Notification functionality.

They could be retrieved by the FBI from the US company Apple's push notification database.

The US company Apple, not Signal, has a shoddy security model here.

PS: To any Apple fanboys who can't stand a single bad word about Apple, I'll block you permanently and happily if you even give a squeak.

#Apple #Signal #FBI #Fascism

@avuko @wdormann

Oh, but it's even worse than that. From TFA:

Authorities have turned to push notifications more broadly as an investigative strategy too; in June 404 Media reported Apple gave governments data on thousands of push notifications. Those were legal demands made to Apple, while the Prairieland case was about data from a device authorities had physical access to.

This suggests that your #notifications are sent home to #Apple. Why is that necessary?

I have further questions:

  • Why, and for whose benefit, were notifications stored on the phone after the #Signal app had been removed? They were useless to the other of the phone.
  • How much of this vulnerability is shared with Android phones?

@CppGuy @avuko

Apple gave governments data on thousands of push notifications

Is open to wide interpretation. Did they give information about thousands of push notifications? (i.e. metadata) (e.g. the App that sent the notification and the timestamp, and potentially account info tied to the request)

If they gave the actual notification content, then that's a whole other scandalous animal. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and whatnot.

@wdormann what does that mean for any other app that pushes sensitive data as notifications? Wondering if disabling the notification rly disables the storing in the DB or just the display of it.
@AwkwardTuring
Right. That's the million dollar question.
@wdormann The default setting is that you get notified when you receive a message, because most people want those.
@prism
The default setting is that you get notified with the message contents

@wdormann @prism

fwiw, I just checked on Android. Notification history goes back only 24 hours. Message + sender visible.

@wdormann @mastodonmigration eh what?

On Android it just shows "you have a new message". Was this an Apple or a Signal decision?

@craignicol @wdormann @mastodonmigration On my Android it did show Name and message completely. Not sure if I have changed that setting myself in the past 8 years that I have been using Signal, or whether that is/was the default.
@erwinrossen @wdormann @mastodonmigration hmm. Entirely possible the default has changed
@wdormann Looks different here. But it’s Most probably the „Preview“ -Thing that causes Information to leak (to the OS which persists it unsecure)

@lennybacon
The screenshot I shared is from the Signal app itself, in Settings.

Not iPhone-wide settings.

@wdormann Thanks. Looks the same in the app to me.

Probably the same but configured from the opposite side of things.

@wdormann @Viss It’s been a while since I installed Signal, but I have a vague memory that it may have reminded me to change that setting the first time I ran it.

@thomasareed @Viss
I don't believe you, as that setting (my screenshot) is within the Signal app itself.

As such, if they wanted a different default value, they would have just released the software with the preferred setting.

@wdormann @Viss Okay, whatever. “I don’t believe you” is a pretty rude response, as it implies I’m lying and that nothing changed in the years since I installed it. I do distinctly remember some kind of warning about Signal notifications from somewhere, though, so this is most definitely NOT new news.
@wdormann switching my friends and family to signal was made easier because of settings like this. It behaves like a normal messaging app. None of them have a threat model that has them thinking of device seizure by law enforcement.