@stman @Sempf @LaF0rge yes.

Because physical SIMs, like any "cryptographic chipcard" (i.e. @nitrokey ) did all that fancy public/private crypto on silicon and unless that was compromizeable (which AFAICT always necessistated physical access to the #SIM, espechally in pre-#OMAPI devices) the SIM wasn't 'cloneable' and the weakest link always had been the #MNO /.#MVNO issueing (may it be through #SocialHacking employees into #SimSwapping or LEAs showng up with a warrant and demanding "#LawfulInterception"):

• These "attack vectors" were known and whilst unfixable they could at least be mitigated by i.e. NEVER using a #PhoneNumber for anything and/or using anonymously obtained #SIMs. But more and more services like @signalapp did #regression demanding #PII and more and more nations criminalized #AnonymousSimCards under utterly #cyberfacist & #FalsePretenses!

Add to that the regression in flexibility:

Unlike a #SimCard which was designed as a vendor-independent, #MultiVendor, #MultiProvider, device agnostic unit to facilitate the the #authentification and #encryption in #GSM (and successor standards), #eSIMs act to restrict #DeviceFreedom and #ConsumerChoice, which with shit like #KYC per #IMEI (i.e. #Turkey demands it after 90 days of roaming per year) und #lMEI-based #Allowlisting (see #Australia's shitty #VoLTE + #2G & #3G shutdown!) are just acts to clamp down on #privacy and #security.

• And with #EID being unique per #eSIM (like the #IMEI on top!) there's nothing stopping #cyberfacist regimes like "P.R." #China, #Russia, #Iran, ... from banning "#eSIMcards" (#eSIM in SIM card form factor) or entire device prefixes (i.e. all phones that are supported by @GrapheneOS ), as M(V)NOs see the EID used to deploy/activate a profile (obviously they don't want people to activate eSIMs more than once, unless explicitly allowed otherwise.

"[…] [Technologies] must always be evaluated for their ability to oppress. […]

• Dan Olson

And now you know why I consider a #smartphone with eSIM instead of two SIM slots not as a real #DualSIM device because it restricts my ability to freely move devices.

• And whilst German Courts reaffirmed §77 TKG (Telco Law)'s mandate to letting people choose their devices freely, (by declarong #fees for reissue of eSIMs illegal) that is only enforceable towards M(V)NOs who are in #Germany, so 'good luck' trying to enforce that against some overseas roaming provider.

Thus #Impersonation attacks in GSM-based networks are easier than ever before which in the age of more skilled than ever #Cybercriminals and #Cyberterrorists (i.e. #NSA & #Roskomnadnozr) puts espechally the average #TechIlliterate User at risk.

• I mean, anyone else remember the #Kiddies that fucked around with #CIA director #Brennan? Those were just using their "weapons-grade #boredom", not being effective, for-profit cyber criminals!

And then think about those who don't have privilegued access to protection by their government, but rather "privilegued access" to prosecution by the state because their very existance is criminalized...

The only advantage eSIMs broight in contrast is 'logistical' convenience because it's mostly a #QRcode and that's just a way to avoid typos on a cryptic #LocalProfileAgent link.

@GossiTheDog the sheer fact that #MSPs & #CSPs can access clients' setups without proper #authorization [including #KYC / #KYB, #AuthCode|s and proper authorization via contract] is already sickening.

• This literally begs to be abused via #SocialEngineering / #SocialHacking of #Microsoft personnel or just blatant "#PrivilegueEscalation" through falsefully claiming to be a #MSP / #CSP contracted by the targeted company.

Such fundamental #ITsec fuckups are reasons alone not to use #Azure or any #Microsoft products & services at all...

• I mean, it doesn't require #Mitnick-level skills to pull this off, since it doesn't necessitate #Lapsus-Style #SIMswap or other means to gain access...