KI-generierte Übersetzungen, okay, nervig, aber irgendwie noch in der Kategorie "halbwegs nützlich" anzusiedeln.

Aber komplette Videos von Uploadern ungefragt durch den KI-Filter zu jagen, egal in welcher Absicht, geht meiner Meinung nach gar nicht.

https://heise.de/-10622259

#YouTube #AI #KI #Videomanipulation

©tombzz

#digitalart #shortvideo #videomanipulation #tombzz #ai #aiart

#Adobe #AI #GenerativeAI #VideoManipulation: "Adobe is showing off a new generative fill feature, Project Fast Fill, that can easily add or remove objects in videos with the power of AI. It’s one of several new, wild, experimental AI features announced today at the company’s MAX conference. Project Fast Fill has the ability to swap in clothing accessories on people in motion or remove tourists from the background of a landscape pan.

Fast Fill works similarly to Google’s Magic Editor, where you can move around people or objects — but with video instead of just still photos. Fast Fill promises to do things the company’s Project Stardust does for still photos, like change colors by just entering a text prompt. Adobe says these generative AI features are made possible by the company’s updated Firefly AI models."

https://www.theverge.com/2023/10/12/23914278/adobe-max-project-fast-fill-ai-video-generative-fill

Videobearbeitung jür Jedermann - leicht mit INVE

#ai #ki #inve #videobearbeitung #kuenstlicheintelligenz #neuronaleverfahren #interaktivedigitalisierung #bildbearbeitung #videomanipulation #multimediabearbeitung #videokunst #videokreativität #videodesign

https://kinews24.de/inve-video-bearbeitung-wird-zum-kinderspiel

“We have to be skeptical viewers” #deepfakes #videomanipulation

https://www.wired.com/story/prepare-deepfake-era-web-video

Disinformation evolving threat

Disinformation is an evolving threat which requires continuous efforts to address the relevant actors, vectors, tools, methods, prioritised targets and impact.

Some forms, especially state driven disinformation, are analysed by the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, in cooperation with the Strategic Communication Task Forces of the European External Action Service and with the support of Member States’ services. The actors behind disinformation may be internal, within Member States, or external, including state (or government sponsored) and non-state actors. According to reports, more than 30 countries are using disinformation and influencing activities in different forms, including in their own countries. The use of disinformation by actors within Member States is an increasing source of concern across the Union. Cases of disinformation driven by non-state actors have also been reported in the Union, for example related to vaccination. As regards external actors, the evidence is strong in the case of the Russian Federation. However, other third countries also deploy disinformation strategies, quickly learning from the methods of the Russian Federation. According to the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, disinformation by the Russian Federation poses the greatest threat to the EU. It is systematic, well-resourced, and on a different scale to other countries. In terms of coordination, levels of targeting and strategic implications, Russia’s disinformation constitutes part of a wider hybrid threat that uses a number of tools, levers, and also non-state actors. Constant targeted disinformation campaigns against the Union, its institutions and policies are likely to increase in the run up to the 2019 European Parliament elections. This calls for urgent and immediate action to protect the Union, its institutions and its citizens against disinformation. Social media have become important means of spreading disinformation, including in some cases, like Cambridge Analytica, to target the delivery of disinformation content to specific users, who are identified by the unauthorised access and use of personal data, with the ultimate goal of influencing the election results. Recent evidence shows that private messaging services are increasingly used to spread disinformation. Techniques include video manipulation (deep-fakes) and falsification of official documents; the use of internet automated software (bots) to spread and amplify divisive content and debates on social media; troll attacks on social media profiles and information theft. At the same time, more traditional methods such as television, newspapers, websites and chainemails continue to play an important role in many regions. The tools and techniques used are changing fast – the response needs to evolve just as rapidly.

Greater public awareness is essential for improving societal resilience against the threat that disinformation poses.

Disinformation is a major challenge for European democracies and societies, and the Union needs to address it while being true to European values and freedoms. Disinformation undermines the trust of citizens in democracy and democratic institutions. Disinformation also contributes to the polarisation of public views and interferes in the democratic decision-making processes. It can also be used to undermine the European project .This can have considerable adverse effects on society across the Union, in particular in the run up to the 2019 European Parliament elections.

It is essential to understand how and why citizens, and sometimes entire communities, are drawn to disinformation narratives and define a comprehensive answer to this phenomenon. Building resilience also includes specialised trainings, public conferences and debates as well as other forms of common learning for the media. It also involves empowering all sectors of society and, in particular, improving citizens’ media literacy to understand how to spot and fend off disinformation.

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#ActionPlanAgainstDisinformation #CambridgeAnalytica #Disinformation #EUHybridFusionCell #EUMemberStates #EuropeanParliamentElections #Falsification #Russia #RussianFederation #SocialMedia #VideoManipulation