Hey folks in infosec,
could you give me some material (if possible ready for management digestion) why TLS interception is an inherently bad thing that should stop _now_?
Things like weakening security, breaking pinning, deprecation in TLSv1.3, ...
Hey folks in infosec,
could you give me some material (if possible ready for management digestion) why TLS interception is an inherently bad thing that should stop _now_?
Things like weakening security, breaking pinning, deprecation in TLSv1.3, ...
@pake_preacher : I forgot the details of PAKE and SRP, but in the end the most secure client authentication requires:
1️⃣ Strong, long term, human comprehensible, *serving endpoint* authentication;
*AND*
2️⃣ TLS channel binding (enforcing known endpoints).
(Apart from those, both serving endpoint AND client MUST be trustworthy).
🚨 The -corrupt- CA/B forum breaks 1️⃣ by:
a) Advocating anonymous Domain Validated certificates, which render secure account creation IMPOSSIBLE;
b) Continuously decreasing certificate lifetime.
🚨 Furthermore, "legitimate" MitM's * break 2️⃣.
* Man in the Middle, like on-device virusscanners and firewalls that "open" TLS tunnels (both requiring installation of a dedicated root certificate) and proxies such as (definitely not limited to) Cloudflare and Fastly.
😱 Passkeys enforce NEITHER 1️⃣ NOR 2️⃣.
😱😱 Worse, because passkeys (or FIDO2 hardware keys) can be easily irretrievably "lost", servers typically provide WAY EASIER phishable authentication methods (such as "rescue codes").
#AitM #MitM #SecureOnlineAuthIsHARD #SecureAuthentication #OnlineAuthentication #Authentication #Impersonation #ChannelBinding #TLSchannelBinding #UTM #TLS #TLSinterception #TLSscanning #Proxy #Proxies #GoogleIsEvil #CloudflareIsEvil