Much of the Rust-in-safety-critical conversation focuses on perceived gaps - but how do those concerns play out in practice? Florian Gilcher (@skade) from @ferrous joins fellow industry experts to discuss what actually matters for Rust adoption in regulated environments, from qualified tooling to certification.

๐Ÿ”— https://oxidizeconf.com/sessions/panel_executing_high-assurance_projects_in_Rust

#Oxidize2026 #RustLang #FunctionalSafety #SafetyCritical #EmbeddedRust

Both communicateโ€ฆ
but SIS always remains independent for safety integrity

๐Ÿ’ก Simple understanding

๐Ÿ‘‰ DCS runs the plant
๐Ÿ‘‰ SIS saves the plant

#SIS #DCS #ProcessSafety #FunctionalSafety #Instrumentation #Automation #ControlSystems #IndustrialAutomation #Engineering #IEC61511 ๐Ÿš€ https://mastodon.social/@InstrumentationTools/116604677178420628

Memory safety is Rust's headline feature - but spacecraft don't fail from buffer overflows. They fail from ambiguity: mismatched assumptions, undocumented contracts, state machines with unintended transitions.

At #Oxidize2026, David de Rosier (Onyx) looks at what decades of safety-critical engineering have learned about these failure modes, and where Rust helps encode those lessons โ€” and where it simply can't.

๐Ÿ”— https://oxidizeconf.com/sessions/software_ate_my_spacecraft

#RustLang #FunctionalSafety #SpaceTech

Safety-critical development is more than picking the right language - it consists of requirements management, testing, structural coverage analysis, & more.

Alex Senier & Manuel Hatzl (@ferrous) work through the software safety lifecycle at Oxidize 2026 in their hands-on workshop, to create a project scaffold for safety-critical development using Ferrocene & open-source Rust tooling.

๐Ÿ”— https://oxidizeconf.com/sessions/safety_critical_rust_development_with_ferrocene

#Oxidize2026 #RustLang #Ferrocene #FunctionalSafety #Embedded #SafetyCritical

RE: https://mas.to/@tg9541/115631644920670100

I consider it my duty to write that I was wrong: the technical problem with flight safety Airbus has in 6000 A320 machines is not theoretical. The following article in the Dutch NRC describes an incident in the 2nd part which indicates that certain technical effects, presumably soft-errors through cosmic radiation, are not handled gracefully. This looks like a methods or architecture problem. Space-tech uses radiation-hardened electronics.
#airbus #functionalsafety

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2025/12/03/airbus-inspecteert-ruim-600-a320-vliegtuigen-wegens-probleem-met-metalen-platen-a4914327?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=mastodon&utm_term=20251203