Memory safety is Rust's headline feature - but spacecraft don't fail from buffer overflows. They fail from ambiguity: mismatched assumptions, undocumented contracts, state machines with unintended transitions.

At #Oxidize2026, David de Rosier (Onyx) looks at what decades of safety-critical engineering have learned about these failure modes, and where Rust helps encode those lessons โ€” and where it simply can't.

๐Ÿ”— https://oxidizeconf.com/sessions/software_ate_my_spacecraft

#RustLang #FunctionalSafety #SpaceTech

Safety-critical development is more than picking the right language - it consists of requirements management, testing, structural coverage analysis, & more.

Alex Senier & Manuel Hatzl (@ferrous) work through the software safety lifecycle at Oxidize 2026 in their hands-on workshop, to create a project scaffold for safety-critical development using Ferrocene & open-source Rust tooling.

๐Ÿ”— https://oxidizeconf.com/sessions/safety_critical_rust_development_with_ferrocene

#Oxidize2026 #RustLang #Ferrocene #FunctionalSafety #Embedded #SafetyCritical

RE: https://mas.to/@tg9541/115631644920670100

I consider it my duty to write that I was wrong: the technical problem with flight safety Airbus has in 6000 A320 machines is not theoretical. The following article in the Dutch NRC describes an incident in the 2nd part which indicates that certain technical effects, presumably soft-errors through cosmic radiation, are not handled gracefully. This looks like a methods or architecture problem. Space-tech uses radiation-hardened electronics.
#airbus #functionalsafety

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2025/12/03/airbus-inspecteert-ruim-600-a320-vliegtuigen-wegens-probleem-met-metalen-platen-a4914327?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=mastodon&utm_term=20251203