How Likely Is “Polexit” After Poland’s Prime Minister Just Warned About It?

How Likely Is “Polexit” After Poland’s Prime Minister Just Warned About It?

By Andrew Korybko

The liberal premier is exploiting the conservative president’s veto of a €44 billion strings-attached EU military loan to fearmonger about this scenario far ahead of fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections in the hopes of spooking on-the-fence voters in these expected neck-and-neck polls into supporting him.

Poland’s ruling liberal-globalist coalition is furious with conservative President Karol Nawrocki for vetoing a bill on their country’s receipt of €44 billion in military loans under the EU’s “Safe Action For Europe” (SAFE) program. It was earlier argued that “Poland’s Conservative Opposition Has Good Reason To Reject A Gigantic EU Loan For Arms” due to the strings attached, namely that two-thirds of the funds must be spent on European equipment and the entire sum could be frozen on arbitrary legal pretexts.

Nawrocki echoed these concerns when explaining his veto and also mentioned how SAFE could indebt Poles for decades. Other arguments that he made were that giving the EU influence over defence spending would threaten Poland’s sovereignty and violate the constitution. Instead of SAFE loans from Brussels, Nawrocki suggested procuring the same amount of loans from Poland’s Central Bank, which he claims would incur no interest. Notes From Poland elaborated more on this in their article about it here.

Nawrocki shortly afterwards revived his proposal from late last year for Germany to subsidize Poland’s military-industrial complex as a form of the World War II reparations that the conservative opposition party with whom he’s associated demands from Berlin. Since then, it was observed that “Germany Is Competing With Poland To Lead Russia’s Containment”, so Germany might not agree to subsidizing its “friendly rival” in this respect for fear of losing influence in Europe and importance vis-à-vis the US.

Regardless of whether or not Germany subsidizes Poland’s military-industrial complex, Nawrocki’s veto was an act of political boldness that powerfully defied the EU, so much so that his rival Prime Minister Donald Tusk hysterically fearmongered about a “Polexit” plot allegedly backed by MAGA and Russia. According to him, most of the conservatives that Nawrocki represents are on board as well as the two populist-nationalist opposition parties, and Tusk pledged to “do everything to stop them.”

The reality is that Poland is unlikely to try leaving the EU since its economic growth is tied to the free movement of capital, goods, and people provided for by the bloc. Poland also benefits a lot from EU subsidies, though it should also be mentioned that “Most of the money in Europe flows from East to West, not the other way around” per a detailed report from Politico in 2019. What Nawrocki wants isn’t a “Polexit”, but to reform the EU as he explained here in November for restoring national sovereignty.

Instead of isolating itself from the EU, thereby also cutting off the Baltic States’ direct access to the rest of the bloc and thus likely inflicting huge damage to their economies that could be exploited by Poland’s historical Russian rival, Poland envisages leading a region-wide reform movement within the EU. This is aimed at advancing Poland’s grand strategic goal of establishing a sphere of influence in Central & Eastern Europe via these political means and the connectivity ones related to the “Three Seas Initiative”.

It would be more difficult to achieve this outside of the EU than within a reformed EU, ergo why most of Poland’s right-wing opposition don’t support the “Polexit” scenario, which Tusk is fearmongering about for political reasons related to fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections. On-the-fence voters in these expected neck-and-neck polls might be spooked into voting for the liberal-globalist incumbents, which is what he wants, and that’s another reason why the opposition likely won’t embrace “Polexit” rhetoric.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Germany #Poland #Russia #Ukraine

Why Is Nord Stream Back In The News?

Why Is Nord Stream Back In The News?

By Andrew Korybko

A recent report claimed that this megaproject has figured into secret talks between Russia and the US.

Berliner Zeitung reported in detail on Le Monde Diplomatique’s paywalled article late last month citing a source allegedly within Gazprom about how the revival of Nord Stream as a joint Russian-US partnership is “absolutely part of secret negotiations” between them. The gist is that Russian gas could return to the EU via these means but under US control and political influence. This modus vivendi would reduce costs across the board in the EU and thus hypothetically make it a better market for US exports than it is today.

As it stands, “The US Weaponized Russophobic Paranoia & Energy Geopolitics To Capture Control Of Europe”, and American energy companies accordingly stand to profit tremendously from exploiting the EU’s newfound LNG dependence on them to the hilt. That said, the strategic dividends of obtaining control over Russia’s budgetary revenues from gas sales to the EU through ownership of Nord Stream are arguably worth the reduced LNG profits due to the leverage that this would give the US over Russia.

Moreover, Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby’s “strategy of denial” calls in part for the US to obtain control over the resources upon which China’s continued growth and rise as a superpower are dependent, and this imperative figures prominently in Trump 2.0’s grand strategy against China. Restoring a degree of Russian gas exports to the EU therefore denies these resources to China, and it’s via these means that “A Rapprochement With Russia Can Help The US Advance Its Goals Vis-à-vis China”.

There’s more to it such as scaling joint energy cooperation to include other deposits and expanding the goodwill generated through this collaboration into the critical minerals industry for the same purpose. The US could consequently achieve three strategic goals: 1) the EU can become a better market for US exports than it is today upon its US-supervised Russian-assisted recovery through the resumption of some low-cost gas exports; 2) these resources are then denied to China; and 3) US companies still profit.

The fears that the Central & Eastern European countries like Poland and the Baltic States had over Nord Stream with regard to Russia and Germany teaming up against them once more would also be dispelled since they’re the US’ most loyal allies in Europe and would thus trust its control over these pipelines. What was described up till this point is arguably what Miami financier Stephen P. Lynch has aimed to achieve ever since it was reported in late 2024 that he’s quietly trying to buy Nord Stream.

All of this makes perfect business and especially strategic sense, but the remaining obstacles are US and EU sanctions, political pressure upon Trump 2.0 by the US’ most fiercely Russophobic European allies, and of course Russia’s willingness to go along with this arrangement, which can’t be taken for granted. Nevertheless, if properly articulated to the right people in the Trump and Putin administrations, it’s indeed possible that something of the sort could be agreed to as part of a Russian-US “New Détente”.

For these reasons, while some might scoff that this is just a political fantasy, it’s actually a realistic scenario that can’t be ruled out. The US’ influence over the EU could be leveraged to surmount resistance to this plan, while Russia’s willingness to compromise and demands to lift all sanctions could combine to ensure its agreement too. Amidst the seemingly inevitable global energy crisis caused by the Third Gulf War, this could help save the EU economy from collapse, but only if decisionmakers act swiftly.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#CentralAndEasternEurope #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #NordStream #NordStream2 #Russia #USA #VladimirPutin

Trump’s Latest Tariffs On NATO Allies Could Trigger Far‑Reaching Consequences

Trump’s Latest Tariffs On NATO Allies Could Trigger Far‑Reaching Consequences

By Andrew Korybko

The US might abandon its new interest in backing radical “security guarantees” for Ukraine due to worsening ties with Western Europe; increasingly Polish-led Central & Eastern Europe could replace Western Europe’s strategic importance for the US; and intra-EU rifts might accordingly widen.

Trump announced that the US will impose 10% additional tariffs on those NATO allies next month who symbolically dispatched a handful of military units to Greenland ahead of upcoming multilateral drills there with Denmark before scaling this to 25% on 1 June. The affected NATO allies are Denmark, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This announcement comes right before next week’s Davos Summit while the second deadline comes right before the next NATO Summit.

Trump therefore expects the issue, as well as the scenario of a new US-EU trade war that could follow the bloc’s lawmakers putting approval of last summer’s deal on hold in response to his new tariffs, to dominate discussions next week and ideally lead to a deal around the time of the next NATO Summit. About that, he declared in his announcement that the US wants to purchase Greenland from Denmark, but he also importantly didn’t exclude using military means if Copenhagen remains recalcitrant.

Given the sorry state of the EU economy in general due in no small part to its compliance with US sanctions that resulted in cutting off low-cost energy imports from Russia, it’s unlikely that the EU could wage a protracted trade war with the US, let alone win one. Likewise, while The Economist speculated that the affected NATO allies like Germany might kick the US out of its bases there, neighbouring Poland could simply host them instead like it’s been practically begging to do for years already.

To channel what Trump infamously told Zelensky during last year’s infamous White House meeting, Europe therefore has no cards, which raises the question of why it would provoke Trump into what might soon become a trade war in which its affected NATO allies are doomed to defeat. The most realistic reason is that they wanted to virtue signal their commitment to the “rules-based order” that Trump shredded with Maduro’s capture during the US’ astoundingly successful “special military operation”.

Given their junior partner status vis-à-vis the US, which was already enshrined in the nature of their relations upon them complying with its anti-Russian sanctions but was radically reinforced amidst the rapid restoration of US power under Trump 2.0, they should have bandwagoned around it. After all, their relations with Russia are already ruined and ties with China aren’t anywhere near as close as they’d need to be to rely on them for balancing the US, so bandwagoning would have been the best option.

Instead of bandwagoning or balancing, the affected NATO allies (which consider themselves to be champions of the now-defunct “rules-based order” that was destroyed by the US’ own hand after it no longer served its interests) tried to militarily challenge it in a symbolic way, which provoked Trump. Knowing how he views the world, which isn’t a secret since he’s open about his opinions, he arguably perceived that as both unacceptable and pathetic. He now wants to humiliate those who opposed him.

This includes the UK’s King Charles, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, all of whom he hitherto thought of as friends and whose countries play key roles in containing Russia. If the US’ ties with those three countries deteriorate in parallel with Trump’s personal ones with their leaders, then the US might stop flirting with extending support to NATO allies’ troops in Ukraine, which would remove the newly dangerous ambiguity over its approach towards this issue.

Furthermore, any worsening of the US’ ties with Western Europe would please Poland, which envisages leading Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and has received tacit US support in pursuit of this grand strategic goal. Likewise, the intra-EU tensions that might erupt as a result of the bloc’s lawmakers putting approval of last summer’s trade deal with the US on hold could help popularize Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s plans for reforming the EU, which regional countries might begin to collectively champion.

To review, the consequences that might follow Trump’s latest tariffs against several NATO allies are: the US abandoning its new interest in backing radical “security guarantees” for Ukraine due to worsening ties between the US and Western Europe; the acceleration of the US’ strategic reprioritization of increasingly Polish-led CEE over Western Europe; and a Polish-led widening of the intra-EU rift between Western and CEE over respectively centralizing the bloc or reforming it to preserve members’ sovereignty.

All of these are plausible but only in the scenario of protracted problems between the US and the affected NATO allies, which might not come to pass if they re-evaluate their strategic positions, realize that they have no cards, and therefore promptly abandon their opposition to Greenland’s purchase. If they stubbornly double down for ideological reasons, however, then the consequences would be far-reaching and altogether make them even more irrelevant in global affairs than they already are.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #Denmark #DonaldTrump #EU #Europe #Finland #France #Geopolitics #Germany #Greenland #NATO #Netherlands #Norway #Poland #Sweden #UK #USA

Poland Is Expanding Its Influence Over The Baltics Through The “Via Baltica” Highway

Poland Is Expanding Its Influence Over The Baltics Through The “Via Baltica” Highway

By Andrew Korybko

The “EU Defence Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki inaugurated the latest section of the “Via Baltica” highway between Poland and the Baltic States in late October in an event with his Lithuanian counterpart, with both highlighting the dual military purpose of this megaproject in an allusion to the “military Schengen”. “Via Baltica” is one of the “Three Seas Initiative’s” (3SI) flagships, many of which complement the newer “military Schengen” initiative of facilitating the flow of troops and equipment eastward towards Russia.

Poland envisages the 3SI accelerating the revival of its long-lost Great Power status that’ll then result in it leading Russia’s containment all across Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) once the Ukrainian Conflict ends. It’s the most populous formerly communist member of NATO with the bloc’s third-largest military, just became a $1 trillion economy with its sights now set on a G20 seat, and has a history of regional leadership during the Commonwealth/“Rzeczpospolita” era, so these ambitions aren’t delusional.

Building upon the last point, most casual observers don’t know that the Commonwealth stretched as far north as parts of Latvia, which remained under its control till the Third Partition in 1795. Prior to that, it even controlled around half of Estonia from 1561-1629, after which it was ceded to Sweden. Suffice to say, what’s nowadays the nation-state of Lithuania was also part of the “Republic of the Two Nations” as the Commonwealth was officially known, thus giving Poland a substantial footprint in Baltic history.

The insight shared in the preceding two paragraphs enables the reader to better understand what Nawrocki told Lithuanian media during his maiden trip as president to that country last September about how “We as Poles, and I as the President of Poland, are aware that we are responsible for entire regions of Central Europe, including the Baltic States and Lithuania. Thanks to this visit and our cooperation, we feel that we are also building our military potential in solidarity, supported across the ocean.”

“Via Baltica” and the complementary “Rail Baltica”, both of which are behind schedule (especially the latter), will serve as the means for Poland to fulfil this dimension of its Great Power vision as elucidated by Nawrocki. The US’ post-Ukraine “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more muscularly containing China could result in it redeploying some troops from CEE to there, but Poland would then likely replace the US’ reduced role through its ongoing militarization and 3SI-driven military logistical access to the Baltics.

The “EU Defence Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia. In that scenario, from Estonia down to the Polish-Belarusian-Ukrainian tripoint, Russia’s number one adversary wouldn’t necessarily be NATO as a whole but Poland. That would have important implications.

In brief, while Poland is closely allied with the Anglo-American Axis for reasons of shared anti-Russian goals, it’s not their puppet and might become even more strategically autonomous under Nawrocki. After all, he surprised many by recently saying that he’s ready to talk to Putin if Poland’s security depends on it, thus opening the door for a Polish-Russian modus vivendi in the future. Such an understanding might be the key to keeping the peace in CEE after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #Estonia #EU #Europe #Lithuania #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine

What Could The Contours Of A NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact Look Like?

What Could The Contours Of A NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact Look Like?

By Andrew Korybko

Awareness of the threats that NATO poses along these three fronts and the division of labour between the top five states therein – Finland, Sweden, Poland, Romania, and Turkiye – enables Russia to devise the most effective countermeasures and propose the best means for managing future tensions.

It was earlier assessed that a NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact (NRNAP) could follow the end of the Ukrainian Conflict, but it would have to cover the Arctic-Baltic, Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), and the Black Sea-South Caucasus to work. That analysis also highlighted Poland’s pivotal role therein due to it now having NATO’s third-largest military that importantly borders both Russia and Belarus. The present one will therefore share some general ideas about the NRNAP after the earlier one argued its merits.

Sweden is the most natural country to contain Russia in the Arctic-Baltic region since it’s part of both, but this can most optimally be achieved through partnerships with Finland (also a dual Arctic-Baltic state) and Poland (only a Baltic state but also crucially a rising land power), ideally via a trilateral format. The goals on this front are to have Sweden arm and fortify its former region of Finland for diverting some of Russia’s land forces from CEE while facilitating the rise of Poland’s sea power through naval deals.

This approach is meant to bog Russia down along the lengthy Finnish border, obstruct its freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea in times of crisis, and possibly blockade Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad dimension segues into the role of the Polish-centric CEE front, which could serve as a launchpad for invading that region and Belarus. It can also function as a staging ground for funnelling land forces into the Baltic States and facilitating a NATO intervention in Ukraine together with nearby Romania.

Just like Poland has a dual containment role in the Baltic and CEE, so too does Romania have a dual one in CEE and the Black Sea since NATO’s largest base in Europe is being built near the port of Constanta in proximity to Crimea. Due to the limits placed on extra-regional states’ naval forces in the Black Sea by the Montreux Convention, NATO will have to rely on both Romania (mostly members’ air and land assets at the aforesaid facility) and Turkiye (whose navy is modernizing and expanding) to contain Russia there.

Turkiye’s main role in containing Russia is along its entire southern periphery starting in the South Caucasus with its mutual defence ally Azerbaijan and stretching across the Caspian Sea into Central Asia via the “Trump Route for International Peace & Prosperity” (TRIPP). TRIPP will facilitate the export of Western military equipment for possibly training Russia’s CSTO allies, with a focus on Kazakhstan, into conforming with NATO standards like Azerbaijan just achieved. A Ukrainian-like crisis might then follow.

Awareness of the threats that NATO poses along these fronts and the division of labour between the top five states therein – Finland, Sweden, Poland, Romania, and Turkiye – enables Russia to devise the most effective countermeasures and propose the best means for managing tensions via a possible NRNAP. The exact details of how to do so will likely vary by the front, but they’ll probably all have in common a desire to limit the deployment of certain forces near the border and ensure free maritime navigation.

Without a NRNAP, these threats could spiral out of control and lead to another NATO-Russian crisis, one which could even be provoked by the UK for ruining the renascent RussianUS “New Détente” or at the very least keeping Russia and Western Europe (chiefly Germany) apart via this revived “cordon sanitaire”. It’s therefore in Russia’s and the US’ interests to begin discussions on a NRNAP without delay and for Trump 2.0 to brainstorm how it can ensure that its junior partners comply with whatever is agreed to.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#cee #centralAndEasternEurope #centralAsia #europe #finland #geopolitics #nato #poland #romania #russia #southCaucasus #sweden #turkey #turkiye #uk #ukraine #usa

What’s The Likelihood Of A NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact?

What’s The Likelihood Of A NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact?

By Andrew Korybko

This is the most effective way to reform the European security architecture and keep the peace, but a lot will depend on Poland, which plays the most decisive role among all of the US’ NATO allies.

Putin recently proposed providing Europe, the majority of whose countries are part of NATO, with formal guarantees that it won’t attack. In connection with this, he also assessed that those who fearmonger about Russia are serving the interests of the military-industrial complex and/or trying to bolster their domestic image, which exposed their ulterior motives. In any case, his proposal could hypothetically lead to a NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact (NRNAP), but only if the political will exists on both sides.

One of Russia’s goals in the special operation is to reform the European security architecture, which the US is newly interested in too as suggested by some of the ideas in its draft Russian-Ukrainian peace deal framework. All of this follows the Pentagon’s drawdown from Romania, which might precede a larger pullback from Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), albeit one that wouldn’t be total nor lead to abandoning Article 5. Such a move could still alleviate the American aspect of the NATO-Russian security dilemma.

The greater the scale of the US” “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia”, especially if it leads to the redeployment of some forces from Europe, the less likely that NATO’s European members (except the UK) are to saber-rattle against Russia since they’d doubt that the US will rush to their aid if they provoke a conflict. Their newfound sense of relative vulnerability, which is derived from their pathological intertwined hatred and fear of Russia, could then soften them up to a US-mediated NRNAP that they’d otherwise not agree to.

Just as “The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine”, so too might it struggle to get them to abide by whatever it proposes with respect to the new security architecture in Europe that it envisages jointly creating with Russia after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. Nevertheless, the US’ presumably reduced military presence in CEE by that point could facilitate agreements on the status of NATO forces in the Arctic-Baltic, CEE, and the Black Sea-South Caucasus.

This vast region uncoincidentally overlaps with the “cordon sanitaire” that interwar Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski wanted to create via the complementary “Intermarium” (a Polish-led security-centric regional integration bloc) and “Prometheism” (“Balkanizing” the USSR) policies but ultimately failed to achieve. In today’s context, US support for the revival of Poland’s long-lost Great Power status could see Poland leading Russia’s containment there on the US’ behalf but within strictly agreed-upon confines.

Russian-NATO tensions can still be managed so long as the risk of war in CEE is reduced, which can be achieved by placing limits upon Poland’s militarization and hosting of foreign forces in exchange for Russia withdrawing some or all of its tactical nukes and Oreshniks from Belarus. A fair Polish-Belarusian deal could thus form the core of any NRNAP. Successful mutual de-escalation on this central front is expected to lead to agreements on the peripheral Arctic-Baltic and Black Sea-South Caucasus ones.

The devil is in the details, and some NATO members might either obstruct talks on a US-mediated NRNAP or subvert it afterwards, so nobody should get their hopes up. That said, Russia and the US should set their sights on the end goal of a NRNAP, which could parallel talks on modernizing the New START. This is the most effective way to reform the European security architecture and keep the peace, but a lot will depend on Poland, which plays the most decisive role among all of the US’ NATO allies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#cee #centralAndEasternEurope #eu #europe #geopolitics #nato #poland #russia #ukraine #usa

Germany Poses A Significant Non-Military Threat To Polish Sovereignty

Germany Poses A Significant Non-Military Threat To Polish Sovereignty

By Andrew Korybko

Its continued hegemony over Central & Eastern Europe threatens to further erode Poland’s already limited sovereignty, but this can be shattered with US support, though at the cost of subordinating Poland to Trump 2.0’s envisaged “Pax Americana” that would also impose limits on its sovereignty.

The AfD’s Co-Leader Declared That Poland Could Become A Threat To Germany” earlier this month, the rationale of which was explained in the preceding analysis, but it’s also true that some in Poland regard Germany as threat to their country as well. Whereas the perception that some Germans have of Poland as a threat is derived from it trying to shatter Germany’s hegemony over Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), the perception that some Poles have of Germany as a threat is derived from that selfsame hegemony.

The grey cardinal of Poland’s conservative-nationalist opposition (“Law & Justice” or PiS per its Polish acronym), Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has been among the most outspoken voices about this. He’s spoken on this subject for years, even declaring right before the special operation that Germany’s EU federalization plans are an attempt to build a “Fourth Reich”. Kaczynski recently reaffirmed that Germany nowadays leads “a kind of new empire” and, together with France, “want[s] to take Poland’s sovereignty away.”

Prime Minister Donald Tusk is “a German agent” tasked for fulfilling this plot, he claimed in late December 2023 after PiS lost control of the Sejm following its defeat in that fall’s elections, but Trump 2.0’s envisaged “Pax Americana” can possibly save Poland according to his latest assessment. He said in late September that “Pax Americana would be global but it would allow for the existence of sovereign states, including a sovereign Poland, constrained only by demands of joint defence within NATO.”

This aligns with the insight shared in the earlier cited analysis about the AfD co-leader’s views on Poland, which drew attention to how the US is helping Poland shatter German hegemony in CEE in order to facilitate the creation of a Polish-led wedge (the “Three Seas Initiative”, 3SI) between Germany and Russia. For Poland to achieve its full geostrategic potential in this regard, both in furtherance of its own and the US’ shared interests, PiS must regain control of the Sejm during fall 2027’s next elections.

That would almost certainly necessitate allying with the Confederation party, which leads Poland’s populist-nationalist opposition and whose chief Slawomir Mentzen came in third place during the first presidential round with 14.81% of the vote, but Mentzen conditioned this on PiS’ top leaders resigning. Other than Kaczynski, he demanded the departure of former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, but their egos (especially Kaczynski’s) might prevent that despite it arguably being for the greater good.

In any case, Poland’s sovereignty can only enduringly be defended vis-à-vis Berlin-led Brussels by rallying CEE to collectively oppose the EU’s federalization plans, which can be advanced through transforming the US-backed 3SI into a political platform to this end. Poland must also continue reviving its lost Great Power status in parallel with replacing Hungary’s role as a continental hub for conservative-/populist-nationalist movements, which requires regaining control of the Sejm, all of which with US support.

Polish independence activists fought “for our freedom and yours” during the Partition period as they famously proclaimed, especially when they participated in independence struggles abroad, with their modern struggle against German hegemony over CEE representing the spiritual successor of that cause. Its success is also far from certain, but unlike back then, Poland can count on US support but at the cost of subordinating itself to “Pax Americana” with no chance of achieving full sovereignty under this order.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#afd #centralAndEasternEurope #eu #europe #geopolitics #germany #nato #poland #usa

AfD Says Poland Threatens Germany, But Is It Really The US?

AfD Says Poland Threatens Germany, But Is It Really The US?

By Andrew Korybko

If it wasn’t for US support, Poland could never pose any strategic threat to Germany, so it’s really the US that already poses the greatest one of all to it.

AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla said during a recent appearance on public media that “Poland could also become a threat to us…We see that Poland’s interests differ from Germany’s…We are seeing double standards on the Nord Stream issue. Poland did not extradite a wanted criminal, a terrorist, to Germany.” He’s not wrong, but he’s also not right for the reasons that people might think, namely the assumption that Poland might one day pose a military threat to Germany. The present piece will clarify the matter.

It’s true that “Poland’s interests differ from Germany’s”, though not necessarily in the economic sense since Poland became a larger export market for Germany earlier this year than China, and Poland has benefited from the German-led EU’s subsidies (that benefit Germany even more though). Their different interests largely pertain to the future of the EU, which Germany envisages becoming a federation under its leadership while Poland wants it to be a loose union of states that retain more of their sovereignty.

Nord Stream embodied these differences since Germany could have leveraged what would have been its leading energy role in the EU had the second pipeline come online to coerce the Central & Eastern European (CEE) countries into making more concessions on their sovereignty to Berlin-backed Brussels. Poland feared this scenario for self-evident reasons, while the US didn’t want the rise of a de facto German-led “Federation of Europe”, so they plotted together to prevent this from happening.

Poland’s Swinoujscie LNG terminal opened in 2015, and it’s now poised to serve as the entryway for US LNG into CEE as explained here, which will erode German influence there. In parallel, the US supports the Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative” of more robust integration among the CEE states, which is one of the means through which Poland plans to revive its long-lost Great Power status. These aforesaid policies were then given an unprecedent boost after the Nord Stream attack that the US arguably orchestrated.

Had the Ukrainian Conflict ended as a result of spring 2022’s peace talks, then the opportunity for blowing up that pipeline would have closed, hence the importance of Poland aiding the UK in its efforts to convince Zelensky to keep fighting by allowing the unlimited transit of military aid to that end. In the three years since that attack, the German economy greatly weakened, which Poland and the US expect to accelerate the erosion of German influence in CEE and facilitate its replacement with their influence.

Poland can’t replace Germany’s economic influence there even though it just became a $1 trillion economy, but the lopsided trade deal that the EU agreed to with the US could eventually see the latter doing so instead. Polish influence can instead take the form of leading CEE’s containment of Russia now that it commands NATO’s third-largest army, thus creating a wedge between Germany and Russia like the US also wants, and rallying the region behind its vision of the EU’s vision in opposition to Germany’s.

Chrupalla was therefore correct in claiming that “Poland could also become a threat to [Germany]” since the successful implementation of the abovementioned grand strategy would shatter German hegemony over CEE. What he didn’t mention, and perhaps he hasn’t (yet?) realized it, is that the aforesaid is a joint Polish-US plan that’s been operational for years already. If it wasn’t for US support, Poland could never pose any strategic threat to Germany, so it’s really the US that already poses the greatest one of all to it.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#centralAndEasternEurope #eu #europe #geopolitics #germany #poland #uk #usa

Germany Stands To Lose And Poland To Gain From The EU’s Latest Energy Move

Germany Stands To Lose And Poland To Gain From The EU’s Latest Energy Move

By Andrew Korybko

Poland’s role in providing more US LNG to Central & Eastern Europe is expected to erode Germany’s influence in this region and accelerate Poland’s revival of its lost Great Power status.

The European Council decreed that the import of Russian gas will be banned across the bloc next year, but with varying lengths of grace periods for countries with short- and long-term contracts, the longest of which will last till 1 January 2028. The Council earlier admitted that pipeline gas and LNG combined accounted for a little less than a fifth of the bloc’s imports last year. It should also be mentioned that the EU continues to import Russian oil too, including indirectly, which has proven to be similarly scandalous.

Nevertheless, the EU’s plans to phase out the remaining fifth of its gas imports from Russia will further enfeeble its economy by leading to their replacement with more expensive US LNG, which will predictably result in the costs being passed down to consumers. This was entirely predictable too since the EU agreed to purchase $750 billion in US energy by 2028 per the terms of their lopsided trade deal from last summer that was assessed here as having turned the EU into the US’ largest-ever vassal state.

Germany is expected to be the most dramatically affected by this development in terms of its domestic politics and geostrategy. As regards the first, a greater decrease in living standards caused by the costs of more expensive US LNG being passed down to consumers could accelerate the AfD’s rise, which would lead to significant political changes if they’re ever able to form a government. Even if they’re kept out of power, such blatant meddling by the elites could worsen political polarization and associated tensions.

On the topic of German geostrategy, Poland with whom Germany is competing for influence over Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) is poised to play a supplementary role in supplying Czechia and Slovakia with US LNG via the Swinoujscie terminal and the planned one in Gdansk. Ukraine will be supplied too. These countries lie within the sphere of influence that Poland envisages creating upon the revival of its lost Great Power status. Czechia and Slovakia are also part of the Visegrad Group together with Poland.

Hungary is a member too and could be supplied with US LNG via Poland or Croatia’s Krk terminal, whose expansion is one of the priority projects of the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) that Poland and Croatia co-founded in 2015 but which is now led by Warsaw. While Germany commands much more influence over CEE due to being the EU’s de facto leader and boasting its largest economy, Poland’s influence over them is increasing through its future role in suppling US LNG, which might pull them away from Berlin one day.

Energy geopolitics play a significant role in geostrategy so the impact of the aforesaid trend shouldn’t be underestimated if it continues to unfold. In that event, the overarching trend would be the likely decline of German influence over CEE, greatly facilitated as it was by Germany’s voluntary participation in the US’ anti-Russian sanctions regime and then the Nord Stream terrorist attack which pushed it beyond the point of no return. These might be seen in hindsight as the beginning of a new regional order in CEE.

While Germany thought that it would inflict a strategic defeat upon Russia, the US ended up inflicting a strategic defeat upon Germany by engineering the circumstances whereby its only Western competitor’s economy would decline. Together with Poland, whose Anglo-American-backed revival of its Great Power status conveniently creates a regional wedge between Germany and Russia, the US is geostrategically re-engineering Europe at Germany’s expense in order to facilitate Russia’s post-Ukraine containment.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Germany #Poland #Russia #TheWest #USA

September 2025 Was The Most Eventful Month For Poland Since The End Of Communism

September 2025 Was The Most Eventful Month For Poland Since The End Of Communism

By Andrew Korybko

The common denominator between these developments is the progress being made on reviving Poland’s long-lost status as a Great Power as proven by its increasingly central role in the region.

Poland is no stranger to dramatic developments, which includes being the scene where World War II in Europe officially began and the one where the Iron Curtain finally started to crumble, both in the last century. September 2025 wasn’t anywhere near as eventful as the ones in which those examples occurred, but it was certainly the most eventful since the end of communism. What follows is a list of everything that coincidentally transpired during President Karol Nawrocki’s first full month in office:

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Trump Committed To Keeping US Troops In Poland & Suggested Sending More

Nawrocki’s first foreign trip was to the US, Poland’s most important ally, to meet with Trump. His American counterpart not only committed to keeping US troops in Poland amidst rumours earlier this year that he was considering reducing them but even said “we’ll put more there if they want.” This signals the US’ appreciation of the role that Poland can play in containing Russia in Europe through the “Three Seas Initiative” that it leads after the Ukrainian Conflict ends and the US “Pivots (back) to (East) Asia”.

Poland’s Former President Revealed That Zelensky Tried To Spark A Polish-Russian War

Nawrocki’s predecessor Andrzej Duda belatedly admitted that Zelensky’s lies about Russian responsibility for November 2022’s Przewodow incident, which was later revealed to have been a Ukrainian air defence missile that crossed into Poland and killed two Poles, were meant to spark another Polish-Russian War. He eschewed any negative judgement of his counterpart, but the significance is that he revealed that Zelensky employed narrative subterfuge in the past to this end, thus raising suspicions of his motives.

Nawrocki Declared Polish Responsibility For The Entirety Of Central Europe

Building upon the last point, Nawrocki declared in an interview with Lithuanian media during his trip there after visiting the US, Italy, and the Vatican that “We as Poles, and I as the President of Poland, are aware that we are responsible for the entire region of Central Europe, including the Baltic States and Lithuania.” His words confirm that Poland envisages restoring its long-lost status as a Great Power through the abovementioned means and that its pursuit of this goal will shape the region’s future.

He Also Reaffirmed His Opposition To Deploying Polish Troops To Ukraine

After Lithuania, Nawrocki then flew to Finland, where he reaffirmed his opposition to deploying Polish troops to Ukraine. This aligns with the pledge that he signed ahead of the second round of elections earlier this year. His visit to Finland was also important in its own right since the “EU Defence Line”, which refers to the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield”, could prospectively expand to that new NATO member for creating a new “Iron Curtain” along the bloc’s borders with Russia and Belarus.

Some Alleged Russian Drones Then Veered Into Polish Airspace Right Afterwards

Right after the event above, some alleged Russian drones veered into Polish airspace, which Russia denied in totality while Poland insisted it was a deliberate provocation. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed in late September that the incident was actually orchestrated by Ukraine. This analysis here takes a middle ground between these narrative extremes by arguing that it was an accident due to NATO jamming ahead of the then-upcoming Russian-Belarusian Zapad 2025 drills in Belarus.

The Polish Foreign Minister Proposed A No-Fly Zone Over Ukraine In Response

Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, who represents Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s liberal-globalist government that’s at odds with conservative-nationalist Nawrocki, proposed after this suspicious drone incident that Poland impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Nawrocki didn’t go along with that since it would risk another Polish-Russian War, thus contradicting the spirit of his earlier mentioned pledge about not deploying troops to Ukraine, but it still shows that some deep state forces have a different agenda.

The Polish Deep State Tried To Manipulate Nawrocki Into War With Russia

It soon thereafter turned out that the damage which a home incurred during this incident was due to a Polish missile, not a Russian drone like Tusk’s government told the UNSC during an emergency meeting, but neither Nawrocki nor his National Security Bureau found out about this till that media leak. As explained here, “The Polish Deep State Tried To Manipulate The President Into War With Russia”, but he refused to be drawn into this trap by authorizing the no-fly zone that Sikorski proposed in response.

Poland Decided To Participate In NATO’s “Operation Eastern Sentry” Instead

Nawrocki couldn’t ignore what just happened regardless of whoever was really behind it and irrespective of their reasons so he decided to have Poland participate in NATO’s “Operation Eastern Sentry” instead. This ongoing operation is aimed at strengthening the bloc’s eastern air defences against drones and jets. While seemingly innocuous, it could possibly be exploited by subversive deep state elements to provoke a crisis with Russia if its aerial assets are shot at on the pretext of them violating the bloc’s airspace.

Tusk & Nawrocki Agreed On The Need To Intercept Russian Aerial Assets Over Poland

Despite being rivals, Tusk and Nawrocki agreed on the need to intercept Russian aerial assets over Poland, but there was nuance to their words. The first spoke about them in general but advised caution when the legal situation is less clear while the second responded about drones when asked about whether he’d authorize this for jets. If Tusk’s coalition amends the law to allow Poland to shoot without prior NATO or EU approval, then his deep state allies might provoke a crisis behind Nawrocki’s back.

Poland Also Clinched A Drone Warfare Cooperation Agreement With Ukraine

The other tangible outcome of the alleged Russian drone incident was that Poland clinched a drone warfare cooperation agreement with Ukraine that’ll indirectly expand the EU’s “drone wall” to that country’s easternmost frontier with all that entails for associated NATO influence there as well. The consequence is that Russia might now be even more reluctant to reach a compromise with Ukraine than before since it now knows that its foes’ military-technical influence will extend up to its new borders.

Its Industrial Development Agency Wants A Railway To Odessa & A Port There Too

Earlier in the month but lost amidst the drama brought about by the alleged Russian drone incident, the new chief of Poland’s Industrial Development Agency disclosed that his planned international department will consider financing a railway to Odessa and leasing a port there too. It was assessed here that any progress on those plans would advance Poland’s envisaged revival of its long-lost Great Power status but also dangerously revive the historical Polish-Russian rivalry in Ukraine as well.

Poland Briefly Closed Its Border With Belarus At The Cost Of EU-Chinese Trade

The earlier-mentioned Russian-Belarusian Zapad 2025 drills served as the pretext for Poland to briefly close its border with Belarus across which €25 billion (or 3.7%) of EU-Chinese trade is conducted. While this might not seem all that significant, especially since the decision was reversely shortly afterwards (reportedly at China’s and the EU’s requests), it highlights how Poland will act unilaterally, including at its partners’ expense. This policy could have very serious implications for NATO-Russian tensions.

Nawrocki Proposed That Germany Partially Fund Poland’s Rapid Militarization

Poland already has NATO’s third-largest army and spends more of its GDP on defence than any other member, the US included, yet Nawrocki proposed during his trip to Germany that it fund his country’s militarization as a form of reparations for World War II. What matters at this point isn’t whether or not Germany will comply, which it would probably do if their shared US ally demands this, but that Poland wants to militarize even more than it already has and wants the EU’s leader to foot some of the bill.

He Also Wants To Host French Nukes & Possibly Develop Poland’s Own One Day

Nawrocki also visited France during the same trip as his one to Germany and reaffirmed to local media that Poland not only wants to host French nukes but possibly develop its own one day. His country is far away from following in Iran’s reported footsteps, but it could much sooner host French nukes, though that depends on President Emmanuel Macron’s strategic calculations. In any case, Nawrocki’s statements of intent shouldn’t be ignored, and it’s certain that they spiked Russia’s threat perception of Poland.

Poland & Sweden Held Their First-Ever Joint Military Exercise In The Baltic

The military pact that Poland and Sweden signed at the start of September quickly turned into their first-ever joint military exercise in the Baltic. Neither boasts a big navy but they could still increase theirs in the future and cooperate more closely together to further their shared goal of containing Russia there. This also represents the de facto expansion of Poland’s “Three Seas Initiative”-centric sphere of influence deeper into Scandinavia per the foreign policy vision that Nawrocki declared in his inaugural speech.

Reports Swirled That Ukraine Is Plotting A False Flag Drone Provocation Against Poland

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova amplified Hungarian media reports at the end of the month alleging that Ukraine is plotting a false flag drone provocation against logistics hubs in Poland for the purpose of dragging the country into war with Russia. Its alleged motives ominously mirror what Duda revealed about Zelensky’s as far back as November 2022’s Przewodow incident so these reports should be taken very seriously by Nawrocki.

SVR Then Claimed That Ukraine & Poland Are Cooking Up A Ground Provocation In Poland

The aforementioned reports were then given weight by SVR’s subsequent one alleging that Ukraine is cooking up a ground provocation in Poland in collusion with the latter’s intelligence services. That claim was constructively critiqued here, which assessed that it’s unrealistic to imagine that Nawrocki would be in on it given how resistant he’s proven to be to mission creep, but it can’t be ruled out that subversive deep state elements could be involved in a desperate attempt to manipulate him into war with Russia.

Nawrocki Declared That He’s Ready To Talk With Putin If Poland’s Security Requires It

While describing Trump as “the only leader of the free world who can engage with Vladimir Putin”, Nawrocki still didn’t rule out talking with Putin if Poland’s security requires it when asked by a journalist about this scenario. It doesn’t mean that he has any such plans, but it still speaks to his comparative pragmatism vis-à-vis the Central, Eastern, and nowadays even Northern European countries over which Poland envisages expanding its influence in the future through the “Three Seas Initiative”.

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As can be seen from the nearly 20 dramatic developments described above, September 2025 was by far Poland’s most eventful month since the end of communism. The common denominator is the progress being made on reviving Poland’s long-lost status as a Great Power as proven by its increasingly central role in the region. This suggests that the resultant revival of the Polish-Russian rivalry will unfold across Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe as opposed to remaining concentrated in Ukraine like before.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#CentralAndEasternEurope #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #NATO #Poland #Russia #SVR #Ukraine