The Baltic States Are More Important For Ukraine Than Most Might Realize

The Baltic States Are More Important For Ukraine Than Most Might Realize

By Andrew Korybko

The Baltic States and Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus are the most likely tripwires for a hot NATO-Russian war, which they have an interest in provoking due to the false expectation of coercing Russia into concessions, due to their artificially engineered symbiotic security relationship from 2024.

Lithuania recently committed to producing weapons for Ukraine, and while the scope and financing of their deal remain unclear, this nonetheless drew attention to the Baltic States’ importance for Ukraine. Few are aware of it, but Ukraine clinched security agreements with all three of them – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – across 2024, the gist of which mirrors those that it clinched with major NATO states in the sense of obligating them to resume their present level of military support if there’s another conflict.

The Baltic States’ armed forces are miniscule by comparison to most NATO members’, but they’re arguably more strategic than most too due to their location along the borders with “mainland Russia”, Belarus, and Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad. This means that any border incident, including that which they or the NATO allies whose troops are present on their territory might provoke with Russia/Belarus, could spiral into a full-blown crisis due to Article 5, after which NATO as a whole could get involved.

This scenario is especially credible in light of the Baltic States’ commitment in late January to form their own “military Schengen” for facilitating the flow of troops and equipment between them. This zone could merge with the “Via Baltica” highway and its delayed “Rail Baltica” counterpart to connect them to the original “military Schengen” between Poland, Germany (which now has troops in Lithuania), and the Netherlands. If Belgium and France join as reported, then this would stretch to the Pyrenees.

Poland envisages restoring its long-lost Great Power status with US support, and seeing as how the Commonwealth once extended as far north as southern Estonia, it’s safe to say that Poland correspondingly envisages restoring its “sphere of influence” over the Baltic States as well. Poland also fields the EU’s largest army right now, which the third-largest in all of NATO with plans to reach 500,000 by 2039 (200,00 of whom would be reservists), and is at the centre of the “military Schengen”.

Accordingly, the earlier mentioned chain reaction of a border incident between the Baltic States and Russia escalating into a full-blown crisis would likely occur if Poland dispatches troops there in “defence” of its envisaged “sphere of influence”, thus drawing in the rest of NATO shortly after. The aforesaid sequence highlights the grossly outsized strategic threat that the Baltic States pose to Russia due to them serving as tripwires for a hot NATO-Russian war in the worst-case scenario.

This makes the Baltic States more important for Ukraine than most might realize given all four countries’ interest in provoking the above scenario with the (arguably false) expectation that Russia would then ultimately be coerced into concessions to avoid World War III. Either could initiate their own border incidents with Russia in order to prompt the other into following suit in the spirit of their security pacts and therefore activating both Article 5 and major NATO states’ separate security pacts with Ukraine.

With this artificially engineered symbiotic security relationship in mind, it thus becomes the case that the Baltic States and Ukraine’s borders with Russia/Belarus are the most likely tripwires for a hot NATO-Russian war, but with the caveat that this all depends on Poland. If it reacts to their border provocations against Russia, then a hot war might be inevitable, but this could be averted if it exercises restraint just like during September’s drone incident when the “deep state” tried hard to manipulate it into war.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#Belarus #Europe #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine

The Baltic States Plan To Form Their Own ‘Military Schengen’ As NATO Reinforces Its Eastern Front

The Baltic States Plan To Form Their Own ‘Military Schengen’ As NATO Reinforces Its Eastern Front

By Andrew Korybko

This will one day link with the existing “military Schengen” between the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland, which Belgium and France plan to join, for creating a contiguous zone of free military movement between the Pyrenees and the approach to St. Petersburg.

The Baltic States’ Defence Ministers signed a statement of intent in late January for forming their own “military Schengen”, which refers to the agreement signed two years ago in January 2024 between the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland for expediting the flow of troops and equipment. Belgium and France are also expected to join the original “military Schengen”, whose members aim to slash to 3-5 days the estimated 45 days that it currently takes to send the aforesaid from the Atlantic to the Eastern Flank.

Upon their modernization, both in terms of infrastructure and legal coordination, the two “military Schengens” will form a contiguous zone of free military movement between the Pyrenees and the approach to St. Petersburg. To be sure, this is a work in progress that won’t be completed anytime soon, especially its Baltic portion. Poland only just opened the portion of the “Via Baltica” highway between itself and Lithuania, while the “Rail Baltica” between them and Estonia is even further behind schedule.

Nevertheless, the unmistakable trend is that NATO is optimizing its military logistics, particularly along its Eastern Flank whose members agreed to turbocharge their militarization during mid-December’s inaugural summit. In connection with that, readers also shouldn’t forget that the Baltic States and Poland are building something called the “EU Defence Line”, which combines the first’s “Baltic Defence Line” and the second’s “East Shield” into what’s de facto a new Iron Curtain that’ll include anti-personnel mines.

This Baltic Front of the New Cold War between NATO and Russia relies heavily on Poland, which already has the EU’s largest military and the third-largest in NATO, with plans to expand from 215,000 troops to 300,000 by 2030 then half a million by 2039 (200,000 of whom will be reservists). Both the Via and Rail Baltica megaprojects, which are the regional flagships of the Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative”, will connect Poland to Latvia’s and Estonia’s borders with Russia for rapid force deployment in a crisis.

The involvement of the EU’s largest military in any such NATO-Russian crisis would inevitably drag the rest of those two overlapping blocs in any whatever war might then follow in the worst-case scenario. If the Baltic States hadn’t agreed to form their own “military Schengen”, and if the associated “Baltica” logistical projects weren’t being built, then potential border incidents could be more easily manageable. Instead, they’d likely result in a speedy deployment of Polish troops, thus escalating matters into a crisis.

Moving beyond the military significance of this recent development and into its political significance, Poland is clearly establishing a sphere of influence over the Baltic States, which is actually a return to history. Casual observers probably aren’t aware, but the Warsaw-led Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth once stretched as far north as southern Estonia and even controlled parts of Latvia for centuries till the Third Partition in 1795. This is part of Poland’s plan to revive its long-lost Great Power status.

The overarching trend is that Poland is preparing to lead Russia’s containment along the Baltic Front, which could also place more pressure upon Kaliningrad (which borders Poland and Lithuania) and Belarus (which borders Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia). The eventual merger of these two “military Schengens” could embolden Poland to more actively, even aggressively, contain Russia by ensuring that back-up would speedily arrive from the EU hinterland or even the US homeland in the event of a crisis.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#Europe #Geopolitics #NATO #Poland #TheBaltics

The Brits Want The Poles To Contain Russia In The Baltic

The Brits Want The Poles To Contain Russia In The Baltic

By Andrew Korybko

Some of the €44 billion in loans that Poland just received from the EU’s “SAFE” program will go towards its new “SAFE Baltic” program, and if the precedent of the newly clinched Polish-Swedish submarine deal is anything to go by, then UK companies will profit from forthcoming Polish deals too.

The Polish Defence Minister announced in late November that his country will buy three A26 Blekinge-class diesel-electric submarines from Sweden as part of a deal estimated to be worth a little less than €2.5 billion. This comes just several months after their first joint exercise, which presaged closer cooperation against Russia in the Baltic, and also follows reported British lobbying for Sweden over other competing bidders since one of its defence companies is expected to profit from this deal.

Although the US is Poland’s closest partner, with which it’s working hand-in-hand to geostrategically re-engineer Europe by facilitating the revival of Poland’s long-lost Great Power status simultaneously with counteracting Germany’s plans to federalize the EU, the Brits are arguably its second-closest one. This was confirmed by the creation of their de facto trilateral alliance with Ukraine exactly one week before the special operation started. They then conspired to sabotage that spring’s peace talks with Russia.

Last summer, it was assessed that “The UK Aims To Entrench Its Influence In Estonia In Order To Lead The Arctic-Baltic Front”, which preceded “SVR Once Again Warning About A British-Ukrainian False Flag Provocation At Sea” a month later. Then at the start of fall, Scandinavia experienced a Russian drone scare that was likely a series of false flags for justifying a potential crackdown on Russia’s shadow fleet in the Baltic, which is already under pressure. Such a move could serve to greatly escalate tensions.

That hasn’t yet happened due to Trump once again escalating against Russia in mid-October and then just as unexpectedly pushing for peace a month later. This made such a provocation redundant and then reduced the likeliness that Trump would fall for it after he soured on the Europeans yet again throughout the ongoing peace process that he abruptly revived. Instead of staging a false flag provocation at sea, the Brits were likely the ones who leaked the Witkoff-Ushakov call, which intended to discredit this process.

Regardless of whether or not Albion employs any more of its infamous perfidy, it’s nevertheless doing what’s needed to ensure its regional influence in the Arctic, Baltic, and Central Europe after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. Its interests in the Arctic are advanced through its base in Estonia, which also enables it to exert influence over the northern Baltic Sea, while its interests in the rest of that sea and Central Europe are advanced through its de facto alliance with Poland.

This takes the form of bilateral cooperation on Ukraine as well as the latest opportunity of indirectly cooperating through Poland’s new submarine deal with Sweden as was earlier explained. From the UK’s strategic perspective, facilitating closer cooperation between Poland and Sweden in the Baltic helps to contain Russia there, the shared goal of which is furthered by Poland’s new “SAFE Baltic” program that expands the scope of its naval activity and aims to streamline decisions on the use of force at sea.

Crucially, some of the €44 billion in loans that Poland just received from the EU’s €150 billion “Security Action For Europe” program (SAFE, which is part of the “ReArm Europe Plan”), will go towards the “SAFE Baltic” program. The precedent established by Poland’s submarine deal with Sweden could see the UK lobbying for more such deals from which its own companies will profit. Therefore, Poland’s rise as a Baltic naval power will be backed by the UK, which hopes that this will tighten Russia’s containment.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#Britain #CentralEurope #Estonia #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Germany #NATO #Poland #Russia #Sweden #TheBaltics #UK

Poland Is Expanding Its Influence Over The Baltics Through The “Via Baltica” Highway

Poland Is Expanding Its Influence Over The Baltics Through The “Via Baltica” Highway

By Andrew Korybko

The “EU Defence Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki inaugurated the latest section of the “Via Baltica” highway between Poland and the Baltic States in late October in an event with his Lithuanian counterpart, with both highlighting the dual military purpose of this megaproject in an allusion to the “military Schengen”. “Via Baltica” is one of the “Three Seas Initiative’s” (3SI) flagships, many of which complement the newer “military Schengen” initiative of facilitating the flow of troops and equipment eastward towards Russia.

Poland envisages the 3SI accelerating the revival of its long-lost Great Power status that’ll then result in it leading Russia’s containment all across Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) once the Ukrainian Conflict ends. It’s the most populous formerly communist member of NATO with the bloc’s third-largest military, just became a $1 trillion economy with its sights now set on a G20 seat, and has a history of regional leadership during the Commonwealth/“Rzeczpospolita” era, so these ambitions aren’t delusional.

Building upon the last point, most casual observers don’t know that the Commonwealth stretched as far north as parts of Latvia, which remained under its control till the Third Partition in 1795. Prior to that, it even controlled around half of Estonia from 1561-1629, after which it was ceded to Sweden. Suffice to say, what’s nowadays the nation-state of Lithuania was also part of the “Republic of the Two Nations” as the Commonwealth was officially known, thus giving Poland a substantial footprint in Baltic history.

The insight shared in the preceding two paragraphs enables the reader to better understand what Nawrocki told Lithuanian media during his maiden trip as president to that country last September about how “We as Poles, and I as the President of Poland, are aware that we are responsible for entire regions of Central Europe, including the Baltic States and Lithuania. Thanks to this visit and our cooperation, we feel that we are also building our military potential in solidarity, supported across the ocean.”

“Via Baltica” and the complementary “Rail Baltica”, both of which are behind schedule (especially the latter), will serve as the means for Poland to fulfil this dimension of its Great Power vision as elucidated by Nawrocki. The US’ post-Ukraine “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia” for more muscularly containing China could result in it redeploying some troops from CEE to there, but Poland would then likely replace the US’ reduced role through its ongoing militarization and 3SI-driven military logistical access to the Baltics.

The “EU Defence Line” that’s being built, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” along NATO’s eastern border, might then be bolstered by Polish-led troop deployments seeing as how Poland would be integral to those three’s survival in any war with Russia. In that scenario, from Estonia down to the Polish-Belarusian-Ukrainian tripoint, Russia’s number one adversary wouldn’t necessarily be NATO as a whole but Poland. That would have important implications.

In brief, while Poland is closely allied with the Anglo-American Axis for reasons of shared anti-Russian goals, it’s not their puppet and might become even more strategically autonomous under Nawrocki. After all, he surprised many by recently saying that he’s ready to talk to Putin if Poland’s security depends on it, thus opening the door for a Polish-Russian modus vivendi in the future. Such an understanding might be the key to keeping the peace in CEE after the Ukrainian Conflict ends.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #Estonia #EU #Europe #Lithuania #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine

Merkel Is Half-Right And Half-Wrong About Who’s Responsible For The Ukrainian Conflict

Merkel Is Half-Right And Half-Wrong About Who’s Responsible For The Ukrainian Conflict

By Andrew Korybko

The US was most responsible for the Ukrainian Conflict by refusing to reach a compromise with Russia for defusing their security dilemma, but Germany deserves as much blame as Poland and the Baltic States, perhaps even more because it was the EU’s de facto leader at the time.

Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel strongly implied in an interview that Poland and the Baltic States are partially responsible for the Ukrainian Conflict. According to her, “I wanted a new format… back then (in June 2021) where we could talk to Putin directly as the EU. Some [at the European Council] did not support that. They were primarily the Baltic States; but Poland was also against it because they feared that we would not have a common policy towards Russia.” She’s half-right and half-wrong.

What she’s right about is that those four are resolutely opposed to Russia for historical reasons (it’s unimportant whether or not readers believe that those reasons should influence contemporary policy) and would therefore certainly obstruct any proposed EU-Russian dialogue on security matters. Had Germany bilaterally engaged in talks with Russia on this matter or together with a “coalition of the willing” comprised of Western European countries, then that would have further divided the EU.

In that scenario, the US could have taken advantage of this serious rift to deploy more troops and equipment towards Russia’s borders for ruining the abovementioned hypothetical dialogue and provoking Putin into what ultimately became the special operation, which Merkel wanted to avoid. Like many, she underestimated how seriously he considered his country’s security dilemma with NATO to be by that point, ergo why she assumed that he wouldn’t resort to kinetic means in Ukraine for resolving it.

Not only was she wrong about that, but her account dishonestly omits what she boasted about in December 2022 regarding how she always considered Minsk to be a ruse for buying time to strengthen Ukraine’s offensive capabilities ahead of a future all-out attempt to reconquer Donbass. No strategic defeat was ever inflicted on Russia, neither in the aforesaid scenario that the special operation narrowly preempted nor throughout the course of the ongoing conflict, so Merkel is now trying to shift the blame.

Another point is that any fears that Germany and others might have had of the US exploiting an intra-EU rift over a security dialogue with Russia could have been counterbalanced by preventing it from using their territory and airspace for transferring troops and equipment to Poland and the Baltic States. They’d have still probably arrived there somehow even in that event, but the military logistics required for turning what could have been a swift campaign into a war of attrition might not have ever taken shape.

Ultimately, Merkel was looking after what she believed (whether accurately or not) to be German interests, ergo why she capitulated to pressure from Poland and the Baltic States to eschew a security dialogue with Russia so as to not further divide the de facto German-led EU. As it turned out, however, Germany’s leadership of the EU is no longer as solid as it once was due to Poland exploiting the special operation to revive its Great Power status and position itself as the US’ top ally in post-war Europe.

Merkel’s efforts to maintain German leadership of the EU therefore failed, but instead of admitting this, she’s shifting the blame onto the one of the countries whose leadership (which doesn’t mean its people) benefited the most, Poland. The US was most responsible for the Ukrainian Conflict by refusing to reach a compromise with Russia for defusing their security dilemma, but Germany deserves as much blame as Poland and the Baltic States, perhaps even more because it was the EU’s de facto leader at the time.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

 

#EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Germany #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine #USA

Merkel’s “Heresy”: Did Poland Help Trigger Ukraine’s War?

Merkel’s “Heresy”: Did Poland Help Trigger Ukraine’s War?

By Uriel Araujo

Angela Merkel’s recent claim that Poland and the Baltic states bear some responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine has caused an uproar. Still, her point — rooted in realist geopolitics — complements Mearsheimer’s warnings about NATO’s expansion. Behind the backlash lies a bigger issue about Europe’s independence, energy politics, and America’s influence on the continent.

In an interview last week, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Poland and the Baltic states share some responsibility for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. She has been under a lot of criticism over this. Her argument, however, deserves some attention.

Merkel recalled that in June 2021, amid the Minsk II accords discussions, she and French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a new EU-wide dialogue with Moscow. The aim was to engage Russia directly, thus seeking to de-escalate tensions.

However, Merkel said, that initiative was blocked at the European Council level — “mainly” by “the Baltic states”, but “Poland was also against it.” These countries feared the EU would adopt a softer stance toward the Kremlin, undermining a “common policy towards Russia.” Merkel concluded that their refusal encouraged Putin to take the path that led to the military campaign in Ukraine.

The backlash in Western media has been intense. But if one looks beyond the noise, Merkel’s point is not absurd at all. It must be understood as a part of a larger picture. The point is, as a matter of fact, consistent with a broader realist understanding of European security, and echoes the warnings of scholars such as John Mearsheimer.

The University of Chicago professor has long argued that NATO’s post-Cold War expansion eastward created a classic security dilemma, leaving Russia feeling cornered and threatened. From that viewpoint, the former German leader’s 2021 initiative — blocked by Warsaw and the Baltic capitals — could have offered one last diplomatic window before the war.

Merkel’s critics in Poland might want to recall another part of the story: the battle over Nord Stream. This pipeline, connecting Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea, also symbolized Merkel’s policy of “Wandel durch Handel” — change through trade. It was about ensuring Europe’s energy security and lowering costs, a win-win project for both Berlin and Moscow. Yet Washington, viewing it as a threat to its influence and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports, relentlessly sabotaged it. As I wrote back in 2021, American interests were simple enough: it is about maintaining leverage over Europe and preventing Moscow from gaining more influence there.

It is all forgotten History now, but German lawmakers even called for countersanctions against the US over Washington’s interference back then. Berlin’s efforts to preserve a pragmatic energy partnership with Russia were systematically undermined — by Washington and Warsaw.

Poland has long campaigned against Nord Stream, hoping to position itself as a future gas hub through the Baltic Pipe which links Poland’s coast to Norwegian gas fields through Denmark. As I noted at the time, the Polish aspirations, with 10 bcm annual capacity, were hardly a viable alternative to the over 55 bcm capacity  of Nord Stream 2 (around five times greater).

Back to 2025, the Nord Stream issue is once again in the spotlight. Poland is now refusing to cooperate with German authorities investigating the 2022 pipeline explosions. Prime Minister Donald Tusk even declared that “the problem of Europe… and Poland is not that Nord Stream 2 was blown up, but that it was built.” No wonder Berlin is exasperated, when Warsaw’s concerns seem to be all about maintaining its political narrative against Germany and Russia.

This latest dispute reflects a deeper fault line in Europe. Merkel’s Germany had pursued energy interdependence with Russia to stabilize relations; Poland, conversely, sought to weaken that link and align fully with Washington. One may recall that when President Biden waved most sanctions on Nord Stream 2 in mid-2021, Warsaw reacted furiously, accusing Washington of betrayal and calling for a more aggressively anti-Russian approach.

The United States, for its part, has consistently shifted the burden of the “Ukrainian issue” onto Europe. Washington repeatedly manipulates Europe into dealing with American made crises. Thus far, the pattern is clear: Washington encourages confrontation with Russia, reaps profits through more expensive LNG exports and arms sales, and lets Europeans pay the economic and political price.

Meanwhile, Poland is emerging as a nuclear flashpoint. Warsaw has declared its ambition to host nuclear weapons, further escalating tensions. This underreported development transforms Poland into a potential frontline in any future confrontation.

Merkel’s recent comments, then, must be seen in context. Her critics in Eastern Europe accuse her of “appeasement”; her defenders see in her a pragmatic realist. When she proposed a new dialogue in 2021, she was acting on a simple insight: peace in Europe is impossible without Russia. That might sound naïve today, but it remains true. The refusal by Poland and the Baltic states to support that diplomatic effort told Moscow that Europe was incapable of speaking independently.

Understanding the complex Russo-Ukrainian conflict requires examining its multiple causes. Structural and conjunctural factors converged: NATO expansion, failed diplomacy, energy geopolitics, and domestic politics within Ukraine. As I’ve argued, Kyiv also faces ethnopolitical unresolved civil-right issues that complicate the picture — but that is a topic for another day.

Merkel’s remarks are, in essence, an appeal to remember what was lost: the possibility of a Europe capable of managing its own security dialogue with Moscow. Whether that window could have prevented the ongoing war, is open for debate. But her critics should at least admit that she is pointing to a hard truth. Europe’s tragedy has a lot to do with its subordination to American interests.

In other words, whether one “likes Putin” or not, the crisis in Ukraine did not emerge from nowhere. It was over a decade in the making, fuelled by ideological blindness and a blatant refusal to confront uncomfortable realities. Merkel, for all her flaws, is one of the few European politicians still willing to say it out loud. And the point she is making is in fact just the tip of the iceberg.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#EU #Europe #EuropeanCouncil #Geopolitics #Germany #NATO #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine

Beyond Ukraine: Norway Becomes The West’s Silent Front In Arctic Tensions With Russia

Beyond Ukraine: Norway Becomes The West’s Silent Front In Arctic Tensions With Russia

By Uriel Araujo

As NATO conducts exercises off Norway’s coast and Washington deploys spy aircraft, Arctic tensions are reaching a breaking point. Moscow’s Arctic strategy, once centred on cooperation, is turning defensive. The frozen frontier is quietly becoming the epicentre of a new East-West rivalry.

So much is written about the developments pertaining to Ukraine, but one crucial theatre of tension between Russia and the West remains underreported: the Arctic and the wider High North, as visible in Norway, a founding member of NATO. Despite a recent visit by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) delegation to Norway — led by Major General Andrei Kudimov, who smiled for the cameras as both sides discussed “cooperation” on border control and fishing rights — Russo-Norwegian relations are, as a matter of fact, deteriorating fast.

Despite those talks, NATO has been conducting large-scale military exercises off Norway’s coast. Moreover, the United States reportedly deployed advanced reconnaissance and P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft into Norwegian territory, flying missions uncomfortably close to Russia’s north-western frontier. The symbolism is clear enough: whatever “dialogue” exists between Moscow and Oslo, the military logic of deterrence — and provocation — still dictates the Atlantic agenda.

The Arctic, long portrayed as a realm of scientific cooperation and peaceful exploration, has quietly become the new crucible of Great Power competition. I have previously argued that the next confrontation between Russia and the West may well unfold not in Ukraine or Syria, but in the frozen North — where NATO’s overreach could ignite unprecedented tensions. That observation now seems increasingly on point.

Russia, for its part, has been revising its Arctic strategy, with new emphasis on military readiness and control over the Northern Sea Route — a shipping corridor that could transform global trade as the ice recedes.

Meanwhile, NATO has steadily expanded its footprint across Scandinavia. Finland and Sweden’s accession to the Alliance, and the renewed US interest in Greenland all form part of a wider encirclement strategy. As I wrote, the US has long sought to secure access to Arctic energy and mineral resources under the banner of “security.”

Beyond the military manoeuvres, the economic dimension of this rivalry is equally telling. The European Union, Norway, and Iceland have recently announced the end of their cooperation with Russia within the “Northern Dimension” framework — an initiative that once symbolized regional pragmatism and coexistence. The abrupt suspension, justified on geopolitical grounds, effectively dismantles one of the few remaining platforms for cross-border coordination in the Arctic.

Meanwhile, the cod fishing industry — historically a linchpin of the Barents Sea economy — has become collateral damage. As analysts have noted, growing geopolitical frictions could severely impact the joint management of fisheries that both Norway and Russia depend on.

The result? Rising costs, fractured supply chains, and yet another example of how Western sanctions and “security” policies often end up hurting the very regions they claim to protect. So much for “rules-based cooperation.”

Thus far, Western media have treated Arctic (and Baltic) tensions as footnotes to the Ukrainian crisis. Yet these northern frontiers are arguably equally strategic — and volatile. The Baltic Sea, heavily militarized, has become a corridor of confrontation. Poland’s nuclear ambitions, in turn, illustrate how the region’s security spiral is intensifying. As I’ve argued elsewhere, Warsaw’s nuclear trajectory is less a defensive reflex than a bid for great-power revival — one encouraged by a US eager to outsource its strategic burdens.

The logic is the same across the North: smaller states, emboldened by NATO, are taking risks they would not have dared a decade ago — from Baltic air patrols to Arctic manoeuvres. Norway’s hosting of US anti-submarine aircraft is but the latest link in a chain of escalations that collectively erode the fragile balance once maintained through calculated restraint.

Be as it may, the Kremlin sees NATO’s northern buildup as part of a long-term encroachment, not a series of isolated incidents. Moscow’s revision of its Arctic doctrine is thus both defensive and adaptive. And it is worth noting that Russia’s cooperation with China in Arctic development — through energy projects, infrastructure, and shipping — adds another layer of complexity to the equation. As I noted recently, as Arctic ice retreats, it exposes deep fault lines running through today’s global power architecture.   No wonder Washington now seeks to “bolster” its own polar presence — a polite euphemism for militarization.

What makes the northern escalation particularly dangerous is its subtlety. Unlike the Ukrainian front, where lines and allegiances are visible, Arctic tensions evolve through technical adjustments — radar deployments, flight routes, research bans, maritime patrols — each justified as “defensive.” Yet taken together, they form a creeping militarization of one of the planet’s most fragile environments.

This is not simply about deterrence. Control of the Arctic means control of future trade routes, energy corridors, and even undersea data cables — the infrastructure of the coming century. The US-led West, unwilling to accept Russia’s geographic advantages, seeks to neutralize them through alliances and encroachments. Moscow, surrounded and sanctioned, responds by doubling down on self-reliance and Eastern partnerships.

This dynamic, left unchecked, could lead to dangerous miscalculations. NATO’s exercises off Norway’s coast send signals not just to Moscow but to Beijing as well, both of which view the High North as a space of shared strategic interest. The idea that Europe can isolate Russia economically while containing China militarily — all without consequences in the Arctic — is, to put it simply, delusional.

The real story, underreported and underestimated, is that the global confrontation between the American-led Atlantic axis and the emerging Eurasian bloc is expanding northward. The Arctic — long the world’s quietest frontier — is becoming its most revealing one. As the ice recedes and new frontiers emerge, the northern theatre may well determine the contours of the next Cold War.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Europe #Geopolitics #NATO #Norway #Russia #Scandinavia #TheArctic #TheBaltics #TheWest #Ukraine #USA

Was Scandinavia’s Russian Drone Scare A False Flag To Crack Down On Russia’s Shadow Fleet?

Was Scandinavia’s Russian Drone Scare A False Flag To Crack Down On Russia’s Shadow Fleet?

By Andrew Korybko

It’s highly suspicious that Zelensky just claimed without any evidence that they were launched by Russian tankers and subsequently demanded that Europe close the straits to its shipping in response.

Unknown drones recently flew in close proximity to Danish and Norwegian airports, prompting speculation among some that they were Russia’s delayed hybrid retaliation against NATO for backing Ukraine’s drone flights in proximity to Russia’s own airports over the past few years. No evidence has emerged in support of that hypothesis, but Zelensky still dishonestly passed off such claims as fact during his speech at the latest Warsaw Security Forum.

According to him, “there is growing evidence that Russia may have used tankers in the Baltic Sea to launch drones – the drones that caused major disruption in Northern Europe. If tankers used by Russia are serving as drone platforms, then such tankers should not be free to operate in the Baltic. This is de facto Russia’s military activity against European countries, so Europe has the right to close straits and sea routes to protect itself.”

His proposal for NATO to close the Danish Straits to Russian shipping on this pretext, which would amount to an illegal blockade that could thus legitimize offensive action by Russia in self-defence, was predictable given Ukraine’s and some of its patrons’ interest in escalating the bloc’s tensions with Russia. In fact, it might even be the case that this was the false flag that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service twice warned could soon be staged by the UK and Ukraine, albeit ultimately taking a different form.

They assessed that those two might orchestrate potentially forthcoming provocations in the Baltic that would then be blamed on Russia in order to justify cracking down on its sanctioned energy trade that the West dramatically describes as being conducted by a “shadow fleet” transiting through that sea. While no US ship was targeted with Ukrainian-transferred Soviet/Russian torpedoes nor were such mines fished out of the Baltic, Scandinavia’s Russian drone scare still arguably fulfils the same role.

Sceptics might insist that Russia resorted to “plausibly deniable hybrid retaliation” against NATO, yet it’s illogical that Russia would risk anything that could justify the same escalation that Putin’s restraint has thus far avoided, the same goes for the earlier drone incident in Poland. Ditto that for the associated accusation that it violated Estonia’s maritime airspace. All these incidents were spun by the West as deliberate Russian provocations and preceded escalatory proposals misportrayed as “retaliation”.

The Polish and Estonian ones were exploited to get Trump to greenlight NATO downing Russian jets on the basis of them violating the bloc’s airspace, which might embolden some to attempt this on false pretexts, while the Scandinavian ones were exploited to call for closing the Danish Straits to its shipping. Both concern escalations in the Baltic, which could amount to an illegal blockade that obstructs the free movement of Russian planes and ships there, thus also placing unprecedented pressure on Kaliningrad.

This insight strongly suggests that Scandinavia’s Russian drone scare was indeed a false flag to justify cracking down on Russia’s “shadow fleet”, though it’s presently unclear whether any NATO members will cross the Rubicon by seriously making any such move like closing the Danish Straits to its shipping. In any case, Zelensky’s proposal proves that he’s trying to manipulate Trump into a disaster of epic proportions together with some of his like-minded NATO patrons, but hopefully Trump won’t fall for it.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Denmark #Estonia #FalseFlag #Geopolitics #NATO #Norway #Russia #Scandinavia #TheBaltics #Ukraine #VladimirPutin

The First-Ever Polish-Swedish Joint Exercise Presages Closer Cooperation Against Russia

The First-Ever Polish-Swedish Joint Exercise Presages Closer Cooperation Against Russia

By Andrew Korybko

They have historical axes to grind against Russia after its imperial predecessor state was responsible for ending their Golden Ages as Great Powers.

Poland and Sweden just carried out their first-ever “short-notice exercise” (SNEX) in the Baltic following the signing of a military cooperation agreement at the beginning of September. This coincides with Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski warning that Poland will shoot down any Russian drones, missiles, or aircraft that enter its airspace. His words follow some Russian drones reportedly doing just that earlier in the month and Poland accusing Russian jets of violating a drilling platform’s safety zone shortly after.

The first incident was arguably caused by NATO jamming while the second – if true – might have been to gather intelligence on clandestine surveillance equipment there following reports that Poland started installing such over the summer on offshore infrastructure like wind farms. Polish-Russian tensions are therefore clearly intensifying, and the Baltic is increasingly becoming a significant theatre in the NATO-Russian front of the New Cold War, especially after Estonia accused Russia of violating its airspace there.

The first-ever Polish-Swedish joint exercise should thus be seen as strengthening NATO’s containment of Russia. President Karol Nawrocki declared in his inaugural speech in August that “I dream that in the long term, the Bucharest Nine will become the Bucharest Eleven, together with the Scandinavian countries. Yes, we, as Poles, in Central Europe and Eastern Europe, are responsible for building the strength of NATO’s eastern flank. And this should also be the international, geopolitical direction of my presidency.”

Scandinavia refers in this context to new NATO members Finland and Sweden, the first of which he visited in early September during the last leg of his first foreign trip while the second is the stronger of the two and the one with which Poland just carried out its first joint military exercise. He also reaffirmed what was conveyed above about his country’s envisaged regional sphere of influence during an interview with Lithuanian media where he claimed Polish responsibility for the Baltic States’ security.

The informally Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative” officially includes the EU’s formerly communist members, Austria, and Greece but is now conceptualized by Warsaw under Nawrocki’s leadership as de facto expanding to Scandinavia (Finland and Sweden) due to their shared interests in containing Russia. The growing ties between Poland and Sweden, which were hated rivals during the 17th century after the Swedish invasion (“Deluge”) killed around 1/3 of Poland’s population, will converge more in the Baltic.

Just as Poland is expected to play a greater role in the Baltic Sea in partnership with Sweden, so too is Sweden is expected to play a greater role in the Baltic States’ security in partnership with Poland, with the Polish-Swedish Baltic duopoly aspiring to jointly contain Russia all across this front. Bases in one another’s territory (perhaps a Polish air-naval one on Sweden’s island of Gotland?) and multilateral drills between Poland, Sweden, the Baltic States, and possibly also Finland, the UK, and the US could follow.

Poland and Sweden have historical axes to grind against Russia after its imperial predecessor state was responsible for ending their Golden Ages as Great Powers. They also have a shared history of influence over the Baltic States, Sweden’s mostly being over Estonia, Poland’s mostly over Lithuania, and varying periods of control over Latvia (many don’t know that some of it remained under Warsaw’s writ until the Third Partition of 1795). This poses an emerging threat to Russia that raises the risk of war with NATO.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #EU #Europe #Finland #Geopolitics #NATO #NewColdWar #Poland #Russia #Sweden #TheBaltics #UK #USA

Poland Envisages Indirectly Expanding The EU’s “Drone Wall” Into Ukraine

Poland Envisages Indirectly Expanding The EU’s “Drone Wall” Into Ukraine

By Andrew Korybko

This would result in the de facto new Iron Curtain and associated NATO influence stretching up to whatever the new Russian-Ukrainian border might be by the time the conflict ends.

Poland and Ukraine signed a drone warfare cooperation agreement that’ll see Ukraine share its relevant experiences with Poland, both of them jointly developing new defensive methods, and their armed forces further strengthening their interoperability in accordance with summer 2024’s security pact. The Polish Defence Minister also declared that “we know very well that the security line of our country runs along the front line of Ukraine and Russia”, which amounts to Polish strategic depth inside Ukraine.

NATO’s unprecedented downing of Russian drones over Poland, which likely veered off course due to the bloc’s jamming and were then exploited by deep state forces in an attempt to manipulate the president into war with Russia as respectively explained here and here, served as the impetus for this deal. NATO then launched “Operation Eastern Sentry” in Poland and Romania to bolster the bloc’s anti-air defences. This aligns with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s proposed “drone wall” concept.

The idea, which was proposed by the Baltic States, is to create an impenetrable electronic and physical warfare barrier along the EU’s eastern border. This pairs with the “EU Defence Line” that the bloc is building, which refers to the combination of the “Baltic Defence Line” and Poland’s “East Shield” that’ll stretch from the Estonian-Russian border down to the Polish-Belarusian one and might foreseeably be expanded northward to include the Finnish-Russian border. This de facto amounts to new Iron Curtain.

Given the rapidly evolving military-strategic context as described above, it therefore appears that Poland envisages indirectly expanding the “drone wall” component of the “EU Defence Line” into Ukraine through their newly signed drone warfare cooperation agreement. Poland’s ruling duopoly, which refers to it conservative-nationalist president and liberal-globalist prime minister, expect to benefit by solidifying their country’s strategic depth inside Ukraine as declared by their country’s Defence Minister.

As for Ukraine, Poland’s explicit plans to profit from Ukraine could hypothetically be moderated through these means, such as if Ukraine proposes being remunerated for sharing its drone warfare experience with Poland through more military donations instead of buying them on credit like is now planned. Zelensky might also calculate that having his country function as Poland’s “drone wall”, which exploits its paranoia about Russia, could help drag it into the conflict like he’s sought to do since November 2022.

Poland and Ukraine also have shared interests. Both want to show the US, EU, and NATO that they can contain Russia’s aerial capabilities (at least in part as they’d present this as having achieved) in the region, thus currying more favour with them. Another point is that Poland will receive €43.7 billion in cheap loans from the EU’s €150 billion defence investment program as part of the €800 billion “ReArm Europe Plan”. Some of this could go towards subsidizing anti-air and -drone equipment for Ukraine.

“Poland’s Military-Industrial Complex Is Embarrassingly Underdeveloped” so it might use these loans to invest in modernizing it, after which the aforesaid equipment could be sold to Ukraine on credit for a steep discount or perhaps simply donated. Through these means, the EU’s “drone wall” can indirectly expand into Ukraine, thus resulting in the de facto new Iron Curtain and associated NATO influence stretching up to whatever the new Russian-Ukrainian border might be by the time the conflict ends.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#drones #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #NATO #Poland #Russia #TheBaltics #Ukraine