What should legitimate processes of international law- and policy-making among democratic peoples look like?
A talk by Francis Cheneval on "Demoicratic Representation in and by International Organizations"
April 25, 15:00, Uni. of Copenhagen, City Campus
https://politicalscience.ku.dk/events/demoicratic-representation-in-and-by-international-organizations/
#PoliticalTheory #PoliticalScience #Democracy #InternationalOrganizations #Copenhagen #Koebenhavn #Demoicracy #talk @politicalscience @politicaltheory @DemocracyNet
Democratic Representation in and by International Organizations
Political Theory Seminar: Francis Cheneval, University of Zurich, âDemocratic Representation in and by International Organizationsâ.
"The Promise of Representative Democracy: Deliberative Responsiveness" by Claudia Landwehr and Armin SchÀfer
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09640-0
"Lottocracy Versus Democracy" by Stefan Rummens and Raf Geenens
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09648-6
"The Right to Expressive Voting Methods" by Pierre-Etienne Vandamme
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09645-9
@landwehr_c @VerglPolwi

The Promise of Representative Democracy: Deliberative Responsiveness - Res Publica
In the eyes of its citizens, liberal democracy is connected to at least three promisesâthe promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. To what extent citizens can view these promises as being fulfilled will affect political trust and support for democracy. The rise of populism and trends towards technocratic government have rightly been interpreted as arising from a gap between normative aspirations and institutional and practical realities. Does this mean that we should adjust our ideals to reality, or that we should strive to bring realities closer to the ideal? Self-proclaimed ârealistsâ argue that democratic ideals are unattainable and that we should therefore settle for a second-best alternative, such as a competitive oligarchy. Against this position, we point out that deliberative democracy offers an attractive ideal for successful representation that can inform democratic innovation. However, deliberative democracy also remains institutionally underdetermined and needs to develop better criteria that enable us to determine if, how and under what conditions the attempt to fulfil democracyâs promises succeeds in practice. In this paper, we suggest a criterion of deliberative responsiveness as a measure for representative democracyâs success in fulfilling promises of autonomy, equality and rationality. We go on to show in what respects these promises tend to be broken in contemporary representative democracies and discuss strategies for institutional reform that have potential to counteract these problems.
SpringerLink"Deliberation and Voting: An Institutional Account of the Legitimacy of Democratic Decision-Making Procedures" by Cristina Lafont
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09634-y
"Why Deliberation and Voting Belong Together" by Simone Chambers and Mark Warren
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09635-x
I have: an article published (open access in Res Publica).
We (hopefully) have: one fewer objection to binding referendums and initiatives.
"Referendums, Initiatives, and Votersâ Accountability"
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09647-7
It is part of a special issue edited by Suzanne Bloks and Dorota Mokrosinska on democratic decision-making methods.
Some of the other pieces are already out, and they're great:
@politicalscience @politicaltheory @democraticinnovations @DemocracyNet #voting #DemocraticTheory

Referendums, Initiatives, and Votersâ Accountability - Res Publica
Do democratic systems that include binding referendum and initiative processes violate a core principle of democracy, namely that legislators should be accountable? Some have argued that they do: these popular vote processes would grant the right to legislate to ordinary voters even though they cannot be held accountableâi.e., face possible consequences imposed by others for their actions and decisions. As a result, we should favor conventional representative systems over systems with popular vote processes. In this article, I analyze this âaccountability objectionâ to referendums and initiatives and the conception of voters as âlegislatorsâ on which it relies and argue that it does not withstand scrutiny. I first demonstrate that there is no sound basis to characterize only voters in popular votes, and not voters in elections, as âlegislatorsâ. Therefore, the scope of the objection is broader than anticipated by its proponents: it cannot be consistently used to dismiss popular votes without also being fatal to elections. I then argue that votersâ lack of accountability is not fatal to either mass voting process. The institutional role of ordinary voters provides them with co-lawmaking powers; but these are not the kind of special powers that justify holding certain actors accountable in democratic systems. This does not exclude that voters have responsibilities. I close by highlighting that, compared to conventional representative systems, democratic systems including well-designed popular vote processes could offer voters more supportive conditions to meet such possible responsibilities.
SpringerLink