PGP signatures on PyPI: worse than useless
https://blog.yossarian.net/2023/05/21/PGP-signatures-on-PyPI-worse-than-useless
PGP signatures on PyPI: worse than useless
https://blog.yossarian.net/2023/05/21/PGP-signatures-on-PyPI-worse-than-useless
> nobody ever attempting to verify them
Well, that is not true. I was approached by some Linux distro packager that my key was not signed by the releaser of the previous release... Once 😂
i heard the same from another maintainer! he told me that a distro noticed that his key changed, and responded by removing verification entirely from his package.
@kushal @moshez @yossarian @jugmac00 Even if they do, there's other ... coping strategies .. for signatures (multiple maintainers on PyPI, shared keys, ...)
(I'm not _happy_ with gpg etc, but yet another article saying "pgp sux" isn't helping The Discourse much if no alternatives are presented)
@yossarian
PGP signatures: worse than useless.
There, I fixed it for you.
As tools GPG (and PGP) are simply unusable by anyone but fastidious zealot pedants. And thus always used wrong.
@glyph @gpshead @yossarian I beg to differ on that point. @[email protected] & I are building https://tumpa.rocks/
Here is an example where we can have better UX focused tools in the #OpenPGP land.
@glyph @[email protected] Something that works for both encryption & signing. Bonus is that I can use the same for my ssh. Works out of my Yubikey, means no secret on disk. My mutt setup mostly works :)
I can see the pain points and hoping to improve them by creating newer things with usability in mind.
On the software side, most of the applications I install separately uses OpenPGP to sign the artifacts, including @fedora and also #debian.
@glyph @gpshead @yossarian my concern is that installing a PGP signed package on PyPI without verifying it is analogous to a safety feature of hazardous industrial plant that is routinely bypassed at the point of use because it isn't fit for purpose.
Bypassing safety features rather than "tagging out" plant from service and removing the feature is a failure of engineering ethics, because having users bypass safety features (who don't always have a minimum qualification) is a horrible precedent.
@yossarian Great post, thanks for sharing the numbers!
I did similar analysis about signing packages (JAR files) in Clojure ecosystem with similar results a few years ago. Unfortunately I didn't write it up in detail, but basically the tooling was broken and majority of the public keys were undiscoverable.
Since it was clear that nobody was systematically verifying the signatures, I stopped signing my own packages.
@yossarian as someone who had to maintain my old job's pgp stuff because banks still use pgp to encrypt files sent to us, I very much hate it
Has any progress been made on replacing pgp for signing? Git also has this problem where there really should be something better to do signature verification but I haven't really seen anything