Valente traces this pathology through multiple successive generations of online community, lingering on #Livejournal, whose large community of Russian dissidents attracted Russian state-affiliated investors who scooped up the community and then began turning the screws on it, transforming it into a surveillance and control system for terrorizing the mutual hostages of the Russian opposition.

15/

Valente and her friends on the service were collateral damage in the deliberate enshittification of LJ, band the Russian dissidents had it worse than they did, but it was still a painful experience. LJ was home to innumerable creators who "grew audiences through connections and meta-connections you already trusted."

16/

Most importantly, the poisoning of LJ formed a template, for how to "[take] apart a minor but culturally influential community and develop techniques to do it again, more efficiently, more quickly, with less attention."

It's a template that has been perfected by the alt-right, by the #SadPuppies and the #Gamergaters and their successor movements. These trolls aren't motivated by the same profit-seeking sociopathy of the corporate person, but they are symbiotic with it.

17/

Valente lays out the corporate community's lifecycle:

I. Be excited about the internet, make a website!

II. Discover that users are uninterested in your storefront, add social features.

III. Add loss-leaders to "let users make their own reasons to use the site" (chat, blogs, messaging, etc), and moderate them "to make non-monster humans feel safe expressing themselves and feel nice about site."

18/

IV. The site works, and people "[use] free tools to connect with each other and learn and not be lonely and maybe even make a name for themselves sometimes."

V. The owners demand that users "stop talking and start buying things."

VI. Users grow disillusioned with a site whose sociability is an afterthought to the revenue-generation that is supposed to extract all surplus value from the community they themselves created.

19/

VII. The owners get angry, insult users, blanket the site with ads, fire moderators, stoke controversy that creates "engagement" for the ads. They sell user data. They purge marginalized community that advertisers don't like. They raise capital, put the community features behind a paywall, and focus so hard on extraction that they miss the oncoming trends.

VIII. "Everyone is mad."

20/

IX. "Sell the people you brought together on purpose to large corporation, trash billionaire, or despotic government entity who hates that the site’s community used those connective tools to do a revolution."

X. The people who "invested their time, heart, labor, love, businesses and relationships" are scattered to the winds. Corporate shareholders don't care.

XI. Years later, the true story of how the site disintegrated under commercial pressures comes out. No one cares.

21/

XII. The people who cashed out by smashing the community that created their asset are now wealthy, and they spend that wealth on "weird right-wing shit...because right-wing shit says no taxes and new money hates taxes."

This pattern recurs on innumerable platforms. Valente's partial list includes "Prodigy, #Geocities, collegeclub.com, #MySpace, #Friendster, Livejournal, #Tumblr," and, of course, #Twitter.

22/

Twitter, though, is different. First, it is the largest and most structurally important platform to be enshittified. Second, because it was enshittified so much more quickly than the smaller platforms that preceded it.

But third, and most importantly, because Twitter's enshittification is not solely about profit.

23/

Whereas the normal course of a platform's decline involves a symbiosis between corporate extraction and trollish cruelty, the enshittification of Twitter is being driven by an owner who is both a sociopathic helmsan for a corporate extraction machine *and* a malignant, vicious narcissist.

24/

Valente describes Musk's non-commercial imperatives: "the yawning, salivating need to control and hurt. To express power not by what you can give, but by what you can take away...[the] viral solipsism that cannot bear the presence of anything other than its own undifferentiated self, propagating not by convincing or seduction or debate, but by the eradication of any other option."

25/

Not every platform has been degraded this way. Valente singles out Diaryland, whose owner, Andrew, has never sold out his community of millions of users, not in all the years since he created it in 1999, when he was a Canadian kid who "just like[d] making little things." Andrew charges you $2/month to keep the lights on.

https://diaryland.com/

26/

Valente is right to lionize Diaryland and Andrew. In fact, she's right about everything in this essay. Or, nearly everything. "Almost," because at the end, she says, "the minute the jackals arrive is the same minute we put down the first new chairs in the next oasis."

That's where I think she goes wrong. Or at least, is incomplete.

27/

Because the story of the web's early diversity and its focus on its users and their communities isn't just about a natural cycle whereby our communities became commodities to be tormented to ruination and sold off for parts.

The early web's strength was in its *interoperability*. The early web wasn't just a successor to Prodigy, AOL and other walled gardens - it was a fundamental transformation.

28/

The early web was made up of thousands of small firms, hobbyists, and user groups that all used the same standard protocols, which let them set up their own little corners of the internet - but also connected those communities through semi-permeable membranes that joined everything, but not in every way.

29/

The early web let anything link to anything, but not always, which meant that you could leave a community but still keep tabs on it (say, by subscribing to the RSS feeds of the people who stayed behind), but it also meant that individuals and communities could also shield themselves from bad actors.

30/

The #RightOfExit and the #FreedomOfReach (the principle that anyone can talk to anyone who wants to talk to them) are both key to #TechnologicalSelfDetermination. They are both imperfect and incomplete, but together, they are stronger, and form a powerful check on both greed and cruelty-based predation:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/12/19/better-failure/#let-my-tweeters-go

31/

Small wonder that, from the beginning, the internet has been a fight between those who want to build a #commons and those who wish to enclose it. Remember when we were all angry that the web was disappearing into #Flash, the unlinkable proprietary blobs that you couldn't ad-block or mute or even pause unless they gave you permission?

32/

Remember when Microsoft tried, over and over again, to enclose the internet, first as a dial-up service, then as a series of garbage Windows-based Flash-alikes. Remember #Blackbird?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackbird_(online_platform)

But standard protocols exert powerful #NetworkEffects on corporations. When everyone is adhering to a standard, when everything can talk to everything else, then it's hard to lure users into a walled garden.

33/

Microsoft coerced users into it by striking bargains with buyers at large companies to force its products on all their employees, and then by breaking compatibility with rival products, which made it hard for those employees to use another vendor's products in their personal lives. Not being able to access your company email or edit your company documents on your personal device is a powerful incentive to use the same product your company uses.

34/

Apple, meanwhile, seduced users into its walled garden, promising that it would keep them safe and that everything would just work, and then using its power over those customers to gouge them on dongles and parts and repair and apps.

Both companies - like all corporations - are ferocious rent-seekers, but both eventually capitulated to the internet - bundling TCP and, eventually, browsers with their OSes.

35/

They never quit trying to enclose the web, via proprietary browser extensions and dirty tricks (Microsoft) or mobile lock-in and dirty tricks (Apple). But for many years, the web was a truly *open* platform.

The enclosure of online communities can't be understood without also understanding the policy choices that led to the enclosure of tech more broadly.

36/

The decision to stop enforcing antitrust law (especially GWB's decision not to appeal in the Microsoft antitrust case) let the underlying platforms grow without limits, by buying any serious rival, or by starving it out of existence by selling competing products below cost, cross-subidizing them with rents extracted from their other monopoly lines.

37/

These same policies let a few new corporate enclosers enter the arena, like #Google, which is virtually incapable of making a successful product in-house, but which was able to buy others' successes and cement its web dominance: mobile, video, server management, ad-tech, etc.

38/

These firms provide the substrate for community abusers: apps, operating systems and browser "standards" that can't be legally reverse-engineered, and lobbying that strengthens and expands those "Felony Contempt of Business Model" policies:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/09/open-letter-w3c-director-ceo-team-and-membership

Without these laws and technologies, corporations wouldn't be able to block freedom of exit and freedom of reach.

39/

These laws and technologies let these corporations demand that the state obliterate anyone who gives users the tools to set their own terms for the communities they built.

These are the laws and technologies that transform network effects from a tool for openness - where even the largest, most vicious corporations must seek to pervert, rather than ignore, standards - into a tool for enclosure, where we are all under mounting pressure to move inside a walled garden.

40/

This #DigitalFeudalism is cloaked in the language of care and safety. The owners of these walled gardens insist that they are benevolent patriarchs who have built fortresses to defend us from external threats, but inevitably they are revealed as warlords who have built prisons to keep us from escaping from *them*:

https://locusmag.com/2021/01/cory-doctorow-neofeudalism-and-the-digital-manor/

41/

Which brings me to the #Fediverse. The Fediverse's foundation is a standard called #ActivityPub, which was designed by weirdos who wanted to make a durably open, #interoperable substrate that could support nearly any application. This was something that large corporations were both uninterested in building *and* which they arrogantly dismissed as a pipe dream.

42/

This means that Activitypub is actually as good as its architects could make it, free from boobytraps laid by scheming monopolists.

The best-known Fediverse application is #Mastodon, which has experienced explosive growth from people who found Musk's twin imperatives to cruelty and extraction sufficiently alarming that they have taken their leave of Twitter and the people they cared about there.

43/

This is not an easy decision, and Musk is bent on making it harder by sabotaging ex-Twitter users' ability to find one another elsewhere. He wants the experience of leaving Twitter to be like the final scene of #FiddlerOnTheRoof, where the villagers of Anatevka are torn from one another forever:

https://doctorow.medium.com/how-to-leave-dying-social-media-platforms-9fc550fe5abf

With Mastodon's newfound fame comes new scrutiny, and a renewed debate over the benefits and drawbacks of #decentralized, #federated systems.

44/

For example, there's an ongoing discussion about the role of #QuoteTweeting, which Mastodon's core devs have eschewed as conducive to antisocial dunks, but which some parts of #BlackTwitter describe as key to a healthy discourse:

https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/202x/2022/12/21/Mastodon-Ethics

But quote tweeting wasn't initially a part of Twitter. Instead, users kludged it, pasting in text and URLs for others' tweets to make it work.

45/

Eventually, Twitter saw the utility of quote-tweeting and adopted it, making it an official feature.

There is a possibility that Mastodon's core devs will do the same, adding quote-tweet to the core codebase for Mastodon. But if they don't, the story isn't over. Because Mastodon is free software, and because it is built on an open standard, *anyone* can add this feature to their Mastodon instance. You can do this yourself, or you can hire someone else to do it for you.

46/

Now, not everyone has money or coding skills - but also, not everyone has the social clout to convince a monolithic, for-profit corporation to re-engineer its services to better suit their needs. And while there is a lot of overlap between "people who can code," and "people who can afford to pay coders" and "people whom a tech company listens to," these are not the same population.

47/

In other words: Twitter is a place where you get quote-tweeting if the corporation decides you need it, and Mastodon is a place where you get quote-tweeting if the core devs decide you need it, *or* if you have the skills or resources to add it yourself.

What's more, if Mastodon's core devs decide to take away a feature you like, you and your friends can stand up your own Mastodon server that retains that feature.

48/

This is harder than using someone else's server - but it's *way, way easier* than convincing Twitter it was wrong to take away the thing you loved.

The perils of running your own Mastodon server have also become a hot topic of debate. To hear the critics warn of it, anyone who runs a server that's open to the public is painting a huge target on their back and will shortly be buried under civil litigation and angry phone-calls from the FBI.

49/

This is: Just. Not. True. The US actually has pretty good laws limiting #IntermediaryLiability (that is, the responsibility you bear for what your users do). You know all that stuff about how #CDA230 is "a giveaway to #BigTech?" That's only true if the internet consists solely of Big Tech companies. However, if you decide to spend $5/month hosting a Mastodon instance for you and your community, that same law protects *you*.

50/

Indeed, while running a server that's open to the public does involve some risk, most of that risk can be contained by engaging in a relatively small, relatively easy set of legal compliance practices, which @eff's Corynne McSherry lays out in this very easy-to-grasp explainer:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/12/user-generated-content-and-fediverse-legal-primer

51/

Finally, there's the ongoing debate over whether Mastodon can (and should) replace Twitter. This week on the Canadaland Short Cuts podcast, Jesse Brown neatly summarized (and supported, alas) the incorrect idea that using Mastodon was no different from using Gab or Parler or Post.

https://www.canadaland.com/podcast/843-god-save-the-tweets/

52/

This is very, very wrong. The thing is, even if you like and trust the people who run Gab or Parler or Post, you face exactly the same risk you face with Twitter or Facebook: that the leadership will change, or have a change of heart, and begin to enshittify your community there. When they do, your only remedy will be the one that Valente describes, to scatter to the winds and try and reform your community somewhere else.

53/

But that's not true of Fediverse. On Mastodon, you can export all your followers, and all the people who follow you, with two clicks. Then you can create an account on another server and again, with just two clicks, you can import those follows and followers and be back up and running, your community intact, without being under the thumb of the server manager who decided to sell your community down the river (you can also export the posts you made).

https://codingitwrong.com/2022/10/10/migrating-a-mastodon-account.html

54/