#Denuvo #Warez #Buzzheavier #FitGirlRepacks #M4CKD0GERepack #SteamUnderground #Vikingfile #VMProtect #voices38 https://sc.tarnkappe.info/61f519
In depth analysis of VMProtect 2 internals (2021)
Part 1: https://blog.back.engineering/17/05/2021/
Part 2: https://blog.back.engineering/21/06/2021/
VMProtect 2 is a virtual machine based x86 obfuscator which converts x86 instructions to a RISC, stack machine, instruction set. Each protected binary has a unique set of encrypted virtual machine instructions with unique obfuscation. This project aims to disclose very significant signatures which are in every single VMProtect 2 binary with the intent to aid in further research...
ΠΠ½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ΅ VMProtect. Π§Π°ΡΡΡ 2
Π ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΠΌΡ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠΈΠΉ Π²ΠΈΠ΄ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ½Π²Π΅ΠΉΠ΅ΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π½Π΅ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΡ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π΄Π»Ρ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ. Π ΡΡΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΡ Π³Π°ΡΠ°Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π° ΡΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ, Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΠΎ Ρ ΠΎΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΠΏΡΡΠΎΠΌ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° ΠΠ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅-ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ½ΡΡΡ ΡΡΠΎ-ΡΠΎ ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΠΠ ΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ Π±ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π΅Π·Π΅Π½ ΠΏΡΠΈ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π΅ ΡΡ ΠΎΠΆΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΉ. ΠΠ½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡ!
https://habr.com/ru/articles/835768/
#malware #vmprotect #reverseengineering #ΡΠ΅Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΈΠ½ΠΆΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΠΈΠ½Π³ #Π²ΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΎΠ½ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅_ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ΅_ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ #ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ #ΠΎΠ±ΡΡΡΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΡ #Π°Π½ΡΠΈΠΎΡΠ»Π°Π΄ΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ΅_ΠΏΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΌΡ
Π ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ ΠΌΡ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠΈΠΉ Π²ΠΈΠ΄ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ½Π²Π΅ΠΉΠ΅ΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π½Π΅ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΡ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² Π΄Π»Ρ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ. Π‘Π»Π΅Π΄ΡΡ ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ Π² ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈ...
ΠΠ½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ· Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ΅ VMProtect. Π§Π°ΡΡΡ 1
Π ΡΡΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ ΠΌΡ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΌ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ Π²ΡΠ³Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅ΡΡ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ VMProtect , Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»Π°ΡΡ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»Π° (Π² Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Π΄Π°Π»Π΅ΠΊΠΎ Π²Ρ Π³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ²Ρ Π·Π°ΠΉΡΠΈ Π² ΡΡΠΎΠΌ Π½Π΅ Π²ΡΠ΅Π³Π΄Π° Π±Π»Π°Π³ΠΎΠ΄Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌ Π΄Π΅Π»Π΅). ΠΠΆΠΈΠ΄Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ, ΡΡΠΎ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ°Π» ΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΌ, ΠΊΡΠΎ Π² Ρ ΠΎΠ΄Π΅ ΡΠ΅Π°Π³ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π½Ρ ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎΠΉ-Π»ΠΈΠ±ΠΎ Π²ΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΎΠ½ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΎΠ»ΠΊΠ½ΡΠ»ΡΡ Ρ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΉ Π² Π²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ. ΠΠ½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡ!
https://habr.com/ru/articles/781592/
#malware #vmprotect #ida #incident_response #cybersecurity #ΠΊΠΈΠ±Π΅ΡΠ±Π΅Π·ΠΎΠΏΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ #Π²ΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΎΠ½ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅_ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ΅_ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ #ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½Π°Ρ_Π±Π΅Π·ΠΎΠΏΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ #reverseengineering
Π ΡΡΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ ΠΌΡ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΌ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ Π²ΡΠ³Π»ΡΠ΄Π΅ΡΡ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ½Ρ VMProtect , Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»Π°ΡΡ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»Π° (Π² Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΎΡ ΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Π΄Π°Π»Π΅ΠΊΠΎ Π²Ρ...
Oh look, more dubious drivers protected by vmprotect.
A driver protected by vmp should be an indicator of compromise at this point.
In the course of doing our research, we studied older variants of #BURNTCIGAR #drivers, and compared them to the new ones we were encountering during the incident response.
We found that these new drivers had been obfuscated with a variety of techniques, specifically that the drivers were packed using a commercial runtime #packer called #VMprotect. The packer makes it more difficult for an analyst to reverse-engineer a #malware sample, but we don't see a lot of drivers that are packed, at all. It was kind of unusual.
In addition, the malware drivers requires the threat actor to run an executable called a loader, which simply does the mechanical work of creating Services entries in the Windows Registry, and moving the driver into the %temp% directory. The loader isn't packed.
I've started looking into the Adylkuzz malware, as mentioned by Tim Blazytko in his article on Automated Detection of Obfuscated Code. Initial analysis shows a TLS entry handler that dumps us straight into a VMProtect VMEnter() function, that looks l...