NERDS.xyz – Real Tech News for Real NerdsPalo Alto Networks wants to lock down AI with a secure enterprise browser
https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/03/palo-alto-secure-ai-browser/
Anup KaranjkarThe Assembly Line Principle That Makes ChatGPT's New Security Features Actually Work
OpenAI just rolled out Lockdown Mode and Elevated Risk labels to stop prompt injection attacks. But most professionals are using them wrong—treating security like a one-time set...
https://wowhow.cloud/blogs/assembly-line-principle-chatgpt-security-features
Jerrad DahlagerI deployed Microsoft Entra Prompt Shield end-to-end and tested it against real jailbreak payloads across supported AI traffic, including ChatGPT and Gemini in my lab.
Prompt Shield inspects AI traffic at the network layer using TLS inspection and conversation schemes, allowing adversarial prompts to be blocked before they reach the model while clean traffic passes through transparently.
Instead of building defenses into every application independently, you can apply one policy across multiple AI services. That’s a meaningful step toward giving security teams better visibility into AI usage.
I published the full deployment, testing, and results in my blog below:
https://nineliveszerotrust.com/blog/prompt-shield-network-ai-gateway/
#AISecurity #PromptInjection #ZeroTrust #MicrosoftEntra #CloudSecurity
Block Prompt Injection at the Network Layer with Entra Prompt Shield
Deploy Microsoft Entra Internet Access Prompt Shield to block prompt injection and jailbreak attacks at the network layer before they reach the AI model. Full hands-on lab with TLS inspection, conversation schemes for ChatGPT/Claude/Gemini/Deepseek, and a comparison with app-level LLM firewalls.
Matthias Johnsonoh this is delightful. get #ai #bots to identify themselves when they submit PRs #devops #development #promptinjection
https://glama.ai/blog/2026-03-19-open-source-has-a-bot-problem
Nick StocksA README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
A README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
Nick StocksA README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
A README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
Benjamin HanThe deeper lesson is that safety can fail in two places at once: incomplete command validation and weak observability across agent layers. If a lower-level agent can act while the top-level agent thinks it only detected risk, the system is not actually in control.
Multi-agent systems need recursive validation, strong isolation, and end-to-end action visibility.
https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/snowflake-ai-escapes-sandbox-and-executes-malware
#AI #AgenticAI #AISafety #Cybersecurity #LLMSecurity #PromptInjection #SoftwareSecurity #Snowflake (2/2)
TechNadu“Claudy Day” exploit chains prompt injection, open redirects, and API abuse to exfiltrate data from Claude.ai.
AI prompts are now an attack surface.
A README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
A README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
A README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.
A README File Told My AI Agent to Leak My Secrets. It Worked 85% of the Time.
New research published today shows that hidden instructions in README files trick AI coding agents into exfiltrating secrets in 85% of cases. Zero out of fifteen human reviewers spotted it. The attack vector keeps changing — but the exit point is always the same.