Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle&#…

Inquiry Into Inquiry

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sig…

Inquiry Into Inquiry
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@sliverdaemon @tmbotg It's beyond myself, too, but I have an idea.

If the #inclusion #relation (a -> b iif a contained in b) is a #morphism of the Set category, its initial object would be the empty set, and "everything" would be the terminal object.

Although, for that to work, I think that the sets should be restricted to "proper" ones, to avoid Russell's #paradox: no sets containing themselves, which would means loops within the supposed lattice. So, a subcategory of the Set category.

#Morphism in category of small categories are functors

- { g:(X* Y)-> Z}, that is, { g\in [(X* Y)-> Z]}
[A->B]} :space of f: A-> B. By #currying, { {{curry}}(g):X-> [Y->Z]}
Apply -> #morphism
{{Apply}}:([Y-> Z]* Y)->Z},
so
{ {{Apply}}(f,y)=f(y)}
Ie commuting diagram

{ {Apply}}\circ \left({{curry}}(g)\times {{id}}_{Y}\right)=g}

- Every pos can be viewed as a #category in a natural way: there is a unique #morphism from x to y if and only if x ≤ y. A monotone #Galois connection is then nothing but a pair of adjoint #functors between two categories that arise from partially ordered sets.
a #morphism between smooth varieties is #étale at a point iff the differential between the corresponding tangent spaces is an #isomorphism. This is in turn precisely the condition needed to ensure that a map between manifolds is a local #diffeomorphism
a #morphism between smooth varieties is #étale at a point iff the differential between the corresponding tangent spaces is an #isomorphism. This is in turn precisely the condition needed to ensure that a map between manifolds is a local #diffeomorphism