Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 4

Re: Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3
Re: Laws of Form • Lyle Anderson

Lyle,

We are engaged in the wider context of which Peirce’s systems of graphs for propositional logic and Spencer Brown’s calculus of indications constitute a prominent corner, one might even say a “cantonical field”, but still just one corner of the larger picture, abstractly syntactic and formally deductive in character.

Over and above that niche the overarching edifice of Peirce’s Logic of Science, supported by the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry, must cover all three forms of inference — abductive, inductive, deductive — plus the bridge from qualitative logic to quantitative statistics.  That is the architecture of inquiry with which we’ll be occupied for quite some time.

Continuing from where I left off last time —

What intrigues me about the recently cited passages from Aristotle is the way he uses what we now regard as semiotic terms — icon, index, sign — to describe the elements and structures of logical syllogisms, including the modes of non‑demonstrative inference.

The roles of signs informing sign relations and the rules of inference guiding inquiries are subjects Peirce explored in depth.  Especially in the early years the subjects of signs and inquiry are so entwined in Peirce’s relevant lectures and papers that he passes from one to the other with little sense of discontinuity between the two.

Over the years, both in Peirce’s work and the community of researchers following after, there develops such an intense focus on the problem of classifying signs that the theory of signs takes on the character of a separate subject, detached from its natural connection to the theory of inquiry.

One of our tasks is to heal that rift and regain a sense of the original common root.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers

Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.

Thanks, John.  Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few.  But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed under x‑rays of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”.  The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.  And when we think to ask, “What is this that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we do not know when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Everything I’ll be working at here will be done within a framework like that.

Regards,
Jon

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/18/reflection-on-recursion-4/

A feature worth noting in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other. It preserves an image of the object n all the while its precedent p(n) is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 4

A feature of special note in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other.  It preserves an image of the object all the while its precedent is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi