Trump's second-term portrait — stern, with furrowed brow, reminiscent of his mug shot — has been used on National Park passes, a commemorative passport and now, possibly, a $250 bill. @huffingtonpost's Katherine Speller looks into its significance, reframing and monetizing Trump's arrest, and communicating his status to both supporters and critics.
In this essay, I investigate the ideas of Stuart Hall in light of my own. Hall and I have many commonalities in the operation of language, but my enterprise is broader and deeper, as his was ostensibly limited to media.
#philosophy #language #substack #blog #podcast #grammar #ontology #agency #Gramsci #semiotics #encoding #ideology #architecture #encounter #languageinsufficiency #response #agentic #media
Imagine a man who spent his entire life deciphering the secret languages of history, from medieval manuscripts to the hidden codes in pop culture. This was Umberto Eco. As a world-renowned semiotician, he understood better than anyone how symbols and words shape our collective reality. But toward the end of his life, he looked at the digital landscape and saw a structural collapse of intellectual hierarchy.
Eco observed: Social media gives legions of idiots the right to speak when they once only spoke at a bar after a glass of wine, without harming the community... but now they have the same right to speak as a Nobel Prize winner. It is the invasion of the idiots.
Eco delivered this critique in 2015 while receiving an honorary degree at the University of Turin. His concern was not rooted in elitism, but in the loss of editorial filtering. He spent decades analyzing how truth is constructed, and he feared that a platform where every voice is amplified equally would eventually lead to the death of expertise. In his view, the democratization of opinion had accidentally dismantled the value of knowledge.
When the village gossip and the seasoned scholar occupy the same digital stage, how do we distinguish signal from noise?
#umbertoeco #philosophy #digitalculture #semiotics #criticalthinking
Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3
Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.
A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss ; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability : e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate. A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1 That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.
An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ; and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures : either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.
If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ; but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ; or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.
In this way syllogisms can be effected ; but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3 For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good. A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ; for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant. Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.
We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true. (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).
Translator’s Notes
Reference
Resource
cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi
By chance just reread this brutal beauty:
from #semiotics discussion before current #LLMs narratives: https://doi.org/10.1007/S12304-021-09470-8
Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/
Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235
I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.
❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).
Reference —
Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.
Resource —
Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide
#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism
now they found the right words to relate :
lubricant shortage
I mean hydrocarbon shortage is too ... abstruse