Anurag GuptaHow to Fairly Split Rent and Rooms | Game Theory & Envy-Free Allocation
PeerTube
ma𝕏poolPolymarket question: "will Jesus Christ return in 2025?" has a 3% probability.
Polymarket wants to provide a public good: correct probability estimates. It fails because how the market is structured and limited.
spoiler: "The Yes people are betting that, later this year, their counterparties (the No betters) will want cash (to bet on other markets), and so will sell out of their No positions at a higher price."
https://ericneyman.wordpress.com/2025/03/24/will-jesus-christ-return-in-an-election-year/
#economics #predictionMarkets #mechanismDesign #MarketDesign #gameTheory
Mohammad Hajiaghayi🎥 New Lectures Alert! 🚨 Lessons 20, 21, & 22 of Computational Game Theory are live! 📊 Dive into Auctions, Ad Auctions, and Online Auctions.
▶ Lesson 20: Auctions & AdTech: https://youtu.be/z8vCG8eInGI
▶ Lesson 21: First & Second Price Auctions:
https://youtu.be/q_ofJswA5zY
▶ Lesson 22: Online Auctions & Algorithms: https://youtu.be/uzkiZRFbYZg
Subscribe for weekly premieres every Wednesday @ 7 PM ET: https://www.youtube.com/@hajiaghayi 🎓
#GameTheory #AuctionTheory #DigitalAdvertising #OnlineAlgorithms #FirstPriceAuction #SecondPriceAuction #MechanismDesign #OptimalPricing #TruthfulMechanisms
Lesson 20: Computational Game Theory by Mohammad Hajiaghayi: Introduction to Auctions & Ad Auctions
Paul Houle🌼 Can ranked-choice voting heal our poisoned politics?
Kyle BurkeI programmed the BYE player to automatically lose every game. I don't actually know whether that's the optimal way to do that for a Swiss #tournament. #MechanismDesign
Market Designer BotCelebrate Vince Crawford in Budapest at the CONFERENCE ON MECHANISM AND INSTITUTION DESIGN in July. (Call for papers...) #EconTwitter #conference #hungary #marketdesign #mechanismdesign
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2024/02/celebrate-vince-crawford-in-budapest-at.html
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2024/02/celebrate-vince-crawford-in-budapest-at.html
AEA's lockbox: recording allegations while reserving the right to report them #EconTwitter #crime #mechanismdesign #sexualassault #sexualharassment
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2024/01/aeas-lockbox-recording-allegations.html
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2024/01/aeas-lockbox-recording-allegations.html
Open Book Publishers📢#OutNow in #OA: 'Models in #Microeconomic Theory: Expanded Second Edition (She & He)' by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein.
Part I presents models of an #economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision-making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the #consumer, the #producer, and #monopoly. Part II introduces the concept of #equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an #economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an #economy with asymmetric information. Part III provides an introduction to #gametheory, covering #strategic and extensive #games and the concepts of #Nash #equilibrium and #subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV gives a taste of the topics of #mechanismdesign, #matching, the #axiomatic analysis of #economic systems, and #socialchoice.
https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0361
https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0362
Models in Microeconomic Theory: Expanded Second Edition (She)
Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice.
Strypey"The paper ... provides a critical introduction to mechanism design... for researchers who study big data, platform capitalism... So far, most critical work in these areas has not engaged directly with this hybrid economic-engineering discipline, even though it is now central to the operations of platform firms, as well as other online networks and data-driven decision-making systems."
Viljoen at al, 2021
Cory DoctorowThat article, "The Web3 Decentralization Debate Is Focused on the Wrong Question," set forth a taxonomy of decentralization, exploring ways that power could be distributed, checked, and shared. It went beyond blockchains and hyperspeculative, Ponzi-prone "#MechanismDesign," prompting me to subtitle my analysis "Not all who #decentralize are #bros":
https://pluralistic.net/2022/05/12/crypto-means-cryptography/#p2p-rides-again
7/