Pierre-Louis Curien

Munich_eSports - Twitch

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Recovering Sparse Neural Connectivity from Partial Measurements: A Covariance-Based Approach with Granger-Causality Refinement

Inferring the connectivity of neural circuits from incomplete observations is a fundamental challenge in neuroscience. We present a covariance-based method for estimating the weight matrix of a recurrent neural network from sparse, partial measurements across multiple recording sessions. By accumulating pairwise covariance estimates across sessions where different subsets of neurons are observed, we reconstruct the full connectivity matrix without requiring simultaneous recording of all neurons. A Granger-causality refinement step enforces biological constraints via projected gradient descent. Through systematic experiments on synthetic networks modeling small brain circuits, we characterize a fundamental control-estimation tradeoff: stimulation aids identifiability but disrupts intrinsic dynamics, with the optimal level depending on measurement density. We discover that the ``incorrect'' linear approximation acts as implicit regularization -- outperforming the oracle estimator with known nonlinearity at all operating regimes -- and provide an exact characterization via the Stein--Price identity.

Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader selects an optimal mixed strategy, anticipating that the follower population plays an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the induced subgame and may satisfy additional ecological conditions. We consider both leader-optimal and follower-optimal selection among ESSs, which arise as special cases of our framework. Prior approaches to Stackelberg evolutionary games either define the follower response via evolutionary dynamics or assume rational best-response behavior, without explicitly enforcing stability against invasion by mutations. We present algorithms for computing SESS in discrete and continuous games, and validate the latter empirically. Our model applies naturally to biological settings; for example, in cancer treatment the leader represents the physician and the followers correspond to competing cancer cell phenotypes.