I'm still reading the first chapter of #AttackSurface by @pluralistic (audiobook; very well read). This security nerd is enjoying it a lot.

If someone can convince me that the protagonist, Masha, isn't at least inspired by @evacide , I will eat my shorts. (I don't recall a dedication at the start, so it may be moot).

#Doctorow #LittleBrother #bookstodon

🔐 Identity compromise and reconnaissance are precursors to deeper breaches and targeted operations. Understanding this shift informs threat modeling and operational OPSEC. The latest index data only just published and signals a shift in attacker prioritization not yet widely reported.

https://industrialcyber.co/reports/ibm-x-force-reports-44-surge-in-exploitation-of-public-facing-applications-as-supply-chain-and-identity-attacks-intensify/ #AttackSurface

Thousands of public Google Cloud API endpoints are exposed — misconfigurations at scale create silent entry points. Visibility is the first line of defense. ☁️⚠️ #CloudSecurity #AttackSurface

https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/thousands-of-public-google-cloud-api.html

Thousands of Public Google Cloud API Keys Exposed with Gemini Access After API Enablement

Research reveals 2,863 public Google API keys can access Gemini endpoints, enabling data exposure and massive billing abuse.

The Hacker News

Security Advisory Summary:
SolarWinds Serv-U 15.5.4 patches four critical vulnerabilities:
• CVE-2025-40538 – Broken access control → system admin creation + root RCE
• Two type confusion flaws → root code execution
• One IDOR vulnerability → elevated execution

Attack prerequisites:
High-privileged access required. Exploitation likely via credential compromise or chained privilege escalation.

Exposure landscape:
12K+ internet-facing instances observed (Shodan)
File transfer platforms remain ransomware-favored entry vectors

Historical context:
Prior Serv-U CVEs exploited by ransomware groups and state-aligned actors.

Immediate actions:
- Patch to 15.5.4
- Audit privileged accounts
- Review FTP/SFTP exposure
- Monitor for anomalous admin creation

Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-solarwinds-serv-u-flaws-offer-root-access-to-servers/

Follow us for tactical advisories and vulnerability intelligence.

Comment with your detection or hardening recommendations.

#Infosec #SolarWinds #ThreatIntel #CVE2025 #RCE #PrivilegeEscalation #BlueTeam #SecurityEngineering #AttackSurface #ZeroTrust

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x3G_XszX0ec

SecPoint® Penetrator™ – New Target World Map Visualization

Learn more about the SecPoint® Penetrator Vulnerability Scanner:
https://www.secpoint.com/penetrator.html

Partner sign up:
https://www.secpoint.com/partner-signup.html

#SecPoint #CyberSecurity #VulnerabilityScanning #AttackSurface #NetworkSecurity

SecPoint Penetrator V66 Target Map

YouTube

Malicious MoltBot skills are pushing password-stealing malware — voice assistants are becoming a new social engineering vector. Convenience can be compromised. 🎙️🔓 #CredentialTheft #AttackSurface

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-moltbot-skills-used-to-push-password-stealing-malware/

Malicious MoltBot skills used to push password-stealing malware

More than 230 malicious packages for the personal AI assistant OpenClaw (formerly known as Moltbot and ClawdBot) have been published in less than a week on the tool's official registry and on GitHub.

BleepingComputer

☢️ Nearly 800,000 Telnet servers are exposed to remote attacks — decades-old services are still wide open on the internet. Legacy risk is real risk. 🔓📡 #LegacySystems #AttackSurface

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nearly-800-000-telnet-servers-exposed-to-remote-attacks/

Nearly 800,000 Telnet servers exposed to remote attacks

Internet security watchdog Shadowserver tracks nearly 800,000 IP addresses with Telnet fingerprints amid ongoing attacks exploiting a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in the GNU InetUtils telnetd server.

BleepingComputer

Active exploitation is being observed via misconfigured security testing applications, enabling attackers to move from exposed training tools into cloud environments.

The issue centers on excessive IAM permissions, default credentials, and poor isolation between test and sensitive systems - not novel malware.

This reinforces the need to treat non-production assets as part of the threat surface.

Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-security-testing-apps-to-breach-fortune-500-firms/

Follow @technadu for neutral, research-driven security reporting.

#CloudSecurity #IAM #Pentesting #Infosec #AttackSurface #TechNadu

🚨 New research & tool release: OID-See - Giving Your OAuth Apps the Side-Eye

OAuth risk in Entra isn’t a table problem.
It’s a relationship problem.

After spending far too long staring at consent screens, Graph responses, and metadata that technically tells the truth while still being wildly misleading, I ended up building something I couldn’t find anywhere else:

OID-See - essentially BloodHound for OAuth in Entra.

It maps:
• OAuth apps & service principals
• Delegated scopes and app permissions
• Consent, assignments, and reachability
• Trust signals (and trust illusions)
• Persistence and impersonation paths

…into a graph-backed analysis model that lets you reason about what an app can actually become when chained, not just whether it looks risky in isolation.

Why this exists

I kept running into the same issues:
• “Verified publisher” isn’t always the signal we think it is
• Microsoft-shaped metadata can lull defenders into false trust
• offline_access ≠ impersonation, but does equal persistence
• Apps without assignment requirements are exposed by default
• Spreadsheets hide abuse paths - graphs expose them

So I stopped trying to answer “is this app bad?”
and started asking “what does this enable if it’s abused?”

What OID-See is (and isn’t)

✅ Graph-only by default (no token scraping, no SaaS, no data exfil)
✅ You run it yourself, get a JSON, analyse it locally
✅ Explainable scoring, externalised logic, no magic
❌ Not a CSPM replacement
❌ Not an EDR, SWG, or token replay tool

It’s about clarity, not control theatre.

📖 Blog (deep dive, philosophy, and war stories):
👉 https://cirriustech.co.uk/blog/oidsee/

🧰 Tool & source (v1.0.0):
👉 https://github.com/OID-See/OID-See/tree/v1.0.0

If you’re an Entra admin, cloud security engineer, or anyone who’s ever said
“it’s just a harmless SSO integration” - this one’s for you.

And yes… the name is intentional.
You probably should be giving your OAuth apps the side-eye. 👀

#Entra #AzureAD #OAuth #OIDC #IdentitySecurity #SecurityResearch #AttackSurface #Graph #BloodHound #OIDSee

OID-See: Giving Your OAuth Apps the Side-Eye

OID-See or BloodHound for OAuth in Entra: mapping consent, scopes, assignments, and trust signals into a graph so you can spot impersonation risk and OAuth sprawl.

CirriusTech | Serious About Tech

Turning Visibility Into Defense: Connecting the Attack Surface to the Detection Surface: https://jonschipp.substack.com/p/turning-visibility-into-defense-connecting

#attacksurface #detectionsurface

Turning Visibility Into Defense: Connecting the Attack Surface to the Detection Surface

First published on jonschipp.com. This article was written entirely by the author, and then polished using AI.

Digital Depths