Sunday, March 22, 2026

Day 80 of Year 3
Day 811 overall since Jan 1, 2024

💻 nhcarrigan-mentorship:
• Strengthened backend fundamentals through consistent debugging
• Reviewed API route structure and request flow
• Improved familiarity with Express, Prisma, and database-backed development

Strong fundamentals build resilient systems. Keep refining, keep improving. ⚙️

#JavaScript #BackendDevelopment #WebSecurity #APIDevelopment #WebDevelopment #DevJourney #SoftwareEngineering #100DaysOfCode

OAuth account takeover doesn't need leaked tokens. No state param = CSRF to forced account linking. Loose redirect_uri matching = code theft via open redirect chains. Implicit flow puts tokens in browser history and Referer headers. PKCE bypass when not enforced server-side. SSRF via OpenID dynamic client registration. Six patterns, all with labs. https://www.kayssel.com/newsletter/issue-43/ #OAuth #BugBounty #Pentesting #websecurity #Offsec #InfoSec
OAuth 2.0: Six Ways the Authorization Flow Breaks

Missing state CSRF, redirect_uri hijacking, open redirect code theft, implicit flow token leakage, PKCE bypass, and SSRF via OpenID dynamic client registration

Kayssel

From Directory Listing to Breaking Logins
This article details a sequence of vulnerabilities chained together during a bug bounty engagement. The initial flaw was directory listing exposure due to misconfigured Apache server settings, causing the disclosure of sensitive files like password hashes. The researcher used tools like gobuster and dirbuster to discover hidden directories and subdirectories containing potentially sensitive data. Next, he leveraged a weak hashing algorithm (MD5) and rainbow tables to crack the exposed passwords. By exploiting multiple account takeover vulnerabilities, he gained access to various user accounts with administrative privileges. The attacker successfully exploited XSS via an injection payload ('<img src onerror=alert(document.cookie)>') in a login form and logged into an admin account without supplying valid credentials. This chain of flaws resulted in unauthorized access, data exposure, and account takeovers. The researcher received $10,000 for reporting the vulnerabilities. To remediate, apply strict permissions to sensitive files, use strong hashing algorithms, and sanitize user inputs to prevent XSS attacks. Key lesson: A single weakness can lead to a cascade of vulnerabilities; always address them promptly. #BugBounty #Cybersecurity #WebSecurity #DirectoryListing #PasswordHashing #XSS

https://0x0meowsec.medium.com/from-directory-listing-to-breaking-logins-02f15533eed7?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

From Directory Listing to Breaking Logins 💥

A Real-World Bug Chain Story

Medium

I Spent 3 Months Failing at Bug Bounty — This Roadmap Fixed Everything
The article describes a bug bounty beginner's experience and the roadmap that helped him improve his skills. The root cause of his initial failures was lack of understanding about common web vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS, SQL Injection) and ineffective searching strategies. To exploit an XSS vulnerability on a test platform, he used payloads like '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'. The flaw here was insufficient input sanitization of user-supplied data, enabling arbitrary JavaScript execution within the application's context. By following a tailored learning path (e.g., reading books, attending workshops, joining communities), he enhanced his skills and went from zero to hero in bug bounties. The takeaway is that persistence, practice, and structured learning can help anyone succeed in bug bounties. #BugBounty #Cybersecurity #WebSecurity #XSS

https://medium.com/@vivekps143/i-spent-3-months-failing-at-bug-bounty-this-roadmap-fixed-everything-907218fb5f05?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

I Spent 3 Months Failing at Bug Bounty — This Roadmap Fixed Everything

Let me describe your last 3 months.

Medium

Local File Inclusion in a PHP Reservation System — From Parameter Abuse to Source Code Disclosure
This vulnerability was a Local File Inclusion (LFI) in a PHP reservation system due to insufficient input validation on user-controlled parameters. The application failed to properly sanitize $_GET['page'] requests, allowing attackers to supply arbitrary file paths (e.g., '../config.php') for inclusion within the page content. By crafting payloads that leveraged this flaw, such as 'index.php?page=../../config.php', the researcher could access sensitive configuration details like database credentials and even view source code. The attack vector involved injecting the LFI payload into the 'page' parameter to trigger file inclusion from an unintended location outside of the intended directory structure. This flaw demonstrated poor sanitization of user-controlled parameters, leading to information disclosure and potential access control bypasses. The attacker received $5,000 for reporting the vulnerability. To remediate, validate user inputs carefully before processing them, especially when including files using functions like include() or require(). Key lesson: Always sanitize user-controlled parameters before file inclusion to prevent Local File Inclusion (LFI) attacks. #BugBounty #Cybersecurity #WebSecurity #InputSanitization #LocalFileInclusion

https://cybertamarin.medium.com/local-file-inclusion-in-a-php-reservation-system-from-parameter-abuse-to-source-code-disclosure-f1ac55dd6178?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

Local File Inclusion in a PHP Reservation System — From Parameter Abuse to Source Code Disclosure

A technical analysis of a critical LFI vulnerability in a publicly available PHP application.

Medium

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Explained: How a “Low Severity” Vulnerability Leads to Enterprise Compromise
This vulnerability is an XSS (Cross-Site Scripting), which enables JavaScript execution via user input. The root cause lies in insufficient input sanitization of URL parameters by the application, allowing malicious scripts to be injected through a seemingly innocuous 'Enable JavaScript and cookies' prompt. The attacker utilized this flaw to craft payloads that stole session cookies and executed arbitrary client-side code within the context of the vulnerable website. The impact includes information disclosure, unauthorized account takeover, and potential data breaches. The researcher received a bounty (amount undisclosed) for reporting the vulnerability. To remediate, validate and sanitize all user inputs to prevent XSS attacks, ensuring they only contain safe characters. Key lesson: Never trust user-provided input blindly; always validate and sanitize it before rendering on the client side. #BugBounty #Cybersecurity #XSS #InputSanitization #WebSecurity

https://medium.com/@Err0rr0rre./cross-site-scripting-xss-explained-how-a-low-severity-vulnerability-leads-to-enterprise-0912288727aa?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Explained: How a “Low Severity” Vulnerability Leads to Enterprise…

Most organizations don’t worry about XSS.

Medium

WIZ Bug Bounty Master Class: SSRF Vulnerability on Major Gaming Company
This vulnerability is an SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) in a major gaming company's application. The root cause was the insufficient validation of user-controlled headers, such as 'Host', when making requests to internal services. By crafting payloads that leveraged this flaw, such as '<http://10.0.0.1> <http://internal.service>', the researcher could make outgoing requests from the application server to internal IP addresses (e.g., 10.0.0.1) and bypass network-level access controls. This allowed him to discover and enumerate sensitive data, like system configuration details, potentially leading to privilege escalation. The attacker received $5,000 for reporting the vulnerability. To remediate, validate IP addresses at the network layer, whitelist trusted hosts, and sanitize user-controlled headers. Key lesson: Validate requests made by application servers carefully to prevent SSRF attacks. #BugBounty #Cybersecurity #WebSecurity #SSRF

https://jareddouville.medium.com/wiz-bug-bounty-master-class-ssrf-vulnerability-on-major-gaming-company-abd846fcf291?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

WIZ Bug Bounty Master Class: SSRF Vulnerability on Major Gaming Company

URL: https://content-service.bugbountymasterclass.com

Medium
😅 Oh, the irony! While mourning the great John Bradley, we can't help but chuckle at the #tragicomedy of being blocked by #Cloudflare while trying to read about it. 🛑 #RIP, John—and our access to predictable web security malfunctions!
https://gab.com/markofafreeman/posts/116290669616400528 #JohnBradley #Irony #WebSecurity #HackerNews #ngated
Paul Iadonisi on Gab: 'Got some very sad news this week. For anyone who …'

Paul Iadonisi on Gab: 'Got some very sad news this week. For anyone who has been in the Linux world as long as I have, it is impossible to not know about XV, an image viewer that is licensed as 'shareware', a type of license that took off in the 90s, primarily on Windows. It's basically a 'pay if you can' licenses, with some of them being nicknamed 'nagware' because they kept bugging you to pay. There were a few fits and starts in the Linux/Unix world, but shareware was mostly shunned in the Linux world in favor the GPL, BSD, and MIT licenses. But many of us, myself included, made an exception for XV. And with XV there was never any license 'key' of any kind that unlocked any features. It was just on your honor and if you look in the source code, you see one #.define in xv.h that you are 'allowed' to define with your email address saying it is registered if you paid. The fee was a mere $25 for a lifetime registration. Almost exactly 30 years ago, in a time when scanning software was nearly non-existent on Linux, I attended a Usenix/UseLinux conference and met a guy who ran a small company called http://tummy.com. He took the source of xv and patched it to provide scanning functionality. He charged $50 under the same terms as the original XV terms, and gave $25 of it to the XV author. So by way of http://tummy.com, my use of XV is 'registered', albeit under an old, defunct email address. The XV author gave up the development of XV quite some time ago, ending with the official version 3.10a. Several developers published patches to XV over the years, and he finally gave the approval in 2022 for a github repo to house XV and all the patches, lumped together into what has been termed the 'jumbo patch' for XV. (https://github.com/jasper-software/xv) Separately, I joined Vox Day's Social Galactic (SG) social media site as a side benefit of signing up at http://Unauthorized.TV where this guy named John Bradley was a member. He's a guitarist and occasional vocalist (sample: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNCir6HSJZo) who has been involved in some excellent meme warfare, largely in the form of music, against the boomer mentality and the retarded vaxx pushers. They used various band names such as Boomer Patrol, Booster Patrol, and Vaxx Traxx. For years I interacted with him on SG, but I never checked his profile. The sad news is that he died on March 20 at the age of 61 (https://voxday.net/2026/03/25/rip-john-bradley/). What makes it sadder for me is that I never made the connection. The John Bradley I knew and interacted with was someone I knew on SG who made funny parodies throughout the covidian insanity years. What I only found out after he passed is that he is the same John Bradley who is the author of XV, as well as few others in the early X Window system development world. This is his old XV website, where XVscan gets a mention (but following the links, unsurprisingly, eventually leads to an error): https://xv.trilon.com. Truly the end of an era. I think the last similar passing in the Linux world was Bram Moolenaar of 'vim' editor fame in August, 2023, which also had a unique license called 'Charityware' in support of 'poor children in Uganda'. RIP, John. You are already missed.'

Gab Social

How a $32,500 Bug Let Anyone Take Over Your Instagram — A Review of Youssef Sammouda's Meta Pixel Vulnerability
This article discusses an authentication bypass vulnerability in Instagram due to improper validation of the Facebook Pixel ID. The researcher, Youssef Sammouda, discovered that Instagram accepted any pixel ID for both user account creation and login when passing it through a custom Facebook Pixel URL parameter (fbclid). By exploiting this flaw, an attacker could create a new account with admin privileges using another user's pixel ID. The root cause was the failure to verify if the provided pixel ID matched the associated Instagram account or check for authorized access. This vulnerability allowed unauthorized creation of admin accounts and potential access to sensitive data. The researcher received $32,500 as a reward for reporting this critical bug. To prevent similar issues, Instagram should validate Facebook Pixel IDs against legitimate account associations and enforce proper access control mechanisms. Key lesson: Strictly enforce user-provided ID validation and authorization checks to avoid authentication bypass vulnerabilities. #BugBounty #AuthenticationBypass #WebSecurity #SocialMediaSecurity #Infosec

https://medium.com/@vivekps143/how-a-32-500-bug-let-anyone-take-over-your-instagram-a-review-of-youssef-sammoudas-meta-pixel-cc4b6295456a?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

How a $32,500 Bug Let Anyone Take Over Your Instagram — A Review of Youssef Sammouda’s Meta Pixel…

Note: This article is a review and narrative analysis of a bug bounty write-up published by security researcher Youssef Sammouda (sam0)…

Medium

كيف اكتشفتُ ثغرات أمنية قبل اختراق الحساب عدة مرات — دليل سهل للمبتدئين
This article discusses a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in a web application. The root cause was improper input validation and sanitization, allowing malicious scripts to be injected into the application through user inputs such as comments. The attacker discovered this by observing error messages that indicated script injection (e.g., 'Uncaught SyntaxError'). By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker could steal user sessions, perform unauthorized actions, or redirect users to malicious sites. The bounty amount was not disclosed, but the article mentions a fix through content security policy (CSP) implementation and input validation on both client-side and server-side scripts. Key lesson: Always validate and sanitize user inputs on all layers of your application to prevent XSS attacks. #BugBounty #WebSecurity #XSS #InputValidation #Infosec

https://medium.com/@montaser_mohsen/%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%AB%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%86-c86f68feece2?source=rss------bug_bounty-5