@lackthereof no, it's not because unlike #Phones and #PhoneNumbers, #eMail is not necessarily traceable by circumstances.

• Because a Phone "Line" (regardless of whether it's POTS, ISDN, VoIP, GSM, VoLTE, …) and #telephony in general are designed for realtime communication, they inherently necessitate an active, ongoing connection.
  • Even if it's just some App/PBX/… to connect to the provider and constantly state "I am on the network and able to recieve calls!" (with PSTN networks, there a physical line that gets assumed to have a phone connected)…

Whereas with eMail (and any #asynchronous #communication) you don't have that requirement.

• So unless the provider is being taken over or otherwise "cooperative" there's no means for a sender to know where, when and how a message was retrieved unless the recipient wants the sender to know of it!
  • Besides, even if you don't have an eMail provider like cock.li which natively supports @torproject / #Tor useage with an #OnionService, unless said provider explicitly prevents you from doing so, you can use not just Tor but also other techniques to make it extremely hard (not necessarily impossible, but at least unfeasible at scale!) to get tracked down.
  • In fact, you could even use #Sneakernet - Style distribution through "#MeatProxies" and #DeadDrops (aka. #dr0p) to further twart tracing attempts.

Or to put it simple:

• You can ring up someone and thus circumstantially verify the chain of #PhoneNumber -> #IMSI -> #ICCID -> #SIM -> #IMEI -> Device -> Location -> Owner quite quickly.
  • Whereas you can't positively verify whether an eMail address and/or #XMPP+#OMEMO account belongs to me unless I want you to know that it does!

So either way a phone number is just a horrible means of doing that.

• And don't even get me started on the fact that legally speaking noone truly owns their number.
  • Because even if you got some spechal case number (like UPT was) you still depend on neither regulators nor telcos to not block or otherwise interfere with it. Which is in contrast to say an OnionService which can only be shutdown effectively by sabotage aka. (more or less figurately) "unplugging" it.

I mean, it's not as if I didn't gave @signalapp a fair chance.

• I wanted #Signal to be good - honestly...
  • But I'm old enough that things rarely are that simple as #TechPopulism & #Propaganda claim it to be.
  • Just like 5th grade #SexEd is not a substitute for Endocrinology, Gynecology and Andrology and actually licensed, medical professionals.

So any #Messenger service that requires a #Phone Number for signup and/or useage is truly not a real replacement and inherently makes PROVEN WRONG assumptions [i.e. that it is legal and possible to obtain a phone number anonymously at someone's juristiction] about it's customers' ability to shield their privacy…

• Cuz all the "#Metadata" claims of Signal are complete #MarketingLies by virtue of them storing a Phone Number and not just being (as per admission by @Mer__edith) 'hard locked-in' with #aws but also subject to #CloudAct.
• They certainly are not deploying real #E2EE cuz you neither get #SelfCustody nor #SelfHosting and have to blindly trust them (aka. "#TrustMeBro!") that what they release as #SourceCode is actually what they deploy.
  • It's like all those "#VPN" shillings which one cannot verify to be true or false!

THIS is why I am going fucking ballistic on #TechPopulism aiming at #TechIlliterates because it's spreading a "false sense of #security" whilst completely disregarding absolute fundamentals when it comes to the underlying systems.

• And I don't mean shit like #Govware of the #SS7 kind, but absolute basics in #ITsec, #InfoSec, #OpSec & #ComSec that every @cryptoparty / @cryptoparty / #CryptoParty worth it's name touches on.
  • Signal can't and won't save peoples' asses and the sooner we realize that "complex problems are hard to fix" the less we waste Resources on #HoneyPots that stench like #CrytpoAG & #ANØM!

@iron_bug @torproject @ooni @limping Do network with frieds and espechally work hard on setting up a decentralized #Sneakernet because it is truly unstoppable.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sneakernet

• But don't take my word for it, ask Cubans, Iranians and North Koreans about it…

@sepehran @timkmak yes and no.

Certainly #NorthKorea is able to maintain that control by literally publicly executing any importer or owner of #Satcom equipment for "#espionage"...

• If in doubt, #Sneakernet is the only truly resilient communications network!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sneakernet

After all, #Iran has almost completed it's #Splinternet infrastructure and tight control over the #Internet.

• It's not able to cut the cord amidst it's own, domestic and exporting #TechIndustry, as even the #IRGC-controlled #DIO needs to make videocalls to sell their stuff...

As for the average citizen, I expect them to organically copy the "Cuban Model" of Sneakernet and adapt to it.

• The biggest hurdle is to get anything out of Iran, not into Iran.

And I doubt Embassies are going to install WiFi Dead Drops and risk getting their premises violated as this would be considered a "hostile act" against the host country similar to Election Interference!

@sepehran @ktn @Parisa Ich bezweifle dass @heiseonline dazu was liefern wird.

#Iran hat durchaus Erfahrungen mit "#ElektronischerKampfführung" wie @dw_innovation / #DWnews selbst erfahren hat und wegen #Satellitenverbot ist #Toosheh darauf optimiert nach Dekodierung per #Sneakernet verbreitet zu werden.

• Also wie in #Nordkorea, wo #AsiaPress #RimjinGang auf diese Weise Material rein- und raus schmuggelt...

https://www.youtube.com/@ASIAPRESSrimjingang/videos

@cassolotl so basically a #Sneakernet system where everyone just has messages and files fully encrypted and they get manually transported point-to-point in a decentralized mesh topology?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sneakernet

Makes sense...

This is basically how #Journalists get footage from #NorthKorea and how reporters do get footage out if places like that and #Iran…

@thalon Neben den üblichen @torproject / #Tor / #TorBridges - Methoden wie #Snowflake, #meek & #webtunnel gibt's sonst nur die Möglichkeit von #Sneakernet und DIY-Antennen samt ausländischer #SIM|s oder gar #Richtfunk in #Grenznähe.

• Ähnlich wie #Nordkorea ist das mit Informatioen reinbekommen einfacher als rausschmuggeln.

Und angesichts historischer Präzedenzfälle wird kaum eine #Botschaft ne Art "#Freifunk" aufspannen und deren extrem teures #Satellit|en-#Internet teilen…