Just scraping the #IANA assigned TLDs and the corresponding documented #nameservers. What I don't get is, why so many companies apply for a #TLD. It's not particularly cheap to apply for one of those ngTLDs, yet compared to the company sizes, it's probably pennies. Is it a prestige investment? Is it a digital resource to grab, before someone else does it?

Other than #Microsoft, #Google, and #AWS, I've rarely seen any ngTLD representing a corporation's name to actually be used in practice.

Does anyone in the #infosec community share their view?

#askfedi #askmasto #askinfosec #DNS

bgp.tools being served via 13 authoritative name servers (via 3 different providers + in house NS):

```
$ dig +short ns bgp.tools
ns1.exoscale.ch.
ns-721.awsdns-26.net.
ns-1329.awsdns-38.org.
ns4-35.azure-dns.info.
ns3-35.azure-dns.org.
ns1.exoscale.io.
ns-302.awsdns-37.com.
ns-1799.awsdns-32.co.uk.
ns1.exoscale.net.
ns1-35.azure-dns.com.
ns2-35.azure-dns.net.
ns1.exoscale.com.
backup-ns.bgp.tools.
```

#bgptools #nameservers #dns

In January 2023, #Cloudflare replaced #Verisign in providing #DNS #registry services for the .gov #TLD. Besides the registry, they also run the authoritative #nameservers.

Verisign ran it for 12 years, and cost the #US #government apparently just half as much as Cloudflare charges ($7.2M).

Verisign loses prestive .gov contract to Cloudflare

Recently made the transition to self hosting authoritative name servers. Wrote a bit of secondary options available for it and the experience itself https://blog.sahilister.in/2025/07/secondary-authoritative-name-server-options-for-self-hosted-domains/

Didn't found the process too hard TBF, worth a try.

#authoritative #nameservers #dns #domains

Case of (broken) maharashtra.gov.in Authoritative Name Servers https://blog.sahilister.in/2025/06/case-of-broken-maharashtra.gov.in-authoritative-name-servers/

TLDR they're broken on multiple levels. Sync broken, RFC 1918 address, each NS giving different response - there's too much going on.

#dns #authoritative #nameservers #india

Good enough amount of name servers :P
```
$ dig ns sahil.rocks +short
ns2.afraid.org.
marvin.sahilister.net.
ns1.1984.is.
ns0.1984.is.
ns3.jing.rocks.
colin.sahilister.net.
puck.nether.net.
ns2.albony.in.
ns-global.kjsl.com.
ns4.he.net.
ns5.he.net.
```

#dns #authoritative #nameservers

I found the case of .UA ccTLD secondaries interesting so did a deep dive on it https://blog.sahilister.in/2025/06/a-look-at-.ua-cctld-authoritative-name-servers/

#dns #ua #cctld #internet #nameservers

Observing .ic TLD against authoritative nameservers serving samsung.com. No information of them anywhere.

$ dig ns samsung.com +short
auth04.sam.ic.
auth02.nhn.ic.
auth01.nhn.ic.
dns-gi2.samsung.com.
auth02.sam.ic.
dnssm.samsung.com.
dns-awskr1.samsung.com.
dnssm2.samsung.com.
dnsst.samsung.com.
dnsst2.samsung.com.
auth03.nhn.ic.
auth04.nhn.ic.
auth01.sam.ic.
auth03.sam.ic.
dns-gi1.samsung.com.

Maybe some internal thingy? Thoughts?

#DNS #Authoritative #Nameservers