The Crisis of Kinship: A Critique of the CNTC and the Erosion of Naga Unity


Responding to “CNTC opposes move to revive Rongmei ST issue in Nagaland” (https://nagalandpost.com/cntc-opposes-move-to-revive-rongmei-st-issue-in-nagaland/)

The persistent and vehement opposition by the Central Nagaland Tribes Council (CNTC) regarding the Scheduled Tribe (ST) status of the Rongmei community in Nagaland represents a profound fracture in the foundational vision of Naga unity. By aggressively revisiting a decision that was ostensibly settled through the 2012 recognition and subsequent 2017 withdrawal, the CNTC’s stance highlights a “Naga factor” characterized more by exclusion, protectionism, and internal dispute than by the brotherhood often preached in the highest echelons of Naga political discourse.¹ This debate is not merely an administrative squabble over certificates; it is a fundamental struggle over the soul of what it means to be “Naga” in the twenty-first century.

The Myth of the “Migrant” Naga

The CNTC’s primary argument rests on the preservation of resources for “indigenous” tribes, claiming that granting ST status to 1,313 Rongmei individuals—who have been integrated into the social and physical fabric of Nagaland for over a century—would deprive the youth of livelihood opportunities.² This zero-sum logic is both statistically questionable and philosophically damaging. It ignores the historical reality that the Naga identity is a multi-layered construct built upon a shared struggle for self-determination that deliberately transcends modern state boundaries.³ To categorize fellow Nagas as “migrants” or “immigrants” simply because their ancestral lands fall across the arbitrary administrative lines created by colonial powers is a historical irony of the highest order.

When the British partitioned the Naga hills, they did so for administrative convenience, not out of respect for ethnic homogeneity. By adopting the same logic today, tribal councils like the CNTC are effectively validating colonial borders that the Naga national movement has spent decades trying to dismantle. If the Rongmei, who were present in Nagaland prior to the state’s formation in 1963, are viewed as “outsiders,” it sets a dangerous precedent for every other Naga sub-tribe that might find itself on the “wrong” side of a political boundary.⁴

The Rhetoric of Dehumanization

Furthermore, the rhetoric used to describe the Rongmei community is deeply regressive and historically insensitive. In its media communications, the CNTC has referred to these individuals as descendants of those brought by the British as “scavengers.”⁵ Such labeling is not only an affront to the dignity of a people who have contributed to the social, cultural, and political life of the state for generations, but it also reeks of a caste-like hierarchy that has no place in a supposedly egalitarian Naga society.

To use a community’s historical socio-economic vulnerability as a weapon to deny them modern political rights is a betrayal of the Christian and democratic values many Naga organizations claim to uphold. Instead of recognizing the resilience of a people who have survived the upheavals of the 20th century, the CNTC chooses to define them by a colonial occupational tag. This rhetoric serves only to further polarize a society that is already grappling with systemic tribalism and political fatigue.⁶

The Failure of Dialogue and the “Naga Factor”

At a time when the Naga people should be consolidating their strength through inclusive dialogue and collective bargaining with the Centre, the current atmosphere is instead defined by “war and dispute.” The “Naga factor,” once a term that inspired hope for a pan-Naga identity, has increasingly become synonymous with internal gatekeeping and “crabs-in-a-bucket” syndrome.⁷ Shame is cast upon a system where dialogue is replaced by warnings, ultimatums, and administrative withdrawals.

The CNTC questions the state government’s long-term plan for “indigenous Nagas,” yet it offers no vision of its own that accounts for the reality of Naga integration. If the tribal bodies cannot find the grace or the political imagination to accommodate a small, historically settled population of their own kin—numbering barely over a thousand individuals—the dream of a “Naga Unity” becomes an empty vessel.⁸ One must ask: if we cannot coexist with 1,313 of our own brothers and sisters in Dimapur and Peren, how do we expect to manage a unified administrative setup for millions of Nagas across the region?

Resource Scarcity vs. Identity Integrity

The CNTC’s concern regarding a “resource-starved” state is a valid socioeconomic observation, but it is a poor excuse for ethnic exclusion. Nagaland’s economic woes—unemployment, lack of industry, and infrastructure deficits—are the result of governance failures and political instability, not the presence of a few hundred Rongmei families.⁹ By scapegoating the Rongmei community, the CNTC diverts attention from the real issues affecting Naga youth. It is easier to attack a vulnerable minority than to demand accountability for the systemic corruption that actually drains the state’s resources.

The council’s warning that this move is a “direct challenge” to the youth of Nagaland is a populistic tactic designed to incite fear. In reality, the true challenge to the youth is a fragmented society where merit is secondary to tribal affiliation and where the definition of “belonging” is constantly shrinking.¹⁰

Conclusion: A Call for Higher Ground

The vision of earlier Naga leaders was one of a broad-based brotherhood. They envisioned a people united by common ancestry and a shared future. By narrowing this vision to “jurisdictional” interests and “ancestral land” exclusion, current tribal hohos are dishonoring that legacy. The “Naga factor” must be reclaimed as a force of elevation and mutual support.

It is time to move beyond the politics of “removing opportunities” and start creating them through unity. The state government’s attempt to rectify the ST status of the Rongmei is not a threat; it is an act of administrative justice that aligns with the historical truth of Naga kinship.¹¹ Failure to recognize this is not just a policy error—it is a moral failure that keeps the Naga people locked in an endless cycle of internal strife. We must ask ourselves: if we continue to devour our own, what will be left of the Naga identity to protect?¹²

Footnotes

  • “CNTC opposes move to revive Rongmei ST issue in Nagaland,” Nagaland Post, May 14, 2026, https://nagalandpost.com/cntc-opposes-move-to-revive-rongmei-st-issue-in-nagaland/.
  • Nagaland Post, “CNTC opposes move,” May 14, 2026.
  • Inato Yekheto Shikhu, A Re-discovery of the Naga Heritage (Guwahati: Spectrum Publications, 2007), 45-50.
  • Sajal Nag, Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Determinsim and Pathological Politics in North-East India (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2002), 188.
  • “CNTC warns against reviving Rongmei ST issue,” The Morung Express, May 14, 2026.
  • U. A. Shimray, Naga Population and Integration Issues (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2007), 112-115.
  • A. Lanunungsang Ao, From Phizo to Muivah: The Naga National Question in North East India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2002), 215.
  • “The Rongmei Settlement Issue,” The Morung Express, June 5, 2017, https://morungexpress.com/the-rongmei-settlement-issue.
  • Charles Chasie, The Naga Imbroglio: A Personal Perspective (Kohima: Standard Printers and Publishers, 1999), 78.
  • N. Venuh, Continuity and Change in the Naga Society (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2004), 134.
  • “Government’s Recognition of Rongmei as Indigenous Tribe,” Nagaland Page, October 12, 2012.
  • Kaka D. Iralu, Nagaland and India: The Blood and the Tears (Kohima: N.V. Press, 2000), 402.
  • Bibliography

    Ao, A. Lanunungsang. From Phizo to Muivah: The Naga National Question in North East India. New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2002.

    Chasie, Charles. The Naga Imbroglio: A Personal Perspective. Kohima: Standard Printers and Publishers, 1999.

    “CNTC opposes move to revive Rongmei ST issue in Nagaland.” Nagaland Post, May 14, 2026. https://nagalandpost.com/cntc-opposes-move-to-revive-rongmei-st-issue-in-nagaland/.

    Iralu, Kaka D. Nagaland and India: The Blood and the Tears. Kohima: N.V. Press, 2000.

    Nag, Sajal. Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Determinsim and Pathological Politics in North-East India. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2002.

    “The Rongmei Settlement Issue.” The Morung Express, June 5, 2017. https://morungexpress.com/the-rongmei-settlement-issue.

    Shikhu, Inato Yekheto. A Re-discovery of the Naga Heritage. Guwahati: Spectrum Publications, 2007.

    Shimray, U. A. Naga Population and Integration Issues. New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2007.

    Venuh, N. Continuity and Change in the Naga Society. New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2004.

    #Education #History #India #Naga #Nagaland #News #politics #RongmeiNaga #travel

    The Legal Evolution of Indigenous Identity: Recognition of the Rongmei Tribe in Nagaland


    Introduction

    The socio-political landscape of Northeast India is frequently defined by the intersection of ancestral heritage and administrative classification. On May 9, 2024, a significant milestone was reached when the Nagaland government approved the issuance of Scheduled Tribe (ST) certificates to 1,313 members of the Rongmei tribe who are permanently settled within the state.1 This decision addresses a long-standing grievance regarding the “indigenous” status of the Rongmei people in Nagaland, a community that also holds deep ancestral roots in Manipur and Assam. Understanding this development requires an analysis of the Zeliangrong identity and the rigorous criteria for “indigenous” recognition in the region.

    I. The Zeliangrong Heritage and the Rongmei Identity

    The Rongmei people are an integral branch of the Zeliangrong collective, a socio-cultural and political union comprising the Zeme, Liangmai, and Rongmei sub-tribes.2 Historically, these groups have shared a common ancestry and geographic continuity across the contiguous hill tracts of Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam.

    International standards, as defined by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), characterize indigenous peoples by their historical continuity, language, and ancestral occupation of lands prior to modern state formation.3 In the context of Nagaland, the Zeliang and Rongmei identities have been closely intertwined; however, the formal recognition of the Rongmei as a separate ST entity within Nagaland has faced unique hurdles compared to their status in Manipur, where they are recognized as a core indigenous group.4

    II. The Criteria for Indigenous Inhabitants in Nagaland

    The government’s recent approval is not a blanket recognition but is strictly bound by the “1963 Cut-off Date.” Under the Nagaland Land and Revenue Regulations, an “Indigenous Inhabitant” is defined as a person who settled in the state prior to December 1, 1963 (the date of Nagaland’s statehood).5

    This legal threshold is essential for several reasons:

    • Protection of Rights: Recognition grants access to reservation in government jobs and education, as well as the right to own land in protected areas.6
    • Genealogical Verification: The 1,313 approved individuals and their direct descendants were identified through a rigorous verification process conducted by the state-appointed Committee on Rongmei Indigenous Inhabitant of Nagaland.7

    III. Regional Comparisons: Manipur and the Yek Salai System

    The meaning of “Indigenous” for the Rongmei takes on a different legal dimension in neighboring Manipur. There, indigenous status is often validated through the “Yek Salai” system—a traditional clan classification system dating back to 33 CE.8 While Nagaland relies on a modern administrative cut-off (1963), Manipur’s traditionalists, such as the Federation of Haomee, argue for a definition based on “First Settler” status and ancestral village records.9

    In Manipur, the Rongmei, along with the Zeme and Liangmai (historically grouped as Kacha Nagas), are listed as Scheduled Tribes with a population of over 62,000 as of the 2001 Census.10 The disparity in population and recognition between the states has often led to identity fluctuations for Rongmei families living near the borders.

    IV. Neighbouring Tribes and the Scheduled Tribe List

    The Nagaland government’s decision must be viewed within the broader framework of the Scheduled Tribe list, which includes diverse Naga and non-Naga groups:

  • Naga Tribes: Angami, Ao, Chakhesang, Chang, Konyak, Lotha, Phom, Pochury, Rengma, Sangtam, Sumi, Yimkhiung, Khiamniungan, and Zeliang (Zeme and Liangmai).11
  • Neighboring Groups: The Kuki tribe, which shares borders with Zeliangrong areas, is also recognized, though historical standing orders from the British era sometimes distinguished between original settlers and later migrants.12
  • Conclusion

    The approval of ST certificates for the Rongmei in Nagaland signifies a reconciliation between historical presence and legal documentation. By acknowledging those settled since 1963, the state recognizes the Rongmei as a legitimate component of its indigenous fabric while maintaining the integrity of its statehood-based eligibility criteria. This move reinforces the Zeliangrong bond and ensures that the Rongmei’s historical ties to the land are translated into contemporary socio-economic protections.

    Footnotes

    1 “Nagaland Govt Approves ST Certificates for Rongmei Tribe Members Settled in State,” The Sentinel Assam, May 10, 2024.

    2 M. T. Laiba, Geography of Manipur, (Imphal: Angomcha Longjam Langmeiba Thangmeiband, 1996), 503.

    3 Fifteenth Session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), Report on Indigenous Issues, May 2016.

    4 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), Art. 33, 2007.

    5 Government of Nagaland, Notification on Indigenous Inhabitant Status, No. Home/Sectt-1/8/94.

    6 Supreme Court of India, Kailas & Others v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction, January 5, 2011.

    7 “State Cabinet Approves ST Status for 1313 Rongmeis,” Nagaland Post, May 9, 2024.

    8 Federation of Haomee (FOH), Resolution on Indigenous Communities and the Yek Salai System, 2019.

    9 O. Kumar Singh, Archaeological Finds in Manipur Caves, (Imphal: Anthropological Survey, 1983).

    10 Census of India 2001, Scheduled Tribes Population of Manipur.

    11 Government of India, The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 (as amended).

    12 T. A. Sharp, Standing Order of the President of the Manipur State Darbar, July 23, 1941.

    Bibliography

    Census of India 2001. Scheduled Tribes Population of Manipur. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India.

    Government of India. The Constitution of India. Articles 342 and 366(25).

    Jamir, Senayangba Chubatoshi. “Indigenous Identity in Nagaland.” Keynote address at the Nagaland Indigenous People’s Forum, Dimapur, October 27, 2019.

    Laiba, M. T. Geography of Manipur. Imphal: Angomcha Longjam Langmeiba Thangmeiband, 1996.

    Manipur State Darbar. Standing Orders of the President (PMSD). Order No. 2 of 1941.

    Singh, O. Kumar. Prehistoric Archaeology of Manipur. Imphal: State Museum Publications, 1983.

    United Nations General Assembly. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Resolution 61/295. New York: UN, 2007.

    United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Report of the Fifteenth Session. New York: UN, 2016.

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