#dragos published an excellent report on the cyberattack on the Polish grid last December.
While the Spanish blackout is often cited as example in blog posts or articles, it is central to understand that both grids are completely different, in power generation sources and connectivity. As Dragos wrote:
"Grid vulnerability to disruptions depends heavily on the generation mix and system inertia. Poland generates over 50 percent of its energy from coal or lignite-fired power plants, providing significant inertia that helps stabilize grid frequency. Wind and solar make up approximately 25 percent of capacity. Grids with higher renewable penetration and less inertia, common in regions aggressively pursuing decarbonization, may be more susceptible to the cascading effects of
coordinated DER disruption."
"This attack was unlikely to cause a nationwide blackout in Poland under current conditions. Strong AC interconnection with neighboring countries and spinning thermal generation would have allowed the system to absorb the disruption, though localized outages could have
occurred."
"Treating remote access as an operational convenience rather than critical infrastructure is no longer viable for DER operators."
https://www.dragos.com/blog/poland-power-grid-attack-electrum-targets-distributed-energy-2025
Spain was reckless in how they managed their grid and they got burned.
Soon (February?) the final report on the Iberian blackout will be published.



