Earlier this week, Jonas Juffinger and I presented our work Not So Secure TSC at #acns in Munich.
Many thanks to Jonas (https://www.jonasjuffinger.com/) and @lavados!
Earlier this week, Jonas Juffinger and I presented our work Not So Secure TSC at #acns in Munich.
Many thanks to Jonas (https://www.jonasjuffinger.com/) and @lavados!
Accepted Papers in the first round Not So Secure TSC Jonas Juffinger (Graz University of Technology)Sudheendra Raghav Neela (Graz University of Technology)Daniel Gruss (Graz University of Technology) Homomorphic WiSARDs: Efficient Weightless Neural Network training over encrypted data Leonardo Neumann (UNICAMP)Antonio Guimarães (IMDEA Software Institute)Diego F. Aranha (Aarhus University)Edson Borin (UNICAMP) CANTXSec: A Deterministic Intrusion Detection […]
The deadline for the second round of submissions is today! Polish your paper, make a final pass on the abstract and introduction and submit it to ACNS 2024!
ACNS'24 workshops AIHWS & ADSC websites are up.
https://aihws2024.aisylab.com
https://adsc2024.github.io
- Paper submission deadline: 15 Nov 2023.
- EUR500 prize for ACNS best workshop paper award sponsored by Springer.
We are now accepting submissions for the second cycle of ACNS 2024. You still have a few days to make your paper shine and impress our TPC committee!
The submission site is at:
https://acns24-cycle2.hotcrp.com
We are excited to announce a list of world-class keynote speakers with a diverse set of topics for ACNS 2024. Stay tuned for the announcements of the talks' details.
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) rely on insecure protocols and devices to monitor and operate critical infrastructure. Prior work has demonstrated that powerful attackers with detailed system knowledge can manipulate exchanged sensor data to deteriorate performance of the process, even leading to full shutdowns of plants. Identifying those attacks requires iterating over all possible sensor values, and running detailed system simulation or analysis to identify optimal attacks. That setup allows adversaries to identify attacks that are most impactful when applied on the system for the first time, before the system operators become aware of the manipulations. In this work, we investigate if constrained attackers without detailed system knowledge and simulators can identify comparable attacks. In particular, the attacker only requires abstract knowledge on general information flow in the plant, instead of precise algorithms, operating parameters, process models, or simulators. We propose an approach that allows single-shot attacks, i.e., near-optimal attacks that are reliably shutting down a system on the first try. The approach is applied and validated on two use cases, and demonstrated to achieve comparable results to prior work, which relied on detailed system information and simulations.