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I work on the ugly bits that nobody loves. These days in infosec, mostly appsec, occasionally (and previously) as a developer.

I'm a Victorian but that doesn't make me old fashioned. I do drink them.

From Spoofing to Tunnelling: New Red Team's Networking Techniques with Shu Hao Tung

https://video.infosec.exchange/w/prcc7PiuCKaKM1VP7wBjBF

From Spoofing to Tunnelling: New Red Team's Networking Techniques with Shu Hao Tung

PeerTube
Your laptop now has a heartbeat: type wrong for 30s and it bricks itself.

Welcome to the era where your own fingers can betray you and the state can’t even read the keys.
https://github.com/geeknik/sigint
GitHub - geeknik/sigint: A keystroke dynamics biometric dead man's switch for Linux.

A keystroke dynamics biometric dead man's switch for Linux. - geeknik/sigint

GitHub

Whoa, that escalated quickly. This just got sent out by the press folks at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC says it has decided that all foreign-made consumer-grade Internet routers are henceforth prohibited from receiving FCC authorization and are therefore prohibited from being imported for use or sale in the United States.

"Update Follows Determination by Executive Branch Agencies that Consumer-Grade Routers Produced in Foreign Countries Threaten National Security

WASHINGTON, March 23, 2026—Today, the Federal Communications Commission updated its Covered List to include all consumer-grade routers produced in foreign countries. Routers are the boxes in every home that connect computers, phones, and smart devices to the internet. This followed a determination by a White House-convened Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise that such routers “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.”

"The Executive Branch determination noted that foreign-produced routers (1) introduce “a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and national defense” and (2) pose “a severe cybersecurity risk that could be leveraged to immediately and severely disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and directly harm U.S. persons.”

"This action does not affect any previously-purchased consumer-grade routers. Consumers can continue to use any router they have already lawfully purchased or acquired."

"Producers of consumer-grade routers that receive Conditional Approval from DoW or DHS can continue to receive FCC equipment authorizations. Interested applicants are encouraged to submit applications to [email protected]."

Not sure how many consumer-grade routers will be left for sale if it really is a ban on approvals for any foreign-made consumer routers like they said, and not just a bunch of already restricted Chinese makers like Huawei and ZTE.

https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-updates-covered-list-include-foreign-made-consumer-routers

FCC's "covered list" of "thou shalt not entities": https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist

RE: https://fosstodon.org/@SocketSecurity/116275498711560605

Aqua Security’s GitHub org was briefly taken over during the Trivy incident.

Archived snapshots show attacker-created repos (e.g. tpcp-docs-*) with messages like “TeamPCP Owns Aqua Security,” indicating the attacker had write access to the org.

We updated our post with more details on this ongoing supply chain attack.

From yesterday.

Socket: Trivy Supply Chain Attack Expands to Compromised Docker Images https://socket.dev/blog/trivy-docker-images-compromised @SocketSecurity #infosec #threatresearch #Docker #cyberattack

Trivy Supply Chain Attack Expands to Compromised Docker Imag...

Newly published Trivy Docker images (0.69.5 and 0.69.6) were found to contain infostealer IOCs and were pushed to Docker Hub without corresponding Git...

Socket
Let's Delve In

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CrankySec
H&R Block tax software installs a TLS root certificate with bundled private key https://lobste.rs/s/d5nvf5 #security
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47457162
H&R Block tax software installs a TLS root certificate with bundled private key

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Lobsters

NorthSec 2026 speaker lineup is here ...and it's our best yet!

31 talks & workshops. Two days in Montréal. Tickets going fast (get yours by April 1st to secure a badge and a t-shirts). 👇

𝗧𝗮𝗹𝗸𝘀:
• Guillaume Valadon & Gaetan — Private Key Leaks in the Wild: Insights from Certificate Transparency
• Philippe Pépos Petitclerc — A systematic approach to evading antivirus software
• Émilio Gonzalez — Increasing detection engineering maturity with detection as code
• François Labrèche — A Needle in a Haystack: Identifying an Infostealer Attack Through Trillions of Events in a Large-scale Modern SOC
• Wietze — Trust me, I'm a Shortcut - new LNK abuse methods
• Reza Sharifi — Internet Blackout 2026 in Iran — Next-Level Internet Censorship: A Technical Breakdown of Techniques and Tactics
• Andrew Buchanan, Max CM & Connor Laidlaw — Commit, Push, Compromise: Attacking Modern GitHub Orgs
• Dirk-jan Mollema & Sanne Maasakkers — Researchers vs. Threat Actors in Cloud Attacks
• Jeremy Miller — Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Cybersecurity Tasks
• Manu Jose — The Merchant of Venice: Trading Latency for Security at Scale
• Joshua Prager & Ben Schroeder — Mapping Deception Solutions with BloodHound OpenGraph
• Christian Paquin — Doxxing-proof authentic digital media: trust the asset, protect the source
• Robbe Van Roey — Hacking Browsers: The Easy Way
• Ron Bowes — Adventures in Process Injection (How I Accidentally Built a Debugger - Again!)
• Xavier Facélina — Le futur s'invente avant-hier
• Charl-Alexandre Le Brun & Simon Lachkar — The OpenGraph diary: Attack path management applied to Ansible
• François Proulx — Living Off The Pipeline: Defensive Research, Weaponized
• Pierre-Nicolas Allard-Coutu — Stolen Laptops: Defeating DMA Countermeasures
• Philippe Marchand — Cybermenaces géopolitiques au Canada: État des lieux et perspectives stratégiques
• Kristine Barbara — From Experts to Everyone: Democratizing Threat Modeling at Ubisoft
• Chirag Savla — When Serverless Becomes a Foothold: Abusing Azure Function Apps in Modern Cloud Environments
• Brad Edwards — APTL: An Open Source Agentic Purple Team Lab
• Maxime Arquilliere & Coline C — Sold to the highest bidder: the escalation of ADINT from geolocation tracking to intrusion vector
• Sébastien Dudek — Hacking 5G: From Radio Security to the APIs

𝗪𝗼𝗿𝗸𝘀𝗵𝗼𝗽𝘀:
• Logan Maclaren & Lewis Moore — Command & Conquer: A hands-on C2 primer for aspiring Red & Blue teamers
• Santiago Abastante — AWS Security - The Purple Team Way
• Faan Rossouw — Agentic AI for Threat Hunting
• Ben Gardiner — Hardware RE: a gentle intro
• Tammy Harper — The Ransomware Negotiation Lab
• Mark El-Khoury — DIY Continuous Security: Practical Security Engineering
• Ashley Manraj & Philippe Dugré (zer0x64) — Breaking and Hardening the Cloud: Advanced Hooking and Shellcoding in a Hardened Environment

#NorthSec #cfp #infosec #cybersecurity

Someday we’re going to look back on the phrase “we provide mechanism not policy” the same way we see “I was just following orders”.

https://mamot.fr/@Khrys/116265905987693759

Delve, a startup that claims to be able to help you get SOC2 compliance in days

Was not surprisingly revealed to have made it all up.

https://substack.com/home/post/p-191342187

Delve - Fake Compliance as a Service - Part I

How Delve managed to falsely convince hundreds of customers they were compliant and then lied about it when exposed and called out