Alex Rebert

139 Followers
270 Following
29 Posts
Security @ Google. Previously co-founder of
@ForAllSecure. Opinions here are my own
We're joining forces with industry & academia to call for memory safety standardization: https://security.googleblog.com/2025/02/securing-tomorrows-software-need-for.html. It's a recognition that memory unsafety is no longer a niche technical problem but a societal one, impacting everything from national security to personal privacy.
Securing tomorrow's software: the need for memory safety standards

Posted by Alex Rebert, Security Foundations, Ben Laurie, Research, Murali Vijayaraghavan, Research and Alex Richardson, Silicon For decades,...

Google Online Security Blog

Had a bunch of thoughts about the recent safety stuff, way more than fit in social media post... Blog post story time! (It's a bit of a ramble, sorry about that...)

https://chandlerc.blog/posts/2024/11/story-time-bounds-checking/

#LLVM #Clang #MemorySafety

Story-time: C++, bounds checking, performance, and compilers

Recently, several of my colleagues at Google shared the story of how we are retrofitting spatial safety onto our monolithic C++ codebase: https://security.googleblog.com/2024/11/retrofitting-spatial-safety-to-hundreds.html I wanted to have a bit of story-time about some of the strange ways that all this came to be, at least as I remember things. There are some really interesting developments that led us here, and some important lessons to learn from that history. Do note that this is just my retrospective memory. It’s entirely possible I’m misremembering some of it (let me know if so!). It’s also limited to my perspective, and others may have seen very different aspects of things (please share!).

Coding in Old Entish
The best part? It’s incredibly cost-effective, with an average performance overhead of just 0.3%. So there’s really no reason not to do it if you’re running C++ code :)
This improves spatial safety across Google’s services, including performance-critical components of Search, Gmail, Drive, YouTube, and Maps. We’ve already seen it disrupt a red team exercise, reduce segfaults by 30%, and improve code correctness.
Excited to share our latest blog post on memory safety! We’re tackling spatial safety in our massive C++ codebase by hardening libc++ by default. It adds bounds checks to things like std::vector, preventing a fair bit of out-of-bounds vulnerabilities: https://security.googleblog.com/2024/11/retrofitting-spatial-safety-to-hundreds.html 🧵
Retrofitting spatial safety to hundreds of millions of lines of C++

Posted by Alex Rebert and Max Shavrick, Security Foundations, and Kinuko Yasuda, Core Developer Attackers regularly exploit spatial mem...

Google Online Security Blog
C++ Safe Buffers — Clang 22.0.0git documentation

I joined @durumcrustulum and @tqbf on the Security Cryptography Whatever podcast to talk about our latest blogpost:

https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/10/15/a-little-bit-of-rust-goes-a-long-way/
https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Something that Thomas said in the podcast really stood out to me. He said “the blog post undersells it. …. This is a lot more interesting than it looks like on the tin.”

I agree with this. It feels like we discovered a game-changer not just in memory safety, but in security more generally - that doing something very practical results in major security improvements for non-obvious reasons. Focusing on new code is disproportionately effective, exponentially.

Thomas also said “And that observation about the half life of vulnerabilities, if that’s true, says something pretty profound about what the work looks like to shift to a memory safe future.”

Or as Deidre said: “You can get really big bang for your buck, which is if you have something new, just write it in the Rust or another memory safe language and make it interop with the rest of your project and you will in fact, get really good returns on mitigating your memory safe vulnerabilities, which is the majority of your vulnerabilities, period.”

Agreed. We’re already prioritizing differently based on this data. It was a fun conversation, and we believe that it applies to a lot more than just memory safety.

A Little Bit of Rust Goes a Long Way with Android

You may not be rewriting the world in Rust, but if you follow the findings of the Android team and our guest Jeff Vander Stoep, you’ll drive down your memory...

Proud to start sharing Google's strategy for tackling our remaining memory safety challenges: https://security.googleblog.com/2024/10/safer-with-google-advancing-memory.html

It's high level, but it outlines the long-term strategy. We'll be sharing more detailed posts in this series.

#CPlusPlus #RustLang #CarbonLang

Safer with Google: Advancing Memory Safety

Posted by Alex Rebert, Security Foundations, and Chandler Carruth, Jen Engel, Andy Qin, Core Developers Error-prone interactions between ...

Google Online Security Blog
The drop in Android's memory safety vulnerabilities is astonishing! It's counterintuitive, but prioritizing memory-safe languages in new code quickly reduces memory-safety risks. Once we turn off the tap of new vulnerabilities, they start decreasing exponentially.
https://infosec.exchange/@jeffvanderstoep/113199270632527576
jeffvanderstoep (@[email protected])

I’m super excited about this blogpost. The approach is so counterintuitive, and yet the results are so much better than anything else that we’ve tried for memory safety. We finally understand why. https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Infosec Exchange
Deploying Rust in Existing Firmware Codebases

Posted by Ivan Lozano and Dominik Maier, Android Team Android's use of safe-by-design principles drives our adoption of memory-safe languag...

Google Online Security Blog