jeffvanderstoep

628 Followers
89 Following
24 Posts
We're looking for a PM who can help us on our mission to ensure Android users never need to trust the network they connect to: https://www.google.com/about/careers/applications/jobs/results/114910074257711814-product-manager-ii-security-and-privacy
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Product Manager II, Security and Privacy — Google Careers

With Rust development surpassing C++ in the Android platform in 2025, we can start making reliable comparisons across a number of important metrics, such as developer velocity and overall quality of changes.

Lots of great data in here, including rollback rates, code review latency, vulnerability density, and a CVE with a twist.

https://security.googleblog.com/2025/11/rust-in-android-move-fast-fix-things.html

Rust in Android: move fast and fix things

Posted by Jeff Vander Stoep, Android Last year, we wrote about why a memory safety strategy that focuses on vulnerability prevention in ...

Google Online Security Blog
Android phones have changed a lot over the years, and with those changes come new privacy and security features that are easy to miss. Here’s a rundown on the most important settings. https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-get-to-know-android-privacy-and-security-settings
How to: Get to Know Android Privacy and Security Settings

Open up your Android phone’s Settings app and you’ll find dozens of different options with little guidance on what those options do. Some of these settings have a serious impact on your privacy and security, altering what data gets shared automatically with apps, data brokers, and Google itself. What sorts...

Undefined behavior consists of exactly one proposition, to wit: There must be compiler developers whom the language standard protects but does not bind, alongside developers whom the language standard binds but does not protect

📰 Risky Biz News: The EU will make vendors liable for bugs

https://news.risky.biz/risky-biz-news-the-eu-will-make-vendors-liable-for-bugs/

EU extends liability definition to cover software and security flaws

In other news: Wiper attacks hit Israel via ESET partner; Microsoft loses weeks of security logs; DOD looks to buy deepfake tech.

Risky.Biz

@durumcrustulum @tqbf

One of my coworkers listened in and had some interesting takeaways:

1. The practicality of the Android team in tackling a problem: working incrementally right away without trying to solve for everything, and how that's almost always the right approach when you're doing big changes like this.
2. The shift away from being attacker focused: how that's applicable to more of security than just memory safety. I.e., don't focus on making the attacker's life harder by constraining yourself to their playing field, but rather focus on making the defender's life easier by focusing on the things that we control
3. It's more expensive to clean up a mess than to prevent the mess: It doesn't follow directly from the blogpost, but it's essentially the difference between "build something in a MSL" (developer-focused) or "build something in an unsafe language, and go and tack on a bunch of mitigations afterwards" (attacker-focused)

I joined @durumcrustulum and @tqbf on the Security Cryptography Whatever podcast to talk about our latest blogpost:

https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/10/15/a-little-bit-of-rust-goes-a-long-way/
https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Something that Thomas said in the podcast really stood out to me. He said “the blog post undersells it. …. This is a lot more interesting than it looks like on the tin.”

I agree with this. It feels like we discovered a game-changer not just in memory safety, but in security more generally - that doing something very practical results in major security improvements for non-obvious reasons. Focusing on new code is disproportionately effective, exponentially.

Thomas also said “And that observation about the half life of vulnerabilities, if that’s true, says something pretty profound about what the work looks like to shift to a memory safe future.”

Or as Deidre said: “You can get really big bang for your buck, which is if you have something new, just write it in the Rust or another memory safe language and make it interop with the rest of your project and you will in fact, get really good returns on mitigating your memory safe vulnerabilities, which is the majority of your vulnerabilities, period.”

Agreed. We’re already prioritizing differently based on this data. It was a fun conversation, and we believe that it applies to a lot more than just memory safety.

A Little Bit of Rust Goes a Long Way with Android

You may not be rewriting the world in Rust, but if you follow the findings of the Android team and our guest Jeff Vander Stoep, you’ll drive down your memory...

The drop in Android's memory safety vulnerabilities is astonishing! It's counterintuitive, but prioritizing memory-safe languages in new code quickly reduces memory-safety risks. Once we turn off the tap of new vulnerabilities, they start decreasing exponentially.
https://infosec.exchange/@jeffvanderstoep/113199270632527576
jeffvanderstoep (@[email protected])

I’m super excited about this blogpost. The approach is so counterintuitive, and yet the results are so much better than anything else that we’ve tried for memory safety. We finally understand why. https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Infosec Exchange

I’m super excited about this blogpost. The approach is so counterintuitive, and yet the results are so much better than anything else that we’ve tried for memory safety. We finally understand why.

https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Eliminating Memory Safety Vulnerabilities at the Source

Posted by Jeff Vander Stoep - Android team, and Alex Rebert - Security Foundations Memory safety vulnerabilities remain a pervasive threa...

Google Online Security Blog
Why does ChatGPT always sound so generic? Because it’s been trained on publicly posted language. What’s the most common public language around infosec? Marketing language.