Ivan Lozano

153 Followers
272 Following
114 Posts
Google Android Platform Security. Opinions are my own, boosts are not endorsements. Posts about information security, foreign affairs, physics, astrophotography, or anything else that I find mildly interesting.

📰 Risky Biz News: The EU will make vendors liable for bugs

https://news.risky.biz/risky-biz-news-the-eu-will-make-vendors-liable-for-bugs/

EU extends liability definition to cover software and security flaws

In other news: Wiper attacks hit Israel via ESET partner; Microsoft loses weeks of security logs; DOD looks to buy deepfake tech.

Risky.Biz
Pixel's Proactive Approach to Security: Addressing Vulnerabilities in Cellular Modems

Posted by Sherk Chung, Stephan Chen, Pixel team, and Roger Piqueras Jover, Ivan Lozano, Android team Pixel phones have earned a well-dese...

Google Online Security Blog

this latest edition of "Android team posting nothing but Ws for adopting Rust" is super important because it identifies that:

*you don't have to actually rewrite all your old unsafe C/C++ code to get the benefits of adopting safe languages, in terms of reducing vulnerabilites*

because they identify that most bugs are in new/changed code (with exponential decay!), so if you preferentially write new code in a safe language, your vulnerabilities crater even though most of your code is still unsafe!

https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Eliminating Memory Safety Vulnerabilities at the Source

Posted by Jeff Vander Stoep - Android team, and Alex Rebert - Security Foundations Memory safety vulnerabilities remain a pervasive threa...

Google Online Security Blog
The drop in Android's memory safety vulnerabilities is astonishing! It's counterintuitive, but prioritizing memory-safe languages in new code quickly reduces memory-safety risks. Once we turn off the tap of new vulnerabilities, they start decreasing exponentially.
https://infosec.exchange/@jeffvanderstoep/113199270632527576
jeffvanderstoep (@[email protected])

I’m super excited about this blogpost. The approach is so counterintuitive, and yet the results are so much better than anything else that we’ve tried for memory safety. We finally understand why. https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Infosec Exchange

I’m super excited about this blogpost. The approach is so counterintuitive, and yet the results are so much better than anything else that we’ve tried for memory safety. We finally understand why.

https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-safety-vulnerabilities-Android.html

Eliminating Memory Safety Vulnerabilities at the Source

Posted by Jeff Vander Stoep - Android team, and Alex Rebert - Security Foundations Memory safety vulnerabilities remain a pervasive threa...

Google Online Security Blog

Rust certainly isn't perfect for everything, but for low-level code, including firmware, I am not aware of any better languages at this time. You get all the control you need, and the biggest class of bugs and vulnerabilities is prevented at compile time.

Rewriting complex code bases from scratch is not a good idea for stability, and therefore the piece by piece conversation really seems like the best way forward if you have a lot of C/C++ legacy code (and no, there is no practical solution to make that code safer without changing to a memory safe language in the process, whichever one it may be).

This post by @lozano gives excellent practical advice on how to do that.

https://infosec.exchange/@lozano/113080200541762841

Ivan Lozano (@[email protected])

@dmnk and I wrote about how to incrementally adopt rust in existing firmware/bare-metal code bases. https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/deploying-rust-in-existing-firmware.html #rust #firmwaresecurity #embeddedsecurity #cybersecurity #infosec #memorysafety

Infosec Exchange

Hi everyone — especially browser security researchers! Today we’ve announced some pretty significant changes to the Chrome VRP reward structure and amounts. This was all built with the purpose of incentivizing deeper and ever more impactful research of Chromium security issues.

I wrote a little blog about it here: https://bughunters.google.com/blog/5302044291629056/chrome-vrp-reward-updates-to-incentivize-deeper-research

We wanted to acknowledge the challenges faced and skills required to find the more complex and impactful issues in Chrome, especially when it comes to demonstrating the full exploitability and impact.

We hope these changes are helpful inspiring to browser security researchers and signal our continued investment in working with you to make Chrome more secure for all users.

Blog: Chrome VRP Reward Updates to Incentivize Deeper Research

The Chrome VRP is increasing reward amounts and their structure to incentivize high-quality reporting and deeper research of Chrome vulnerabilities, see this post for details!

Deploying Rust in Existing Firmware Codebases

Posted by Ivan Lozano and Dominik Maier, Android Team Android's use of safe-by-design principles drives our adoption of memory-safe languag...

Google Online Security Blog
Deploying Rust in Existing Firmware Codebases

Posted by Ivan Lozano and Dominik Maier, Android Team Android's use of safe-by-design principles drives our adoption of memory-safe languag...

Google Online Security Blog

Navy SEALs have disproportionately been dying by suicide …

.. with a similar pattern: Each seemed healthy until their early 40s, when — abruptly — a host of severe mental health issues arose

One wife suspected brain damage, and had her husband’s brain quickly frozen

She unlocked it all

It’s a new form of brain damage

You can read about her story in this superb investigation by Dave Phillips in the New York Times;
gift link here: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/30/us/navy-seals-brain-damage-suicide.html?unlocked_article_code=1.3k0.DGwe.i3OzX90az7c6&smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&sgrp=c-cb

Pattern of Brain Damage Is Pervasive in Navy SEALs Who Died by Suicide

A military lab found distinctive damage from repeated blast exposure in every brain it tested, but Navy SEAL leaders were kept in the dark about the pattern.

The New York Times